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Abstract
Grounded in critical geopolitics and feminist political geography, this dissertation undertakes a
critical examination of Trinidad and Tobago’s (T&T) responses to the inflow of Venezuelans from
the “Maduro migrations” since 2015. This massive displacement was triggered by conditions of
economic, political and humanitarian crisis on the Venezuelan mainland. The dissertation’s central
argument is that T&T’s responses are strategic exercises in defence of its sovereignty, launched
through the conscious use of its island-geographies, with a view to rejecting external dictates in its
domestic affairs. The island’s responses are examined through three interrelated, but scalarly
disparate foci: regional and hemispheric geopolitical influences on domestic state decisions; the
(dis)connections between immigration policy, migrant reception and migrants’ lived experiences;
and shifts in the island’s functioning as a migration site. Reading the island nation from these three
key positions, the dissertation’s argument tethers island self-preservation practices, and metaphors
of control, containment and closure, that occur at all scales of the analysis.
In service of the central argument, this dissertation will demonstrate that the state’s politics
of response through its intermittent domestic action and contentious country-position, intended to
craft and control the precise discourse of Venezuelan migrants in the domestic and international
geo -political landscape. It will also expose the racialized, sexualized and violent readings of
Venezuelan migrants, compounded by the island’s ad hoc and fragmented migration infrastructure
geared to restrict and regulate migrant bodies. Further, it will reveal the work of the island’s
regulatory policies as a strategy to interfere, interrupt and ultimately contain migrant mobility. The
lessons from the historically rooted/routed Trinidad and Tobago’s response to the Maduro
migrations fortify the notion that the smallness of islands’ geographies 1) do not determine their
relevance in understandings of how sovereignty is variously launched in human mobility
containment efforts, and 2) do not prescribe their global impacts.
i

This dissertation contributes to migration, mobilities, sovereignty and political geography
literatures that acknowledge the centrality of island geographies. It adds to nuanced understandings
of islands’ geo-political involvement and heightened consciousness in shedding their “passive”
profiles, through the re-assertion of autonomy.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The ongoing politico-economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has caused a massive exodus
of its nationals. While most Venezuelans have migrated to mainland South American countries, a
significant number have also made their way to the neighbouring two-island nation of Trinidad
and Tobago (T&T). According to Human Rights Watch (2018), T&T has been the recipient of the
largest number of Venezuelan migrants in the southern Caribbean. The reception of these migrants
among the T&T population has been mixed. While there has been a show of compassion and
humanitarianism from some segments of society, there has also been a dangerous degree of antiimmigrant attitudes toward the Venezuelans. These responses come amidst the T&T government’s
silences and intermittent actions in the domestic context on the Venezuelan in-migration question,
and its “neutral” country- position on the crisis in Venezuela, in the face of hemispheric
developments, shifts and provocations.
The “Venezuelan crisis” is the consequence of a longer history of political and economic
mismanagement, whose foundations were laid during Venezuela’s former President Hugo
Chávez’s time in office (1999-2013). The global drop in oil prices in 2008, and then in 2014 under
Nicolás Maduro, precipitated the continual deterioration of Venezuela’s socio-economic
structures, making daily life perilous. This circumstance has triggered the intense out-migration of
the country’s nationals. I characterize this contemporary outflow of Venezuelans as the “Maduro
migrations” to underscore its distinctiveness of scale and urgency, engaged by all socio-economic
classes and segments of Venezuelan society under the Maduro Presidency. As of May 2020, the
number of Venezuelan migrants, refugees and asylum seekers stood at an estimated 5.1 million
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(Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela 1,
2020). T&T is estimated to have received numbers ranging from 40,000 to 60,000 people
(UNHCR, 2019; Vice News, 2019), equating to approximately 3-5% of the islands’ population.
Migrant stock data have been in contention. In May 2019, through its “Migrant Registration
Framework”, the T&T government claimed to have registered only 16,532 Venezuelans (Senate
Deb, 2019). This “framework” is a belated policy response since 2015 – when the in-migration
dynamic to T&T began gaining currency.
This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of Trinidad and Tobago’s responses to
the inflow of Venezuelans from the Maduro migrations. The inquiry engages three interrelated,
but scalarly disparate foci: the bearing of regional and hemispheric geopolitics on domestic state
decisions; the (dis)connections among immigration policy, migrant reception and migrants’ lived
experiences; and the shifts in the island’s functioning as a migration site. Reading the island nation
from these three key positions, this dissertation finds a robust thread of island self-preservation
practices, and autonomy and control metaphors occurring across scales.
My central argument is that Trinidad and Tobago consciously utilized the islands’
geographies to organize a containment project, with a view to maintaining its status quo and
offsetting external dictates, in defence of its sovereignty. In service of this argument, this
dissertation will demonstrate that the state’s politics of response through its intermittent domestic
action and contentious country-position, intended to craft and control the precise discourse of
Venezuelan migrants in the domestic and international geo -political landscape. It will also expose
the racialized, sexualized and violent readings of Venezuelan migrants, compounded by the
island’s ad hoc and fragmented migration infrastructure geared to restrict and regulate migrant
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This is a joint coordinating body of the United Nations constituted by the UNHCR and the IOM, formed at the
request of the UN Secretary General in 2018
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bodies. Further, it will reveal the work of the island’s regulatory policies as a strategy to interfere,
interrupt and ultimately contain migrant mobility. The lessons from the historically rooted/routed
Trinidad and Tobago’s response to the Maduro migrations fortify the notion that the smallness of
islands’ geographies 1) do not determine their relevance in understandings of how sovereignty is
variously launched in human mobility containment efforts, and 2) do not prescribe their global
impacts.
Trinidad and Tobago has a history of being party to inter-territorial squabbles because of
its vacillating position on migrants. Venezuelan migrants were subject to protracted state silences
and left on their own to navigate the island’s fragmented migration policies and procedures. The
local media spotlighted the challenges faced by Venezuelans to access essential services and the
asylum-seeking process, in addition to the unforgiving treatment meted out by many locals. Media
stories also began highlighting the vulnerabilities of these migrants, framed within sex and human
trafficking narratives, giving new life to the sexualized discourses surrounding Latin Americans
on the island. Venezuelan migrants in T&T encountered an entanglement of anti-immigrant
sentiment and a deficient im/migration infrastructure. All the while, the state remained
“strategically” quiet on the domestic situation, while its silence and limited activity spoke volumes
on the international circuit.
I draw on Caribbean literary scholar Kamau Brathwaite’s “tidalectics” or “tidal dialectics”
to characterize my view of the fluid but cyclical nature of the issues examined over the course of
this island migrations study. Brathwaite’s invocation of the “continual movement and rhythm of
the ocean” (DeLoughrey, 2007), its receding tides and swells, offers an apt framing of the periodic
resurgence of traditional power geometries, social ideologies and im/mobilities over time and
space. Such issues episodically emerge in global view, then abate, then re-emerge across
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geographies. The Venezuelan migration crisis presents a key resurgence and converging moment
of historically seated geopolitics and massive migration in the Western hemisphere, with global
implications.
The remainder of this chapter introduces the research context, establishes the dissertation’s
conceptual foundation, and details its methodology. I begin by introducing T&T’s historical
geography by outlining the island nation’s social, political and economic composition, setting the
foundation for conversations about migration on the island. I then engage in an important reflection
on the question, “why islands?” with the intent of re-marking and re-making space for the study
of islands in wider scholarship. Next, I detail the epistemological framework guiding my approach
to the study of the politics of islands’ responses and migration on islands. It is a framework
grounded at the intersection of political and feminist geography approaches in a way that enables
the interrogation of Venezuelan in-migration to T&T. The chapter then details the methodological
tools utilized in this qualitative study. I conclude with a summary outline of the remaining
dissertation chapters.

1.1. Research Context: Trinidad and Tobago
This study is contextually situated in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T). As its name
suggests, the island nation is composed of two islands – Trinidad being the larger island, with its
300 km² sister isle, Tobago. T&T is the southernmost territory of the Caribbean archipelago and
sits just north east of mainland Venezuela. Fostered on the colonial plantation model, both islands
shifted across the hands of several European powers: Trinidad, initially under the control of the
Spanish (and settled by many French colonists) was ceded to the British in 1802; and Tobago
changed hands from the British, French, Dutch, and Courlanders, and back to the British in 1814
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(see Williams, 2010). These shifts eventually culminated in “Trinidad and Tobago” as a merged
British crown colony in 1889 (MacDonald, 1986; Carmichael, 1961). T&T achieved independence
from the British in 1962 and was proclaimed a Republic in 1976. Both the islands of Trinidad and
Tobago are starkly dissimilar. Considerably smaller in size, Tobago is known for its coral reefs,
pristine blue waters and white sandy beaches. It is ideal for leisure activities and an immersive
experience with nature (Auty & Gelb, 1986). Modern Trinidad grew out of a largescale oil and
natural gas industry (and related industrial processing products) (Rajnauth & Boodoo, 2013). This
energy landscape has made significant contributions to the strength of the T&T economy—making
it one of the strongest economies in the region. The island-nation is therefore highly urbanized and
has a relatively high GDP within the Caribbean. The estimated population of T&T is 1.36 million
people (Central Statistical Office of Trinidad & Tobago, 2019) and comprises two main ethnic
groups: persons of African descent (Afro-Trinidadians) and persons of East Indian descent (IndoTrinidadians). These two groups compose about four-fifths of the country’s total population. The
remaining people are of Syrian- Lebanese, European and Chinese heritage. The island also has a
growing mixed-race population. As a consequence of its colonial past, English is the official
language of the country. Colonial experiences and their vestiges have significantly fashioned the
social, political and economic structures, compositions and hierarchies in modern-day T&T.
T&T’s post-independence political system functions within the framework of a unitary
state, with a parliamentary system modelled after that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, that is, the Westminster model. The British monarch was replaced by a President
as head of state, under the 1976 republican constitution. The country is a Commonwealth member
and has retained the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London as its highest court of
appeal. Historically, party politics have run along racial lines; the two major parties are the
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People’s National Movement (PNM), largely supported by Afro-Trinidadians, and the United
National Congress (UNC) and its previous iterations, widely supported by the Indo-Trinidadian
population. The issue of race is fraught in T&T; however, it is scarcely frontally addressed, and its
tensions are usually made visible during national elections seasons. Analyses of T&T’s voting
record evidence a pattern of tribal voting steeped in, what Daurius Figueira (2010) calls, a
“discourse of racist hegemony”, primarily used to mobilize voter support for elections.
At independence in 1962, the novelty and challenges of self-governance revealed itself in
the newly formed government’s handling of the country’s economy. Dr. Eric Williams, the PNM’s
political leader and T&T’s first Prime Minister, engaged in an “industrialization by invitation”
scheme to grow the country’s economy—this was a Puerto Rican model that encouraged outside
investors to participate in national development (Bissessar & Haqq, 2001). The arrangement placed
the country’s oil industry in the hands of foreigners, characterizing government’s limited direct
engagement with national development, and little economic gain redounding to the citizenry. The
economic situation in T&T was, in essence, a reproduction of the extractive machinery of the
colonial era, this time with new players – large foreign corporations. The economic situation led
to the violent “Black Power Movement” riots of the 1970s and triggered a shift in policy.
Government’s new approach aligned itself with increases in oil prices and advanced oil and gas
exploration initiatives, resulting in the creation of state enterprises and public utilities. In the
1980’s however, oil prices declined and revealed the unsustainability of the policy approach,
especially in the recession-like circumstances. The drop-in oil revenue encouraged further foreign
investments, and rising state debt burdens. This caused the request for financial assistance from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who, through their arduous Structural
Adjustment Programme, significantly impacted the country (Barclay, 2004). So onerous was this
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loan repayment that some measures included a “10% reduction in salary of public servants, the
introduction of a voluntary early retirement scheme and a suspension of merit increases and other
allowances” (Melville, 2002, p. 6). As oil prices eventually increased however, this solidified
T&T’s position in the Caribbean as a strong economy, but also showcased the government’s
continued reliance on the energy sector, with seemingly limited interests in broader economic
diversification.
The noted shifts and changes in the economy, paralleling with the billowing oil prices,
impacted the migration patterns to and from the island. For example, in the 1980’s recession-like
circumstances, many T&T nationals emigrated, especially healthcare professionals. Within the
Caribbean however, energy-rich T&T, occupied the position of a desirable and resilient economy.
Along with its locational geography, this shaped the nation’s central placement in the region’s
inter, intra and extra regional migration configurations.
This research is focused exclusively on the island of Trinidad. While there is some
Venezuelan migration to Tobago, it is significantly less than what is occurring on the larger island.
This is primarily because of the closer geographic proximity of Trinidad to the Venezuelan
mainland, in addition to the directness of travel (by plane or boat). Throughout the dissertation,
reference is made to Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) as a singular entity, however, for the purposes
of this research, it is understood to refer solely to the island of Trinidad, unless otherwise noted.

1.1.1. The “Maduro Migrations”
With an amplification in the momentum of migration outflows in 2015, between 2016 and
November 2019, more than 4.6 million persons left Venezuela; from a population of 30.08 million
in 2015 (World Bank, 2019). These numbers do not include undocumented migrants or citizens
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with dual European, Colombian, or Ecuadorian nationality. There has also been a marked increase
in the number of Venezuelan asylum seekers and refugees, and child migrants in other countries.
I have suggested the characterization of this contemporary outflow of Venezuelans as the “Maduro
migrations”, as it falls primarily under the watch of the Maduro regime. The Venezuelan crisis has
evolved into a severe humanitarian challenge that cuts across the demographic of the Venezuelan
population leaving the country en masse. These “Maduro migrations” are distinctive, given the
intensification in scale and the urgency with which the out-migration is happening. Venezuelans
exiting the country are not solely anti-Chávistas2, rather they represent all socio-economic
segments and classes of society, significantly impacted by the current situation. Unlike the Chávez
era, out-migration is not only framed by political opposition and class conflicts, but for the
Venezuelan people across all classes of society, it is a fundamental matter of survival.
Categorizing the Maduro migrations invokes governance politics of the flow of persons –
it is an issue of designating or “placing the migrant”. Thomaz (2018) reminds us that classification
of migrants is no trivial matter and that each migrant category assumes certain subjectivities.
Categorizations have direct implications on migrants’ rights and regulation of their boundaries.
The political capacity of migrant classifications also reasserts and reproduces states’ sovereignty
over the means of movement. Should these Venezuelans migrants be considered “refugees”?
Legally, it is incontrovertible that most fleeing Venezuelans fit the 1984 Cartagena Declaration
definition of a refugee; they are clearly escaping “massive violations of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order”. The 1951 UN Convention is more
restricted in its prescription. Receiving territories are hard-pressed to categorize Venezuelans on
the move as refugees, because of a myriad of context-specific reasons; for example, backlogs in

2

Venezuelans who were opposed to President Chávez and his left-wing political ideology, Chavismo.
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existing asylum systems, limited resources and supports, the perceived notion of external actors
and threats to sovereignty.
However, defining migrant categories is much more complex than definitional
prescriptions. For example, migrants may legally enter a country, but “become illegal” by
remaining after their initial designations expire. Or, migrants making entry into territories through
unauthorised means may quickly regularize their situations by obtaining protected status. There
exists considerable porosity between the categories. Alexander Betts (2013, 2019) characterizes
these human flows as “survival migration”. He draws parallels between Zimbabweans in the early
2000s and the Maduro migrations – people fleeing the economic consequences of the underlying
political situations, rather than political persecution per se. Betts promotes a compelling argument
as to why Venezuelans from the Maduro migrations should be considered refugees. He
underscores the developmental approach to migration governance, and the potential for host
countries to benefit from these supports.
The Maduro migrations to T&T have prompted fraught debates and critical reflections on
refugee protection and immigrant classification on the island. While T&T is signatory to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, there are no domestic laws to operationalize its
provisions and protections. T&T is the second largest refugee-receiving country in the Caribbean
(after Belize), with the number of asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR having increased
exponentially since 2014 (Living Water Community, 2016). Although Venezuelans’ migration
motivations to T&T are varied – for economic reasons or escape from political persecution, the
Venezuelan inflow generally, has re-energized refugee conversations on the island. Given the
restrictive nature of T&T’s domestic immigration laws, some Venezuelans, in spite of their
migration motivations, have utilized the asylum-seeking infrastructure as a strategic way to remain
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in the country, protected by the principle of non-refoulement. Despite the enhanced spotlight on
the island’s refugee situation, little state effort has been demonstrated to advance domestic refugee
law. Venezuelans who apply for refugee status are engaged by the UNHCR and its representative
independently – however, their presence must be registered with local immigration authorities.
The T&T government has instead sought to classify Venezuelans as “economic migrants” under
its belated registration scheme. The nuances and complexities of “placing the migrant” (Silvey and
Lawson, 1999) will be examined in Chapter Three.

1.2. Why Islands?
“Why study islands?” I have been confronted with this question several times over the course of
this project’s life. Interestingly, the askers have all been academics at conferences or workshops.
Following from social science tradition, I have been prompted to “legitimize by comparison”; a
provocation to rationalize why the study of migration on small islands is valuable, relative to
migration in a poor, rural town in a mainland country (this, an actual characterization presented to
me). My instinctual rejoinder, only vocalized in my mind however, asks, “why not the study of
islands?” The initial question has given me pause to reflect on two things: 1) the uncritical reproduction of island contexts across geographies, and 2) the status of island studies in wider
scholarly discourse. Although I focus on these issues in some detail in chapter five, here I offer
that islands’ ubiquity as formative and critical components in world-systems’ architecture, has
rendered them banal in the wider imaginary. As important constituents of colonial experiences,
and as part of the global systems of mobility – financial, technological, carceral, migratory, etc. –
the interconnections and interconnectedness of islands are understood. In these terms, islands can
be read as any other context or territory. Islands’ physical geographies however, are quite
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distinctive and cannot be ignored. I have observed the dilution of islands’ materialities being
promoted by sometimes productive, but often over-stretched metaphors in an academic program
that emphasizes replicability. While relationality and connectivity are enhanced and lived through
new technologies, as evidenced by islands’ integral role in mobility infrastructure, islands’
physical thresholds remain exact. The ways in which islanders respond to global events in such
concentrated spaces, and already limited capacities, will be different from other contexts.
Therefore, islands’ geographies are inimitable and distinct, warranting focused academic
interrogation.
Islands’ idiosyncrasies are discerned through their responses. Bolstering the
interconnectedness of islands to the global, Baldacchino (2004) acknowledges that the “locality
has come within global reach” (p. 280) and islands are faced with significant threats. In the
contemporary setting, islands have been in conversation with climate change and Anthropocene
discourses (see for example work by Scobie, 2019; and Chandler & Pugh, 2020), and primarily
because the tangible impacts of the climate emergency are experienced on islands first (Thompson,
2008; Walshe & Stancioff, 2018). The impacts of migration on islands, climate-induced or
otherwise, are significant and visibly amplified, not just because of islands’ small geographies, but
because of the disproportionate country responses to these dynamics. Scholars refer to the
“limitations” (Nakid & Welch, 2017) of small islands to manage different human flows given their
“limited resources and weak or otherwise resource-poor state structures” (Fernández-Alfaro &
Pascua, 2006). This is compounded by the treacherous im/mobilities that a piece of land
completely surrounded by water presents to mobile bodies. Of equal significance, is the propensity
of out-migration from islands, and the impacts on the islands themselves. The socio-economic
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consequences on the island of its citizens leaving are instructive, especially in terms of the braindrain effect on the island’s population and the economy’s dependence on migrant remittances.
Directly invoking the “island exceptionalism” debate – are islands unique spaces, or should
they be viewed as any other territorial entity – the “why islands?” question compels a reacknowledgement of the distinctiveness of islands’ physical geographies and their attendant
capacities of response. Importantly as well, this question underscores how conceptually
paradoxical island spaces remain in academe.

1.3. At the Intersection of Critical & Feminist Geopolitics
To interrogate the island’s response to Venezuelan in-migration, this project engages scholarship
in political geography. The project’s focus on Trinidad and Tobago unearths the embeddedness of
state decision-making within the wider geopolitical landscape beyond its borders. It also yields
nuanced understandings of migrant reception by locals at the backdrop of the unique socio-cultural
histories of the island. This project moves across scales, a conscious divergence from the statecentric framings of some international relations theories or traditional geopolitics. Through a more
relational engagement, this project contributes to the ongoing disruption of the imagined rigidity
of top-down politics and power, and re-situates the migrant as central to migration discourse, while
acknowledging space as an important mediator in these relationships.
This project is epistemologically anchored at the intersection of critical and feminist
geopolitics. Born as a subdiscipline of political geography, critical geopolitics offers a deconstructivist understanding of politics, power and space, rejecting classical geopolitics’
territorially bounded and state-centered hierarchies. Dalby (1994) defines critical geopolitics as
“the critical and poststructuralist intellectual practices of unraveling and deconstructing
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geographical and related disguises, dissimulations, and rationalisations of power” (p. 595).
Practitioners of critical geopolitics therefore, approach political power as a perpetual negotiation
for spatial control and focus on the role of discourse in building power (Dalby, 1991; ÓTuathail,
1996; Dodds, 2001). The conceptual work of critical geopolitics questions the production of
knowledge, more specifically, it probes the intellectuals or agents behind knowledge production
that guide state policies and relations. This allows for states’ dominant discourses, policies and
rhetoric to be anatomized. Not without critique, Thrift (2000) argues that this approach to
geopolitical analysis leaves out “the little things” such as everyday texts and embodied practices,
ignoring traditional doings. Dalby (2010) however, reminds readers that critical geopolitics
endeavours “to encourage political and methodological pluralism to open up new ways of thinking
about the geo in politics and the politics of geography” (p. 281).
Feminist geopolitics underscores and challenges the absence of the materialities of
everyday life (Sharp, 2000; Hyndman, 2001, 2004; Smith, 2001; Gilmartin & Kofman, 2004) in
classic geopolitical analyses. These approaches deliberately emphasize topologies of power that
connect multiple scales previously ignored, such as the body, the household, the locality, and the
supranational organization (Marston, 2000; Marston & Smith, 2001). This follows Jennifer
Hyndman’s (2004) instructive work calling for a re-definition of scales that are “finer and coarser
than that of the nation-state and global economy” (p. 315). By recalibrating scales into political
analysis, feminist geographers have, in essence, destabilized traditional readings of “the state”
(Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Brown & Staeheli, 2003; England, 2003; Desbiens, Mountz & WaltonRoberts, 2004; Hyndman, 2004) and importantly, re-politicized previously disregarded spaces.
Feminist geopolitical scholars contest the idea of the “Political” as politics that lives only in formal
spheres (Kofman & Peake, 1990) and instead emphasize the “political” as political engagement
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attached to the intimate sites of daily life. In practice therefore, feminist geopolitics focuses on a
multiplicity of scalar interventions, to account for the re-production of the global in routine practice
(Brown & Staeheli, 2003), and in the local (Dalby, 1994; Cope, 2002). This approach has
facilitated the study of ways in which state policies are given form and operationalized in migrants’
everyday lived experiences and realities.
The “global intimate” (Pratt & Rosner 2006, 2012) focuses the conceptual specificity of
this overarching framework. This conceptual lens allows for the navigation of geopolitical
complexities through the collapsing of scales. It emphasizes connections between daily life and
events that unfold at the global scale, and vice versa. It also allows for the thinking through of
geopolitics beyond bounded spaces or categories. The intimate then, is not simply relegated to the
personal or private, but should be viewed as attached or entangled with macro-scale processes,
actions and spaces. There is a co-constitution here that launches readings of the intimate as being
infused with worldliness, and the global, drawing meaning from the intimate.
This project is grounded in both of these subdisciplines. Critical geopolitics guides my
scrutinization of the broader sets of power relations in which the island’s state responses are
embedded. It facilitates a critical deconstruction of the overarching and controlled discourse of
Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago – a powerful scripting of the preservation of island
sovereignty. Feminist geopolitical scholarship engenders my analytical approach to restrictive
immigration policies and limiting actions of both state and locals as gendered and racialized toward
migrants. The global intimate presents a useful lens to engage this kind of conceptual synthesis
that attends to the ethos of political geography, endeavouring to unearth the power relations
inherent in responses and relationships. The ways in which the tenets of this overarching
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framework have informed the contextual and issue-specific frameworks of this dissertation, will
be detailed in the proceeding chapters.

1.4. Methodological Approach
In this section, I outline the methodological framework and devices engaged in the collection and
analysis of data in this research project. Crafted in service of a critical interrogation of Trinidad
and Tobago’s response to the Maduro migrations, this framework is informed by an ethnographic
and feminist approach to method. Its structure and make-up allows for a fluid approach to research,
shifting from the traditional “theory-methodology-methods” style, and enabling work across
conventionally fixed categories – fieldwork, data analysis and writing. This, with a view to
bringing focus to previously neglected spaces, scales and subjects. “Periscoping” as method
(Hiemstra, 2017) is an apt characterization of this approach. The periscope is an apparatus that
houses a careful arrangement of mirrors and prisms that allows for things to be seen that are
otherwise out of sight. As a feminist geographic method, periscoping is an inherently political
strategy that facilitates the circumvention of obstructionist barriers that would alternatively
preclude investigation of a particular topic (Hiemstra, 2017). This method is productive in
centering people’s daily lived experiences that were previously marginalized in traditional
iterations of geopolitics and political geography (Desbiens, Mountz & Walton-Roberts, 2004).
Periscoping identifies and lays bare the silences in discourses, disrupting the intentioned and
streamlined “truth” articulated by power and political structures. The periscoping approach runs
counter to the blanket acceptance of perceived silences and constrained vision, in efforts to
diminish the researcher’s complicity in furthering these limitations.
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By adopting this more flexible but critical approach towards the research, I moved back
and forth between theory, fieldwork and data analysis to examine the project’s constituent parts.
The project endeavoured to a) deconstruct overarching state discourse, b) analyse the lived realities
of Venezuelan migrants on the island, and c) explore the impacts of the multiple mobilities and
movements across the island. Specifically, there were five objectives, derived from primary
research questions that guided the research:
1. To what extent does Venezuela – Trinidad and Tobago geopolitical relations, and regional
and hemispheric geopolitics, play a role in the state’s response to the Venezuelan inmigration episode?
a. To explore geopolitical tensions by identifying how the Trinidad and Tobago state
navigates and potentially balances domestic circumstances versus its regional and
hemispheric expectations on the same matters.
2. What are the experiences of Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago?
a. To determine the challenges faced by Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad in terms of
immigrant reception and daily living.
b. To identify the migratory intentions and/or trajectories of the migrants.
3. In what ways are state infrastructures being operationalized to address the influx of
Venezuelan migrants? How effective has this been?
a. To review the gaps and areas in need of improvement in existing legislative
frameworks and other state sponsored measures, identifying the disconnections
between policy and procedures and lived migrant realities.
b. To identify obstacles to migrant mobilities, in addition to strategies to structured
migration management on islands.

16

Engaging in an analysis of the linkages among these three analytical scales and through
these objectives, allowed for the comprehensive scrutiny the island’s responses.

1.4.1. Research Design
An effective research design is one where all the components work harmoniously together and
promote efficient and successful functioning of the larger project (Maxwell, 2005). Several data
collection methods were engaged to add depth and breadth in the exploration of the varied
dynamics and layers of the island’s responses to the Maduro migrations. Research activities
commenced in 2017, when I began collecting and reviewing media stories online, analyzing them
for information regarding Venezuelan migratory movements to the Caribbean. In December 2017
to January 2018, alongside a visit home to Trinidad, I used the opportunity to formalize
connections with immigration organizations at the frontline of the Venezuelan in-migration
situation, and with potential interview contacts – solidifying network connections ahead of the
bulk of fieldwork, which took place across 5 months from April to September 2018. During the
latter visit, I continued with document and media review and conducted interviews. In addition, I
captured observations and (re)presentations through detailed fieldnotes. All of these strategies,
moments, places and engagements were essential in generating the range of mirrors and prisms for
the periscoping approach to qualitative analysis. Finally, data analysis took place upon my return
from Trinidad, in the 4 months that followed.
The initial design of this research exercise targeted the engagement of two groups of
persons: the Venezuelan migrant community in T&T, and key stakeholders in the immigration
landscape on the island. While interviews with Venezuelan migrants were somewhat easier to
access, contact with most key stakeholders including the Venezuelan embassy and government
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representatives were quite challenging. I was however able to form a productive working
relationship with the Living Water Community (LWC) – Ministry for Migrants and Refugees. The
LWC is a regional Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and “Lay Ecclesial Community”
under the patronage of the Catholic church. The NGO was established in 1975 and is headquartered
in Trinidad and Tobago. The LWC operates as a central institution to migrants seeking asylum, as
it serves as the implementing partner for the UNHCR in T&T. In addition to this, the LWC
provides social services and legal advice to migrants in need. Not surprisingly, since 2015, its
largest constituency has been Venezuelan migrants. While there are other NGO’s and Civil Society
Organizations providing social supports and assistance, no other institution on the island provides
legal and asylum assistance to migrants.

1.4.2. “In the Field”
When and where does “fieldwork” begin, and when and where does it end? Rather than thinking
about the field as a far away place in romanticized and exoticized terms, I follow in feminist
geographers’ (see for example Kobayashi, 1994; Nast, 1994) understandings of the field and
fieldwork as being the processual linkages and engagements with the academy’s construction of
knowledge and other ways of knowing. Therefore, the “academy” can be read as part of the “field”
in which research is done. Heidi Nast’s (1994) instructive observation that “the “field” is not
naturalized in terms of “a place” or “a people”; rather it is “located and defined in terms of specific
political objectives that (as such) cut across time and place” (p. 57) characterizes fieldwork as an
inherently political project, not necessarily relegated to the finding of objective newness about a
specific object or subject of study. I launch fieldwork therefore, as a political project that seeks to
expose hegemonic social and spatial relations, and articulate possibilities for their subversion.
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Here, unmasking the systemic deficiencies in immigration infrastructure and policy, will disrupt
extant inequalities and hierarchies of difference toward ensuring that migrants, asylum-seekers and
refugees have a safe and dignified stay in T&T.
My own positionality as a Trinidadian male, immigrant student in Canada, afforded me
differential degrees of access during this project. In the field, I was able to harness my “insider
status” to secure potential interviews with Venezuelan migrants. My initial worry was about
Venezuelans’ willingness to share their stories, because of the fact that I am a Trinidadian male.
This was however quickly dispelled. There was no occasion where a Venezuelan refused to speak
with me. I think however that this willingness was boosted because of my positionality as a PhD
student based in Canada — with participants having the idea that I had the capacity to share their
stories and struggles to a larger audience. My positionality also worked productively to garner a
sense of what the local population was feeling “on the ground” in relation to the Venezuelan inmigration. These interactions and conversations littered my everyday experiences in spaces I
patronized such as the village bar or the supermarket. Many informal conversations like these have
served to inform themes that have framed this dissertation.
Embarking on this project as an immigrant myself, brought a heightened consciousness of
the needs of people who move to different places for the betterment of their lives. Of course, I
accept my privileges, and I appreciate that my situation is no where near those that Venezuelans
face in the current circumstance. However, the very acknowledgement of the struggles, anxieties
and traumas that immigrants face, fueled my resolve to craft a project that engenders trajectories
for migrant social and mobility justice.
Throughout this dissertation, reference is made to my position as researcher, in the first
person, speaking directly from my point of view. The first-person reference is utilized
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intentionally, to reflect my reflexive positionality and familiarity with the study context and subject
matter, framing the discursive processes of this project.

1.4.3. Interviews
Interviews are not interrogations; rather they are dialogues (Valentine, 1997). Researchers conduct
interviews to fill gaps in knowledge left by other methods, examine the complexities inherent to
behaviour, gain access to a range of perspectives and experiences, and as a method that potentially
empowers and honours participants (Bloom, 1998; Dunn, 2000). This medium enables the
researcher to understand individual people’s experiences and their lives in their own words and in
relation to their own personal experiences (Kitchin & Tate, 2000). I engaged participants in semistructured interviews rather than in intensive, fixed and rigid form, since I wanted these
“conversations” to be as fluid and open as possible, allowing the participant to not feel restricted
and enabling their personal narratives to come across clearly. Further, they “…allow[ed] for an
open response in the participants’ own words rather than a ‘yes or no’ type answer” (Longhurst,
2003, p. 119).
I conducted 31 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Venezuelans who emigrated to
T&T between 2015-2018; 13 males and 18 females. The length of time participants had been in
Trinidad and Tobago varied. However, most persons resided on the island for more than one year,
with 2 participants indicating that they emigrated less than 7 months, and one person stating that
he visited the island regularly but had only consistently been on the island for “about 3 months”,
at the time of the interview. Participants’ employment backgrounds also varied tremendously, from
former parliamentary workers, to fishermen in Venezuela. A table detailing basic demographic
information of participants is presented in Appendix A. The noted information includes
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participants’ age, gender and length of time they have been present in T&T. There are no personal
identifiers. Each participant has been assigned a pseudonym.
I made contact with potential interviewees through the Living Water Community in the
first instance, and later through colleagues and informal communication. These links evolved into
the “snowball” method of establishing interview connections. Invitations through the Living Water
Community and colleagues were made via a recruitment flyer articulated in both Spanish and
English.
In an attempt to eliminate potential biases, I attempted to engage the interview process in
a systematic way – from recruitment to post-interview. A majority of my participants were
recruited through the Living Water Community. My recruitment flyer stated clearly my affiliation
and the objective of the exercise. At the interviews, I ensured that participants were provided with
informed consent forms reiterating the information in the initial flyer (see Appendix B). At the
start of the interview, participants were again verbally apprised of my detached role from the LWC,
through the interpreter. Therefore, I was not perceived to be part of the LWC.
All 31 formal and in-depth interviews were conducted during the months of April to
September 2018. They took place primarily at the Living Water Community headquarters, and in
other instances, at an agreed upon location by the participant; some interviews were conducted on
the campus of the University of the West Indies or at a public library, and on one occasion, at the
participant’s home. The interviews were done in both English and Spanish. Although I have a
working proficiency in basic conversational Spanish, I was fortunate to be provided with a
translator through the Living Water Community. For interviews conducted outside of the LWC, a
colleague who is a fluent Spanish speaker and based at the University of the West Indies, attended
the interviews with me to facilitate proper interpretation. With participants’ permission, I digitally
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recorded the interviews and simultaneously made detailed notes. The length of the interviews
varied with each participant, from 50 to 90 minutes. On some occasions, interviewees had much
to say about one aspect of the topic and I would consequently modify the line of questioning, in
an effort to elicit as much information as I could from the interview and respond to their desire to
extend conversation about certain topics.
After each interview, in an informal de-briefing session, I inquired with the interpreters, if
there were any key observations or noted moments that were represented in the language or the
way participants framed responses, for example, through colloquial expressions or changes in tone.
Temple and Edwards (2002) assert that excluding interpreters from these reflection and reflexivity
processes is unproductive. The interpreter, simply by being another body in the interview space,
creates or dissipates tension during the interview process, and therefore plays a critical role that
goes beyond their technical capacity. Noting the interpreters’ comments, I later transcribed these
recorded interviews, to provide an additional source for analysis and to ensure rigour (Emerson,
Fretz & Shaw, 1995; Baxter & Eyles, 1997; Winchester, 2000).
These semi-structured interviews were composed of a number of basic but key questions
which prompted participants to offer their personal narratives. These questions set the trajectory
of the interview, to which other questions were added as the interaction organically unfolded (see
Appendix C for the question guide). The questions allowed for participants’ explorations and indepth reflections on their personal experiences and circumstances, in addition to contemplations
on the wider sociopolitical environment in both T&T and in Venezuela.
Not uncommon in fieldwork exercises, research plans are modified because of unexpected
challenges. The second cohort of intended interviewees was official state representatives,
specifically from the Ministry of National Security and the Immigration Division, and the Ministry
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of Foreign and CARICOM3 Affairs (key stakeholders in this context), in an effort to discern
government’s appreciation of, and position on the Venezuelan in-migration situation. All attempts
to make contact were unsuccessful. This, after contact attempts through emails, follow-up request
letters, and in a final effort, an in-person visit to the offices for a chance encounter with officials
failed. These were not moments of state prevarication—absolutely no acknowledgement was given
to my requests. In this instance, officialdom was making itself invisible to the research process.
By “periscoping” however, I was able to surmount this barrier by weaving and articulating the
state’s positions through the careful arrangement and examination of government’s official
publications, interviews and commentaries.

1.4.4. Document and Media Review
Of parallel importance to a comprehensive review of literature when framing a migration research
project, is a document review: that is, a purposeful and careful reading of policy papers and
legislation in the mapping of states’ positions on specific issues. An identification of timelines and
timeframes when decisions were made can give an indication of the larger (domestic, regional and
hemispheric geopolitical) circumstances in which positions are articulated. In addition, media
images and articles can be useful in supplementing and broadening understandings of the political,
cultural, and economic milieu in which decisions are situated. Through this method, the researcher
is able to deconstruct and analyze the discourses embedded in the texts under study (Forbes, 2000).
At the very beginning of data collection, I engaged in an ongoing exercise of identifying and

3

CARICOM or Caribbean Community & Common Market was in established in 1973 by the Treaty of
Chaguaramas. It is a regional organization composed of 15 full members: Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, Bahamas,
Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Belize, Saint Lucia, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Grenada, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago; Montserrat and 5 associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands. CARICOM operates within 4 integrative pillars:
economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development and security.
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summarizing pieces that I interpreted as pertinent, in order to make connections with other methods
in the field, and to later return to those pieces during data analysis.
I engaged in a review of Trinidad and Tobago’s legislative and policy frameworks specific
to immigration: The Immigration Act Chapter 18:01 of 1969, the Immigration (Caribbean
Community Skilled Nationals) Act 1996, Draft National Policy to Address Refugee and Asylum
Matters in Trinidad and Tobago of 2014, and later, the Migrant Registration Framework. This was
undertaken to examine the legal and procedural contours of migration matters, to understand how
the island treated these matters through the lens of policy, and to identify the parameters of the
island’s laws to which immigrants are subjected. I also engaged in a review of the Trinidad and
Tobago’s Parliament Hansard dating back to 1990, via the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament’s
website (www.ttparliament.org) – as far back as the digitized archives allowed – to gain an
appreciation of the relationship between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, and to get a sense
of how Venezuela was situated in the T&T and wider Caribbean discourse. This was an ongoing
exercise until the time of writing.
On an almost daily basis, I reviewed three daily newspapers: the Trinidad Express
newspapers, the Trinidad & Tobago Guardian newspapers and the Trinidad & Tobago Newsday
newspapers – all available online. I scanned media coverage for stories that highlighted the
unfolding of events in Venezuela, and I followed closely the exodus the Venezuelans, and the
region’s responses to this migration. Importantly as well, I followed media stories for any
developments in the domestic context. I created a search engine alert to filter any media stories
and articles to my email, with the key words “Venezuelan migration”, “Venezuela refugee”,
“Venezuela crisis”, “Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago immigration”, “CARICOM and
Venezuela”. Through these reviews, I deepened my knowledge of migration-related events,
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debates, and responses, occurring at multiple scales and spaces. Media stories also brought focus
to the many ways in which Venezuelan migration permeates daily life in T&T and underscored
the ways in which various stakeholders were constructing the image of the state. Additionally,
newspaper reviews helped me to keep up to date with happenings in the country and the region
while off-site. Further, to facilitate the easy retrieval of stories that I found relevant, I utilized my
twitter account, @ShivaSMohan, as a of repository of sorts. Unintentionally, this attracted
commentary from external observers and provided me with additional resources through digital
networking, for example, with Professors based in Venezuela and other researchers working on
parallel issues in the Caribbean.

1.4.5. Analyzing Data
This research focuses largely on discourses and texts. Texts, within this academic context, are not
only written material, but, can represent interviews, landscapes, communicative media-verbal
interactions, media and artistic images, music, abstract symbolic icons, in addition to other modes
of cultural production (Barnes & Duncan, 1992; Johnston et al., 2000; Mains, 2000). Drawing
from Foucault’s (1984) philosophy, the social and signifying practices from or with(in) texts,
coalesce in particular combinations to formulate an understanding of the world and make practices
meaningful can be characterized as discourse. “[D]iscourse [therefore,] is much more than
language as such: it is constitutive of the social world that is a focus of interest or concern”
(Bryman, 2004, p. 370). The embedded texts within government documents, interview narratives
and media discourses facilitate the context for exploration of the internal and external power
relations and tensions across scales. I reviewed the selected documents and media with the
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understanding that “there are multiple layers of meaning that can be derived from a text” (Forbes,
2000, p. 127).
Data analysis was based on dual methods of content and discourse analyses. In the first
instance, through content analysis, I engaged in a systematic review and manual coding of the data
into patterns and themes, based on the frequency of appearance in the transcripts. In concert with,
and following from the literature reviews, this provided thematic framings of my discussions in
this dissertation. The data was then analysed through a rigid round of analyses through discourse
analysis. Discourse analysis allowed for the critical deconstruction the text with the intentional
search for silencers, power structures and the underlying meaning of the text. Fairclough (1993)
views discourse analysis as a critical process that:
…systematically explore[s] often opaque relationships of causality and
determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider
social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such
practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of
power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these
relationships between discourse and society itself a factor securing power and
hegemony (p. 138).
Specifically, in the analysis, I routinely asked questions such as: “who wrote the text?”,
“who commissioned the text?”, “who owns the text?”, “why was the text written?”, “what
positionalities/values/political beliefs does the text reveal?”, “who is the reading audience?”,
“silences—what is not being said?”, among other analytical probes.

26

Fieldwork and analysis on this project continue as I write these words. Coutin (2005) notes
“[t]he moment of writing…becomes part of the moment of fieldwork” (p. 202). It is a reminder
that there is hardly ever a precise and neat end to fieldwork.

1.5. Dissertation Outline
The project’s overarching argument is broken down into its constituent parts across this
dissertation’s six chapters. In this chapter I have presented the conceptual, methodological and
analytical infrastructures operationalised by this research endeavour. This qualitative research
project sought to interrogate Trinidad and Tobago’s responses to the Maduro migrations and is
conceptually framed by a careful and productive fusion of critical and feminist geopolitics. Guided
by ethnographic and feminist ontologies, the project utilized the periscoping approach: a
methodology conscious of directing focus to previously discounted, spaces, scales, and objects of
study, with a view to questioning the silences inherent in real and imagined power structures. The
layout of this dissertation is carefully arranged to assemble a coherent narrative. Each chapter
works in support of the overarching argument in particular ways. Chapter Two provides context;
Chapter Three focuses on the geopolitics of state response; Chapter Four explores the lived
realities of Venezuelan migrants on the island; Chapter Five focuses on the island itself as a
migration site; and Chapter Six is the concluding chapter and presents the research’s empirical and
conceptual contributions to the field. The differential focus of each chapter, in particular, Chapters
Three, Four and Five, engages conceptual frameworks relative to the specific scale and issue under
study.
Chapter Two provides the contextual overview of the dissertation. To inform
understandings and readings of the Caribbean in the contemporary setting, I engage in a historical-
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geographical mapping of the region. Here, I identify the prevailing migration and mobility flows
into, through and out of the region. I highlight the shifting geometries of power over time, by
tracing intra- and inter-territorial relations amongst the region’s key players. Then, I focus
specifically on the objects, subjects and relationships under study in this project. I first explore the
contours of the crisis in Venezuela and its unfolding outcomes – I present my conceptualization of
the exodus of Venezuelan nationals as the “Maduro migrations”. I then link Venezuela to the
Trinidad and Tobago context through a discussion of antecedent connections. Subsequently, I
explore Trinidad and Tobago’s locational geography and situatedness in the regional and
hemispheric geopolitical landscapes. This chapter introduces the key elements of the study and
sets the stage for proceeding analytical inquiry.
Chapter Three engages in a meticulous mapping of Trinidad and Tobago’s governmental
response to the Venezuelan in-migration flow between 2015-2019. I trace the outward and
domestic posturing, strategic silences and intermittent action of the government amidst intense
geopolitical pressures and internal agitations. Through a framework that synthesizes political and
feminist geography, I detail the state’s contentious domestic and country-positions on the
Venezuelan (migration) crisis, in the face of global attention. I demonstrate that the state’s efforts
sought to a) control the discourse of Venezuelan migrants on the island – with a conscious drive
to delegitimize the dominant global narrative of Venezuelans as “refugees” on the island, and b)
to “defend” the island’s autonomy through sovereignty practices that ran directly counter to
hemispheric dictates and external expectations.
In Chapter Four I undertake a careful examination of the lived experiences of Venezuelan
immigrants in Trinidad and Tobago. I analyse immigrants’ experiences through the conceptual
lens of the race-immigration nexus that invokes historical continuities of racism in readings of
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contemporary migrations. In this chapter, I argue that the very laws designed to protect migrants,
make them vulnerable, through racialized and gendered imaginaries. Tangible markers; corporeal
and cultural dissimilarities, remain material considerations in the construction of hierarchies of
difference. These are replayed representations of colonial readings of the Caribbean body, re-cast.
Additionally, through migrant narratives, I engage in a discussion of the extensive precarities, and
everyday vulnerabilities to exploitation and violence that Venezuelans face. Venezuelan women
in particular, are exposed to layered discriminations through both racialized and intense sexualized
readings of their bodies. Sex is the mediator between Venezuelan women and local males.
Chapter Five, engages in a spatial analysis of how Venezuelans’ shifting migration
trajectories have impacted the functions of Trinidad and Tobago as a migration site. I demonstrate
how the multiplicity of migrant movements into and across the island site, compounded by the
island’s intensified mobility regulating regimes, have interfered and interrupted migrant
trajectories, causing deviations from migrants’ aspirational trajectories. The island functions as a
barrier to movement, while simultaneously enforcing its function as a site of settlement. T&T
operates essentially as an enclosed geography that constrains and confines the mobilities of
migrants. In this chapter, I also engage in an important discussion of the ways in which IslandMigration studies can benefit from an “island-mobilities approach” especially in light of the
complex human migrations and non-human mobilities occurring on island sites.
Lastly, in Chapter Six, I offer concluding thoughts on the political geographies of migration
and mobility in small island states. I then reflect on the empirical and conceptual contributions of
this study to the wider field of political geography and to island and migration studies. Then, I
suggest new lines of inquiry opened by this study.
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CHAPTER TWO
Towards an Understanding of the Contemporary Caribbean
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I provide a contextual overview of the Caribbean’s contemporary migration flows,
and geopolitical (dis)connections and mobilities, through a scaled mapping of the region’s
historical geographies. Specifically, I trace the historical developments in Caribbean relations that
have persisted to inform its contemporary profile. The Caribbean’s situational geography, between
two great continents, has been integral to hemispheric mobilities, including the migrations of
indigenous peoples between the North and South American continents. It also continues to be
central in hemispheric geo- political bargaining and the navigation of shifting geometries of power.
Connections to major power players through this central geography and across political ideological
divides, have reified the Caribbean’s sensitive and productive situatedness. The crisis in
Venezuela, and its “Maduro migrations” outcome have not only impacted Caribbean territories but
have also re-energized erstwhile tensions and allegiances among hemispheric players.
It is important to outline how the “Caribbean region” is defined for the purposes of this
research, in light of competing representations and constructions of the Caribbean among scholars
and policy makers. The multiplicity of framings is attributed to the region’s diversity,
fragmentations and differences, geographically and otherwise. Spatially, the region is constituted
by both islands (approximately over 700 small islands and cays) and continental territories, most
of which are washed by the Caribbean Sea. As a project of Empire, the Caribbean is comprised of
myriad languages, cultures, political, legal and economic infrastructures and specific colonial
experiences. For example, the ways in which the abolition of slavery unfolded in each colony at
the behest of different colonial powers, largely differed across the region, having implications on
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migrations and the eventual socio-cultural groupings of people. Post-colonial and postindependence manifestations of integration groupings were initially guided by linguistic
commonality and the sameness of colonial experiences; CARICOM formation among the former
British colonies; the commonality in language and culture of the Dominican Republic, Cuba and
Puerto Rico formed the “Hispanic Caribbean”; the French Antilles and French Guyana and
occasionally Haiti4 constituted the “French Caribbean”; and the polities of the former Netherland
Antilles and Suriname, the “Dutch Caribbean”.
Additionally, many geo-political definitions carve up the region. As a consequence, several
sub-regional groupings exist, complicating standardized delineations of the Caribbean (Girvan,
2001; Serbin, 1982; Cohen, 2003). These variants have also been instructive in the evolution of
institutional Caribbean unity as sought through integration initiatives. I follow from Braveboy
Wagner’s (2014) productive reinforcement of Barry Levine’s (1989) observations that the
Caribbean is socially constructed specific to the researcher’s own analytical interests. In this study
therefore, the Caribbean region is operationalized as the insular Caribbean, composed of the larger
island states of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica; the smaller island states mostly
of the eastern and southern archipelago including Trinidad and Tobago; mainland states of
Suriname, Guyana and Belize; and dependent territories including US, French, British and Dutch
dependencies. These are all territories that share varying degrees of cultural, historical and politicoeconomic connectivities, but are integral players in the construction of the historical geo-political
narrative of the region.
In the final sections, I turn to an overview of the geopolitical landscape of the Caribbean.
Anchored by a discussion of the US-Caribbean relationship, I signpost key events and their

4

With constitution as part of an inter-American system, but not quite Latin American in the 1980s, Haiti could be
included in the French Caribbean depending on the policy perspective.
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implications for the region’s relations with Venezuela. I then outline more contemporary shifts in
the geopolitical landscape with the emergence of non-traditional powers in the Caribbean. With
more specificity to the subjects, objects and moments under study in the research project, I then
focus on the emergence of Venezuela in the Caribbean’s geopolitical landscape. Lastly, I introduce
the Venezuelan crisis and its impact on Caribbean nations, specifically Trinidad and Tobago,
whose migration relationship with the Venezuelan mainland has been established for some time.

2.2. Migration in the Caribbean
The Caribbean cannot be discussed without conversations about migration (Thomas-Hope, 2005).
Human migration flows in the Caribbean are hardly ever linear. Territories often play simultaneous
roles as points of origin, transit and destination with changing socio-economic, politico-legal and
environmental circumstances (Thomas-Hope, 2005; Nurse, 2004; IOM, 2017). From the outset, it
must be noted that it is an empirical challenge to present up-to-date patterns and flows of
movement across the region. This is attributed to a deficiency in systematic and standardized data
collection methods, and shared databases across Caribbean territories. Recently however, large
international organizations with the required resource faculties, have attempted to fill this gap in
the region, through for example, training in data collection methodologies and the introduction of
the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) system (see IOM and ACP reports). There are, however,
some instructive studies on Caribbean migration to the global North (Hernández & River-Baitz,
2003; Duany, 2011). Studies related to south-south and regional migrations are category specific,
for example, irregular migration and human trafficking (Thomas-Hope, 2003, 2006); remittances
(Orozco, 2002, 2003, 2004; Figueroa, 2009); and “free movement”, that is, facilitated intraregional mobility among the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern
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Caribbean States (OECS5) territories, with the view to advancing economic and regional
development (Whyte-Givans, 2009; Brown et al., 2010). The legacy of migration in the Caribbean
began with European colonization in the 16th century followed by the forced migration of African
slaves to work on plantations. This was then followed by the migration of indentured labourers to
the Caribbean in the 19th century. As time progressed, particularly in the second half of the 20th
century, shifting with socio-economic, political and environmental circumstances, new migratory
flows were observed. Migratory movements in the Caribbean can be broadly categorized as
follows: migrations to Europe and North America; intra-regional migration; south-south extraregional migration; and an inclusive descriptive category of irregular migrations.
The Caribbean as a source region has seen a considerable emigration of persons to
countries in the global North. Caribbean to North American emigration is consistent with earlier
patterns of migration to Western Europe in the post-war era. Linguistic and colonial histories of
Caribbean territories guided these earlier flows. For example, many persons from Commonwealth
Caribbean territories migrated to the United Kingdom (UK). In the wake of World War 2, the
“Windrush generation” was birthed – the cohort of West Indians that emigrated to Britain between
1948 and 1971 to offset labour shortages after the war. Here, citizens of the UK’s colonies were
given status and the right to settle in the UK6.
In the 1960s, changing British laws made it more difficult for West Indians to migrate to
the UK. This coincided with shifts in North American policy, as immigration laws became more
open in both the US and Canada. The regulating principles of entry into these countries shifted

5

The OECS was formed by the Treaty of Basseterre in 1981. It is composed of 7 full member states: Antigua and
Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines; and 4 Associate members: Anguilla, The British Virgin Islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe.
6 In 2018 a contemptible situation become public, called the “British Windrush Scandal”, where it was revealed that
Britain’s Home Office wrongly detained and threatened persons from this migration cohort with deportation. Some
were in fact deported, others were refused re-entry into the UK. The roll-on impacts of this situation affected
people’s daily lives, such as job losses and denial of access to medical care (Agerholm, 2018).
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from nationality and race, to occupational skills and education. This was particularly impactful in
the healthcare industry and saw a large number of Caribbean-sourced nurses on this trajectory.
Since this turning point in immigration law in the 1960s, the flow from the Caribbean to North
American countries has been a fixture in Caribbean migration dynamics over several decades and
remains today.
In the French Caribbean, between 1963 and 1982, several thousand men and women from
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, and Guiana migrated to mainland France for work, during the
period of “economic boom” in the postwar years. Massive emigrations to the metropole were also
experienced in the Dutch Caribbean following changes in the territories’ economic and political
landscapes7 (Sharpe, 2005). Emigration from the Spanish Caribbean is a much more fragmented
dynamic; however, there were initially direct migration flows to the metropole, Spain, from the
Caribbean. In the 1980’s Spain’s transition to democracy and subsequent economic boom enticed
migrants from the Dominican Republic and to a lesser extent, Cuba.
Contemporary manifestations of these flows note large numbers of students migrating from
the Caribbean to pursue educational opportunities abroad. Net out-migration levels remain high,
causing concerns among Caribbean territories, as they fear the impact of “brain-drain” on their
economies (Schmidd, 2003). Further evidence of this large-scale out migration is observed in the
sheer size of the Caribbean diaspora.
More recently a trend of North-South migration has been observed (Thomas-Hope, 2018).
Migrants who may have left in the 1950s and 1960s are now returning to their Caribbean source

7

History records three major occurrences prompting emigration: in 1985, closures of oil refineries on both Aruba and
Curacao; in 1986, Aruba was granted “status aparte” from the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and, in 1975, in the build
up to Suriname becoming independent of the Netherlands (Sharpe, 2005).
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countries, when they retire. Additionally, a long-standing but now amplified North-South flow is
noted, through the increase in deportee numbers from global north countries such as the United
States and the United Kingdom to the Caribbean (Lloyd & Mountz 2019; Charles & Roberts, 2019;
Gentleman, 2019). A more structured North-South flow is also observed through the proliferation
of Offshore Medical Universities (OMUs) (Mclean & Charles, 2018; Morgan et al., 2017). These
OMUs have created a steady inflow of North American students since the 1970s. The Caribbean’s
lure for students is its geographical proximity to the US and Canada, making for easy return;
language similarities; and the weaker domestic currencies in Caribbean territories.
Intra-regional migration characterizes movements of persons between Caribbean
territories. This type of migration is distinctive from other routine migration flows, in that they are
usually temporary or circular, involving the eventual return of the migrant to their country of
origin. Intra-regional migrations in the Caribbean are based on economic disparities, violence and
political instability and natural disaster displacements in countries of origin, and the perception of
better conditions in receiving states. Regulated intra-regional migrations of Caribbean nationals
through CARICOM’s 2006 formalized Single Market and Economy initiative, and OECS’ 2010
free market protocols, have allowed persons to move “freely” within their member states for
employment. For CARICOM member states, those engaging this framework, are entitled to six
months stay in the receiving country. The OECS’ regime on the other hand, provides for full and
free movement for all OECS nationals of Protocol member states, without a time restriction for
permitted stay, or “indefinite stay” (IOM, 2019). According to a 2019 IOM Report on Free
Movement of Persons in the Caribbean, 2017 figures indicate that Trinidad and Tobago with
90,795 and Guyana with 72,913 people, recorded the highest numbers as sending countries, while
Barbados with 147,072 persons and T&T with 124,314 persons, registered as the countries
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receiving the most CARICOM nationals. Trinidad and Tobago is both a sending and receiving
country.
The Caribbean region, open to the impacts of environmental phenomena, has seen
periodic intra-regional displacement migrations as a result of natural disasters. An almost default
example is the acute migration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic following the 2010
earthquake in Haiti. Haitians also migrated to Jamaica, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and
Brazil. More recently, Hurricane Maria in 2017 in Dominica prompted flows of persons to
Guadeloupe, other OECS countries and Trinidad and Tobago.
In addition, politically fraught circumstances have also caused intra-regional migrations.
After the overthrow of Haiti’s Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, for example, there was an exodus
of Haitians who sought refuge elsewhere. Nearby Caribbean islands hosted many, in addition to
Suriname and French Guiana.
The south-south extra-regional migration configuration invokes the Caribbean region’s
role as a transition space. Flows of persons use the Caribbean as a thoroughfare from one
territory to another, while some migrate to the Caribbean as their destination. This flow of
movement is highly subscribed by persons originating from mainland South America, usually on
their way to a Spanish speaking territory in the Greater Antilles, or a North American country.
More recently, there has been a noted emergence of West Africans and Asians traveling to the
South American mainland, then onward through the Caribbean as a conduit to North America
(IOM, 2017). One notable exception that configures the reverse migratory movement, that is,
from the Caribbean to South America, is the continuous migration of Haitians to Brazil (Da
Silva, 2013; Thomaz, 2013).
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Irregular migration occupies a default category in the migration flows previously noted.
Elizabeth Thomas-Hope (2003) characterizes this as the “informal sector of the migration
process”. Given the Caribbean’s locational positioning and connectivity between North America
to South America, much irregular movement has taken place across this geography. Of course,
concrete statistical data are challenging to access, because these movements occur outside of
regulatory frames, and most irregular migrants seek to avoid detection. There have been reports
however of sea interdictions and human trafficking which evidence these flows. An IOM (2018)
report has suggested that irregular migration possibly exceeds regular flows. The Caribbean is a
prime location for intense flows of irregular migrations, given the closeness of territories which
can be accessed via boat journeys. There are severe challenges in patrolling exposed and isolated
coastal borders, and this makes island territories particularly susceptible to these entrants (ThomasHope, 2003). Modes of movement, for example clandestine land crossings or boat journeys,
discern the “documented-ness” or legality of the migratory flow. Clandestine inland crossings of
Haitians into the Dominican Republic, on the island of Hispaniola is a prime example of irregular
movement. Boat migrations to the US or a second country, from source countries such as Haiti,
Cuba and the Dominican Republic can also be characterized as irregular migration, when tied to
human smuggling (Kahn, 2019).

2.3. The Shifting Contours of the Caribbean’s Geopolitical Landscape
In this section, I discuss the evolving geopolitical landscape of the region, noting shifts that shape
the present-day Caribbean. The geopolitical configuration of the region has long been aligned with
its security and economic capacity. I anchor this sketch of the Caribbean’s geopolitical landscape
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with the region’s meta-geopolitical narrative: hemispheric hegemon, the United States, and its
engagement in the Caribbean.
In the 19th century, the years before the Cold War, the US was preoccupied with its
expansionist and economic programme, until its eventual appreciation of the Caribbean region as
a geostrategic space to establish naval bases on islands. This, in an effort to protect its trade and
shipping lanes, and also to serve as bases for World War 2 eventualities. Geographically, the
Caribbean Sea in particular was exceptionally important to the US. This period also saw
heightened involvement of US firms in the Caribbean who were attracted to the commercialism of
natural resource extractions such as asphalt and bauxite. These overarching operations were termed
the “Caribbeanization of Manifest Destiny”8 (Merck & Bannister Merck, 1963) in US’
expansionist and economic endeavours.
During the Cold War years, especially during the 1950s and 1980s, there was a clear shift
in the US’ policy toward ideological containment and military interventionism in the region. It was
also a period characterized by increased US foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean
nations. The prevailing objective during this time, however, was to keep a keen eye on
independence movements and to monitor unfolding leftist inclinations of groups, postindependence. The Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in 1959, in addition
to the US imposed trade embargo against Cuba in 1960 and 1962 on exports to the country,
punctuated this period. In particular, US-Cuban relations broke down when Castro aligned Cuba
with the Soviets in the 1970s and made a deal to be in receipt of a supply of oil, in exchange for
Cuban sugar cane, to lessen US domination over Cuba (Cannon, 2013).

Manifest Destiny, coined in 1845, was the US’ cultural reference to its expansionist efforts. The
“Caribbeanization” of these efforts represents the US’ shift in optics to the Caribbean to carry out said
programming.
8
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Of note, the relationship between the US and Venezuela was quite cordial. By 1940
Venezuela was the third largest producer of crude oil in the world (Brown, 1985), and the fourth
largest supplier of foreign oil to the US (Di John, 2009). This relationship rested on earlier
concessions given to US oil companies for exploration and drilling by Venezuela’s Juan Vicente
Gomez, and the country’s continuing generous oil policies toward the US through the mid-1900s.
Even a change in administration from the right-wing military dictatorship to more democratic
governance in 1958, did not significantly impact Venezuela’s oil industry and contracts, or its
political and economic relationship with the U.S (Derham, 2002). The relationship remained
relatively intact for the next two decades. The US-Venezuela relationship was further fortified as
Venezuela remained a US ally after the Cuban Revolution (1953-1959) (Trinkunas, 2005).
In the post-Cold War years, US’ policies in the Caribbean targeted transnational drug
trafficking and free trade. The Caribbean region was viewed as “a transit zone for illegal drugs,
alien smuggling, laundered money, contrabanded weapons, and other “transnational” threats”
(Duany, 2000, p. 97). US policy prioritized maritime securitization for the Caribbean Sea.
Extensive patrolling of the “high” Caribbean Sea was a priority – consolidated through shiprider
agreements (Vascianne, 1997; Henke, 1998). During this time, there was an observed decline in
US foreign aid, however there was also a continuous programme of engagement through bi- and
multi- lateral agreements specific to international criminal control.
In the early 2000s, there was a prevailing notion that the US’ engagement in the Caribbean
had become “limited” or significantly declined because of distractions elsewhere in the world,
allowing for other actors to emerge in the region (Thorburn, 2006). Chaitram (2020) compellingly
argues however that this was not an accurate representation of the situation, calling the assertion
the “abandonment narrative”. Chaitram (2020) argues that this claim is “overblown and
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inaccurate”, suggesting that the US shifted focus to other areas of geostrategic importance at the
time, but continued its engagement with the Caribbean. Whatever the claim, there was indeed
heightened involvement in the region from peripheral and external players.
Diana Thorburn (2006) views the 2004 “overthrow” of Jean Beatrand Aristide in Haiti, as
the moment that unveiled a gap in the power configuration that external actors willingly
patronized. Through the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH) in 2004,
Brazil led the peacekeeping force on the island, marking Brazil’s increasing foreign policy
activism in the region. China contributed to the police and civil component of the Mission, a
significant entry point in the region, against the backdrop of Caribbean states’ support of Taiwan
in opposition to the “One-China” policy at that time (Olsen, 2009). Also, South Africa’s show of
diplomatic activism in the region by granting asylum to Aristide was notable. Further, France
played a role in Aristide’s departure from the island, signalling its first active role in the Caribbean
since the Haitian Revolution (outside of its dependencies) (Thorburn, 2006). This opportune
moment allowed for outside players to (re)enter the region, and for some, signalled a watershed
for new and continued engagement in the Caribbean. The “opening up” of the Caribbean space,
and the warm reception of peripheral and external actors by Caribbean territories was facilitated
by a compounding of existing tensions between the United States and the Caribbean, especially
amongst the English-speaking territories (Bernal, 2013).
External players’ interventions were outwardly non-ideological and focussed largely on
economic investments in the region (McElroy, Jerome & Bai, 2008). China in particular has
amplified engagement in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)9 (MacDonald,
2019), and increasing bilateral trade and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the

9

Launched in 2013, the BRI seeks to create a major Eurasian trade zone extending from China to Europe, woven
together by an extensive network of road, rail and other critical infrastructure.
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region. Latin America and Caribbean countries have also been invited to join the BRI, a region
where China’s pocket-book diplomacy has sparked interest in several countries. According to the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), as of mid-2019, 18
countries in the region have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with China under the
initiative, including 10 Caribbean countries.
Over this swathe of history, the US has emerged as a permanent fixture in the Caribbean’s
geopolitical story. Along the way, it has yielded benefits to the region, but it has also created
chasms and uneasiness among Caribbean territories which have been instructive in contemporary
US-Caribbean relations. There is a kind of apprehensiveness among Caribbean territories to the
actions of the United States. Yet still, Caribbean territories have remained cognizant of the United
States and the influence that it wields in the region—as the region’s natural trading partner
(Ikenberry, 2014). Jeanne A.K. Hey (2003) suggests, “[b]ecause of their relatively weak power
base, small states act in passive and reactive modes, rather than as proactive agents of international
change” (p. 6). Therefore, bargaining power is limited (Maingot, 1990), and structural dependence
is lived through the economic decisions and projections of these small Caribbean territories.
Generally, the region continues to maintain relations with the US on “friendly” terms.

2.4. Venezuela in the Caribbean
The situational geographies of both countries of the Caribbean and the Venezuelan mainland are
naturally connected by the Caribbean Sea—an important space acknowledged by both entities.
Venezuela views itself as the mainland bridge between Central America and the Caribbean on one
hand, and the Caribbean and South America on the other (Jácome, 2011). President Hugo Chavez’s
use of oil as a fundamental mediator of its foreign policy was constructed upon previous work of
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Venezuela’s former Presidents in the 1970s, namely Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) and Carlos
Andrés Pérez (1974- 1979). These former Presidents saw the Caribbean as an important region,
not only as a close neighbour, but also because of the wave of Caribbean nations gaining
independence in the 1960s and the unpredictability of their actions. There was already the enduring
Venezuela-Guyana territorial border conflict inherited from the colonial powers, and negotiations
of maritime space with Trinidad and Tobago. This concern by the Venezuelans, however, was
fundamentally shaped in relation to Venezuelan oil’s primary transport space – the Caribbean Sea
– that needed to be secure. The 1980s San Jose Agreement followed by the Caracas Agreement in
2000 were progressive steps in an attempt to bring a semblance of stability to Venezuela-Caribbean
relations.

2.4.1. ALBA- TCP10 and PetroCaribe
When Hugo Chávez rose to power in 1999, and during his re-election in 2000, his rhetoric was
unabashedly anti-American, his policies were designed as strategies to challenge the United States
– a departure from his predecessors and a new conceptualization of what regionalism would look
like. In true form, Chávez’s ALBA was established as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). ALBA came at a time of growing divisions and disillusionment within the
Americas (Altmann, 2011; Eguizábal, 2015) and performed a significant role in cultivating
regionalism between Latin American and Caribbean nations. It was formally initiated in 2004 with
a bilateral agreement between Cuba and Venezuela and began expanding in 2006 with Bolivia’s
accession.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty or Alianza Bolivariana para los
Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (ALBA or ALBA-TCP)
10
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In 2005, under the Presidency of Hugo Chavez, using ALBA as its gateway, Venezuela
engaged the Caribbean in the sale of oil, through PetroCaribe. This Treaty also came with added
supports for development projects and other productive conditionalities. Oil-rich Venezuela
offered member-states deliveries of oil on concessionary terms (Jácome, 2011). By 2008 it became
the largest provider of concessionary finance, in absolute terms, to recipient countries, exceeding
the flows of development assistance from the EU, USAID and the World Bank (Girvan, 2010).The
founding members were Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Venezuela. Haiti and Nicaragua joined in 2007, Honduras in 2008,
Guatemala in 2012, and El Salvador in 2014. Island-states have depended on oil imports to sustain
their economic and social development while suffering from low purchasing power on the world
market (Shirley & Kammen, 2013). Out of Venezuela, PetroCaribe allowed member nations to
rectify these vulnerabilities, and instead benefit from equal exchange between partners. The
Venezuelan state enterprise Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) created PDVCaribe S.A., to
further bilateral assistance from the Venezuelan government to its partners. PetroCaribe financed
a percentage of the bill for oil imports from Venezuela with loans between 1 and 2 percent payable
over 25-years with a grace period of two years. The loan monies were utilized for approved
projects in the state sector, infrastructure and poverty reduction (Girvan, 2010).
While this arrangement fostered greater regional integration, it was not lost how the energy
geopolitics in the region shifted. The “middle level country” of Venezuela took up where the US
left off (Cusack, 2019). The implications of this Treaty drew discontent among certain member
states, and obvious concern from the United States. For example, Trinidad and Tobago – another
oil producing powerhouse in the Caribbean through Patrick Manning, former Prime Minister of
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Trinidad and Tobago, warned that the agreement would undermine private enterprise, and that the
region would be subject to the inclinations of a single energy supplier. Trinidad and Tobago, in
context, was in a well-placed economic position to make such overt comments.

2.5. The Venezuelan Crisis
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, once one of the richest countries in the hemisphere with a
century-old oil history and largest oil reserves in the world, is now grappling with a politicoeconomic and humanitarian crisis. Structures and institutions necessary for the regular functioning
of everyday life have absolutely degenerated. Analysts suggest that the contemporary crisis is a
culmination of years of political corruption and economic mismanagement (Ellsworth, 2012). The
foundations of this crisis were laid in the late 1980s with the deterioration of the 1958 Puntofijo
Pact11 that some forty years later propelled Hugo Chavez to the Venezuelan Presidency (Villa,
2005). Upon his death, his successor Nicolas Maduro was charged with the responsibility to carry
on Chavez’s legacy. Chávez’s tenure oversaw extensive state interventionism, through deprivatization and over-regulation of the private sector. Venezuela’s economy is extremely oil
dependent, therefore with the dramatic decline in global oil prices and revenue in 2008 and again
in 2014, shockwaves reverberated through all sectors and levels of Venezuelan society. This
economic collapse created a complex situation that can be appreciated as a multiplicity of crises:
an economic crisis, a political and legal crisis, and a social crisis. Combined, these crises have
caused extensive disruptions in the daily lives of Venezuelans that have resulted in a massive
exodus from their homeland.

11

The Puntofijo Pact (1958-1998) was a formal agreement signed by the three main political parties in Venezuela to
establish a power-sharing (coalition) type of governance arrangement to preserve democracy. The Pact worked to
concentrate power into the hands of a select few, limiting the political system (Buxton 2005), causing major
uneasiness among the Venezuelan population.
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In the wake of rising oil prices in the 1970s and amidst heavy spending by Venezuelan
leaders, the “La Gran Venezuela” plan was put into action. This plan was designed to make
Venezuela a developed country in brief time (Melcher, 1995). However, when the mid-1980’s
severe oil price drop impacted Venezuela, the indebtedness from the earlier flagrant spending was
exposed (Di John, 2009). President Perez turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
assistance through loans and other austerity measures, which were extremely unpopular among the
Venezuelan masses (Levine & Crisp, 1999). As Perez attempted to carry out a radical structuraladjustment program, in 1989, there was a massive protest in response to an increase in gas prices.
For the next two years there were numerous student protests, labour strikes and intensified political
debate (McCoy, 1999). Hugo Chávez took part in one of two failed coups that attempted to remove
Perez. In 1998, Chavez launched an anti-corruption, anti-poverty campaign. He won the national
election by popular vote, largely as a consequence of support among the Venezuelan poor
(Cannon, 2013).
When Hugo Chávez took office, he introduced the “Bolivarian Revolution” that aimed to
situate all the fundamentals of the Venezuelan economy into the hands of the government. Chávez
unleashed a programme of massive de-privatization which some dubbed an “economic war”
against private enterprise and the bourgeoisie (Bravo, 2019). Dramatic moves like these, caused
agitations amongst segments of the Venezuelan population. In April 2002, there was a failed coup
to oust Chávez, driven by Venezuela’s private sector and allegedly backed by the US’ Central
Intelligence Agency (Forero, 2004). Chavez then moved to further rein in the private sector. In
early 2003, Chávez took control of PDVSA, after firing 20,000 of its managers and workers.
Government replaced key workers with loyalists in the company, and the industry has since
suffered from inefficacious management and a lack of investment in infrastructure (Gonzalez,
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2019). To further rein in the private sector, the government engaged in strict foreign exchange
control measures. The Bolivar (Venezuelan currency) was artificially overvalued, to allow for
cheap imports. During this time of plenty, the state engaged in many social programmes: it
provided cheap loans, subsidies, numerous jobs, free public services, and made sure that imported
goods were accessible (Corrales & Penfold, 2011). The Economic Survey of Latin America and
the Caribbean Report 2006-2007 (ECLAC, 2007) stated that in 2005 “all branches of economic
activity registered rises, with the highest rates being observed in construction (32.1%), financial
services (39.2%), communications (23.2%) and commerce (19.9%). On the demand side, the
components that showed the strongest growth rates were investment (30%), chiefly public
investment in infrastructure, and private consumption (18.8%). In the first quarter of 2007 the
economy expanded by 8.8% over the same quarter of the preceding year” (p. 111).
Upon Chávez’s death in 2013, an election was held, where Nicolás Maduro, a member of
Chávez’s party United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), narrowly won. Maduro was not able
to maintain Chavez’s electoral support. His Presidency was met with failing oil prices, which
accounted for approximately 95% of the country’s revenues and a changed political landscape
(Buxton, 2019). With a slim majority in Venezuela’s National Assembly, Maduro endeavoured to
pass an Enabling Act to rule by decree, which he claimed would be operationalized to fight against
corruption. With a few political and suspicious moves, limiting and muzzling the opposition,
Maduro was able to secure the majority needed to pass the Act in 2013. Maduro has been ruling
by these decrees since. In 2015 to “confront the aggression” of the US, and from 2016 onward,
numerous extended decrees to State of Emergency and Economic Emergency. Lopez Maya (2014)
characterizes the Maduro’s administration as “Cuban style”, taking guidance from a political

46

military directorate and using Decrees to concentrate power in the Presidency that has rendered
Venezuela’s legislative arm inconsequential.
The collapse in oil prices in 2014 shed light on the weaknesses of the economy: little
diversification of exports and heavy dependence on imported goods. This meant that the financing
of all the social programmes either slowed or stopped. Violent protests in 2013, 2014, and 2017
made it increasingly difficult for President Nicolás Maduro to navigate both foreign and domestic
policy objectives while facing domestic opposition, a resurgent regional right, and the Trump
administration in the United States (Cederlöf & Kingsbury, 2019). At the same time, growing
problems between Venezuela’s Supreme Court, the opposition, and Maduro’s socialist party
continued to fuel the rise of protests and civil unrest (De Córdoba & Forero, 2015).

2.5.1. Dimensions of the Crisis
Today, Venezuela continues to experience hyperinflation, food shortages, plummeting oil prices,
heavy debt, crime and poverty. The calamitous circumstance in present-day Venezuela is dissected
below.
Venezuela’s economic situation has been characterized as a “wartime economy” (IMF,
2019). In 2014, Venezuela’s economy was in freefall, and continues to be in a state of economic
depression. The country’s GDP growth rate has been on a general decline at -20 % in 2018 (World
Bank, 2020) (see Figure 1). At the same time, Venezuela is experiencing a period of hyperinflation.
In the IMF’s (2020) World Economic Outlook, April 2020, it estimated Venezuela’s inflation rate
at 15,000%. Oil production has reached its lowest point since 2003, production has declined from
2.6 million barrels per day in 2015 to 1.02 million barrels per day (OPEC Annual Statistical
Bulletin, 2020), a 60.8% decrease. Oil exports decreased by 57.1% over the same period (OPEC
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Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2020). Venezuela’s debt is on the increase as well. While figures are
not available from the World Bank, or IMF, a report from the Institute of International Finance in
2018, suggested that Venezuela’s debt rose to about $156 billion in 2018. In 2017, the Venezuelan
government announced that they owed Russia US $3.5 million (ECLAC, 2017). According to the
World Bank (2020), based on the International Labour Organization’s statistical modelling,
Venezuela’s unemployment rate for 2019 was 8.8%, while the IMF’s 2019 World Economic
Outlook report, indicated that Venezuela’s projected unemployment rate was 50.5% for 2020.
Although Maduro has increased the minimum wage from 450,000 to 800,00 Bolivars per month
(77% increase) in 2020 – this, after doing the same numerous times from 2018 to now– the
purchasing power of Venezuelans is severely diminished with continued rising inflation. President
Maduro blames international sanctions on Venezuela for the seriousness of the situation. For
example, since the US’ President Trump took office, he has overseen 22 economic sanctions and
has issued 5 Executive orders against Venezuela (Bravo, 2019). These sanctions were largely
directed to persons in the top tiers of the Maduro administration, but were then extended to
financial transactions on Venezuela’s oil trade, restricting PDVSA’s sales (Congressional
Research Service, 2020).
Figure 1
Venezuela’s GDP Growth Rate 1980-2018

Note: Reproduced from World Bank (2020)
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The division of powers in Venezuela has also been compromised. In practice, all the
powers of the state have been aligned to serve the executive branch. This became evident in an
eventuality called the “2017 Constitutional Crisis” (Antonopoulous & Cottle, 2018; Legler, Serbin
Pont & Garelli-Rios, 2018). In March of that year, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela
took over the legislative powers of the constitutionally sanctioned National Assembly. The
Tribunal, mainly supporters of President Nicolás Maduro, also restricted the immunity granted to
the Assembly’s members, who largely belonged to the opposition (Alfaro Pareja, 2020).
Opposition commentators called this dissolution a “coup”. A few weeks later, Maduro ordered that
the decision be reversed, in the face of significant domestic and international opposition
(Rodríguez, 2018). The damage however, had already been done and added fuel to the already
volatile situation. Politically, the situation came to a head again in 2018 with the re-election of
Nicolás Maduro, then again in 2019 with the follow-up inauguration. In 2018, the Venezuelan
Electoral Observatory called into question the Constituent Assembly’s12 authority to call a new
election, while at the same time restricting the participation of opposition political parties. Maduro
was eventually elected, however the opposition denounced the results citing many irregularities in
the elections process. In January 2019, the National Assembly, under article 233 of the Bolivarian
Constitution13, moved to have Juan Guaidó as the succeeding acting President of the country.
Maduro quickly caused the National Assembly to be deemed an unconstitutional body by the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Alfaro Pareja, 2020). At present, the country is split with the
recognition of two Venezuelan Presidents. Internationally, Juan Guaidó has been recognized as

12

A pro-Maduro body that acts as a parallel National Assembly mandated to write a new Venezuelan constitution
Under article 233, the National Assembly may declare the president absent from office, thus requiring that a new
universal, direct, and secret election be held within the following thirty consecutive days. In the meantime, the
President of the National Assembly is to serve as the interim president of the republic.
13
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the acting President of Venezuela by 54 countries (Phillips, 2019), while Maduro continues to
enjoy support among his traditional geopolitical allies.

2.5.2. The Social Crisis & the Maduro Migrations
In Venezuela, poverty rates are severe and worsen daily. According to 2017 figures, Venezuela
has a poverty rate of 87%, while its extreme poverty rate is greater than 50% (Instituto Nacional
de Estadísticas, 2017). Access to basic food is severely limited (Doocy et al, 2019). There has been
a 75% decline in food imports (FAO, 2018), in favour of debt servicing (Aponte & Martinez,
2018). In addition to this, there is a health crisis. The maternal mortality rate has risen dramatically
(increasing 65% from 2015 to 2016), as has the infant mortality rate (increasing 29.5% over the
same period); moreover, there is a severe shortage of the most basic medications – around 85 %
of all medicines in the country are out of stock (Romo, 2019). At the same time, there is a high
emigration of doctors and nurses, and frequent electricity blackouts. Without access to proper
medical care and access to vaccination, people have become more vulnerable to treatable diseases
like measles and diptheria. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) (2018) has reported
that there has been a consistent increase in diseases— more than 7,300 cases of measles were
reported between June 2017 and September 2018. By contrast, between 2006 and 2015, not a
single case of disease was reported in Venezuela (PAHO, 2020)
The United Nations has ranked Caracas the second-most dangerous city in the world.
According to the Venezuelan public prosecutor, 21,752 violent deaths were recorded in the country
in 2018. Venezuela now has 27,000 homicides annually, with a rate of 89 homicides for every
100,000 residents. Venezuela has again ranked as a Tier 3 country in the Trafficking in Persons
2019 report, meaning that the country does not meet the minimum standards of the Trafficking
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Victims Protection Act and is not making significant efforts to do so. The report indicates that
human traffickers continue to exploit domestic and foreign victims in Venezuela, and traffickers
exploit Venezuelan victims abroad. There are observed parallels in the rate of trafficking and the
deteriorating situation in Venezuela. Traffickers have exploited Venezuelan victims in Aruba,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Macau, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Spain, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Venezuelan men are increasingly vulnerable to
forced labour in destination countries, while Venezuelan boys are vulnerable to forced criminality
and forced recruitment by dissident illegal armed groups (Trafficking in Persons Report, 2019).
There is a strong presence of criminal organizations in Venezuela, such as the Colombian guerrillas
(the National Liberation Army, or ELN), mining mafias, and mega-gangs located in the central
and eastern regions of the country who are involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, and
exploitation of the indigenous (Galavís, 2020).
As a result of these factors, Venezuela has gone from being a net receiver of migrants to a
sending country, since the end of 2015 (UNHCR, 2019) with a daily increasing diaspora. From
November 2018 to June 2019, the number of refugees and migrants increased by one million (IOM,
2020). This is an unprecedented level of emigration, which is in stark contrast to a migration
dynamic that was characterized by immigration to Venezuela in the past. In broad terms, the mass
exodus of Venezuelans can be categorized in two waves, a response to the “Bolivarian Revolution”
and, the “Maduro migrations”.
When Chávez undertook his extensive de-privatization scheme, a number of well-educated
individuals were faced with employment precarities or received dismissal outright. In these
circumstances, where job prospects were grim and political ideologies clashed with Chávez’s,
large numbers of Venezuelans emigrated. It is estimated that between 2000-2014, 2.5 million

51

persons between the ages of 25 and 40 left Venezuela (Legler, Serbin Pont & Garelli-Rios, 2018).
These were disillusioned professionals, artists, lawyers, physicians, managers and engineers.
People left for educational purposes or in search of better work opportunities. These Venezuelans
were considered largely middle- and upper-class citizens who made planned decisions to leave.
As elucidated in Chapter One, the “Maduro migrations” can be conceptualized beyond the
“Chávez effect”, given the amplification in scale and the urgency with which out-migration is
happening in this current period. In addition to the destination countries of previous years, migrants
are primarily moving to countries in the region such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama,
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. The main country receiving the migratory flow since 2015 is
Colombia, with an estimated 1.3 million Venezuelans. In addition, Spain and the United States
recorded the arrival of more than 200,000 Venezuelans each. Migrants from Venezuela have the
fourth most asylum requests globally (after Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq). In fact, Venezuelan
refugees make up 5.8% of the world’s total, requesting asylum in countries like Peru, the United
States, Brazil, Spain, and Panama. Since 2014, 414,000 Venezuelans have requested asylum
worldwide, nearly 60% of them (248,000), during 2018 alone (UNHCR, 2019). Many people
decide to leave Venezuela illegally because of problems processing their passports and apostilles.
This makes them more vulnerable, exposing them to trafficking, prostitution, and recruitment by
guerrillas. Restrictive measures in receiving countries also increase the precarities of migrating
Venezuelans. Figure 2 maps estimated Venezuelan migrant stock in select countries, where data
is available.
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Figure 2
Approximate Venezuelan Migrant Stock in Selected Countries as of December 2019

Note: Reproduced from R4V (2019)
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/72764.pdf

Although more publicized migratory patterns and statistics feature land border crossings
into surrounding territories, significant numbers of Venezuelans are also migrating to island
neighbours, such as Curacao, Aruba and Trinidad and Tobago.

2.6. The Trinidad & Tobago - Venezuela Connection
Extensive reciprocal mobilities and movements characterize the relationship between Trinidad and
Tobago and Venezuela. The countries’ deep historical ties and geographic proximity have
facilitated such connectivity. Contemporary inter-territorial mobilities are primarily structured
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through highly formalized and regulated energy arrangements, given common maritime geology.
However, the trade of goods and services, human migrations and smuggling between both nations
are historically routed/rooted. The Maduro migrations are tied to a longer history of politicoeconomic inspired movements that follow from the earlier Venezuelan migrations to Trinidad.
However, this most recent migratory movement is distinctive in scale, composition and acuteness
of flow. Natalie Dietrich Jones (2020) has termed this the “Venezuela-Trinidad and Tobago
Migration Corridor”.
Largely captured in historic-cultural accounts, the Venezuela-Trinidad connection dates
back to pre-colonial times with the migrations of indigenous Indians (Brereton, 1981; Kelshall,
2005; Moodie-Kublalsingh, 2012; Padron, 2012; Bissessarsingh, 2013). The connection
intensified throughout the colonial period, as interterritorial functions and relations became
increasingly complex. Trinidad served as a bridge for the journeys of Meso-indians making their
way from mainland South America to the Caribbean Sea (Beckles & Shepherd, 2004). At its
closest point, the two territories are merely 8 miles apart (see Figure 3). In fact, there is
archeological evidence that shows the island of Trinidad was once part of the South American
continent (Bissessarsingh, 2013).
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Figure 3
Map showing Proximate distance between Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago

Note: Created by Ryan Seemungal (2020)

Under Spanish colonial rule, Trinidad functioned as an administrative site over Venezuela
or Audiencia de Venezuela (Captaincy of Venezuela) (Kaufman et al, 2005), and was ‘tied’ to the
Spanish mainland as a “Province of Venezuela” prior to 1797-1802 (Baptiste, 2002; Hilton, 2005).
As the region’s tumultuous colonial circumstance unfolded, there was considerable movement
between the two territories, both in terms of goods and people. It appears however, that Trinidad
became the larger recipient of people in the migratory movement. History records Trinidad as
having served as a base and refuge for Venezuelans revolutionaries and political subversives. For
example, during Venezuela’s War of Independence (1810-1823), Trinidad, under British rule,
offered refuge to major figures in Venezuela’s history, such as Francisco de Miranda and Simón
Bolívar (Reis, 2013).
With its large reserves of oil and above-average per capita income, Trinidad and Tobago
is considered a high-income country by the World Bank and ranks in the high human development
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category in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2019). The twin island Republic has
experienced several waves of migration to and from various spheres of the world which have
produced a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse population. The country has also experienced a
significant degree of inter-island (regional) migration, referenced earlier, with immigrants
originating predominantly from within the subregion (Pizarro & Villa, 2005). The industrialized
Trinidad and Tobago economy has positioned it as a site for investment and created a sizeable
demand for labourers. This has contributed to mixed migratory movements which comprise
economic migrants, asylum-seekers, trafficked persons and other migrants (Anatol et al., 2013).
There have been several periods of migration of Venezuelans to Trinidad over hundreds of years,
almost always motivated by political and economic conditions in Venezuela (MoodieKublalsingh, 2012; Tinker Salas, 2009). In an ethnography exploring these migrations, Reis (2013)
categorizes six “waves” of Venezuelan movement to Trinidad. These typologies reiterate the
functional role(s) of Trinidad to Venezuelans, offering an account of social groups of people
emigrating there and politico-economic moments in Venezuela’s history. Reis’ (2013, p. 9)
categorizations are:
1. Venezuelan revolutionaries fleeing dictatorships and civil war;
2. A small influx of Sephardic Jews in the 1790s and 1800s;
3. A substantial inflow of rural peasants who worked in the cocoa industry
(cocoa panyols);
4. Urban aristocrats who settled in Woodbrook and the immediate suburbs of
Port of Spain at the end of the 19th century/beginning of the early 20th
century;
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5. A steady flow of boarders in convents who came to learn English from the
1940s to 1960s; and
6. “Recent”14 arrivals of predominantly anti-Chávistas (The Chávez Effect).
The 2014 drop in oil prices strained the financial resources of both Trinidad & Tobago and
Venezuela but prompted greater cooperation between both nations – both ‘one-commodity’ (oil)
economies. The nations have committed to large scale agreements where the mutual benefits are
more explicit. For example, in 2016, both countries signed onto a 29.6 million-dollar deal where
Trinidad committed to supply Venezuela with food, a quantum larger than all of CARICOM
combined (Dowlat, 2016). A parallel agreement affords natural gas from Venezuela to Trinidad—
a dwindling resource in Trinidad necessary to sustain the island’s industrial sector (discussed in
Chapter 3). The economies of both territories appear to be more expressly integrated than before.

2.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented contemporary readings of the Caribbean through a mapping of its
geographies and the historical evolution of Caribbean relations. This exercise has exposed the
intricacies, entanglements and deep divergences of inter-territorial relations characteristic of the
heterogenous space. As a region of relatively young nations which were afforded an unequal
launching platform post-independence, Caribbean nations still operationalize a quite insular and
territorially bounded conceptualization of sovereignty, coloured by sovereign ambitions that are
fundamentally undergirded by economic progressions and capacity.
This chapter traced how the US and Venezuela’s structured interventions in/to the region
impacted, and now situate the Caribbean as a central part of the present hemispheric configuration.

14

In current terms, this categorization is post 2002 and not considered “recent”
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At the backdrop of these contemporary readings, this chapter brings together the host of objects,
subjects and relations under study. It elucidates the historical rootedness of the relationship
between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. The present Venezuela to T&T migration
circumstance, the Maduro migrations, are distinctive, primarily because of the constitution and
urgency of its flows, and compounded by both nations’ depressed capacities, amidst volatile
economies and a dynamic (geo)political environment. Following from this contextual foundation,
the proceeding chapters will further interrogate the unfolding outcomes of the Venezuelan
migration crisis. From a multiplicity of scales and perspectives, the chapters will critically examine
Trinidad and Tobago’s responses to the Maduro migrations on the small island.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Geopolitics of Islands’ Response:
Trinidad and Tobago and the Maduro Migrations

3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I examine Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) government’s response to the contemporary
in-flow of Venezuelans to the island nation. While the in-migration of Venezuelans to T&T
became pronounced in 2015 and continued steadily, government only took a decisive position on
the issue in the first half of 2019. The configuration of T&T’s response was two-fold: an external
country-position on the crisis in Venezuela itself, followed by its stance on the impact of the
Maduro migrations in the domestic setting. I interrogate the build-up to these responses by
focusing on T&T’s hemispheric geopolitical positionality, asking to what extent has regional and
hemispheric geopolitics impacted the island’s domestic reaction to the Venezuelan in-migration
question. The effect of the lethargic response, I argue, was a strategy to maintain governmental
control of the Venezuelan in-migration discourse in efforts at self-preservation. The nation’s
position on the crisis of “non-intervention and non-interference” is historically rooted and
regionally supported, while its belated “Migrant Registration Framework” initiative is consciously
crafted to stifle and shift the initial widespread “refugee” narrative attached to the Venezuelan
migrants. I will demonstrate how T&T’s response is steeped in a political and geo-historical
muddle of apprehensiveness to external dictates.
Trinidad and Tobago’s physical situational geography compounded by its colonial and
imperialist histories, have shaped its delicate positionality in the wider hemisphere. The island
nation is flanked by the hemisphere’s hegemon, the United States of America, and the island

59

nation’s closest neighbour, Venezuela. Further, the enduring legacies of its settler history are
quotidian and pervasive. The “debris of empire” have configured the retention of particular notions
of sovereignty and the politics that inform these understandings in the post-colonial period. As a
consequence, the dependence and politico-economic weakening of islands have forced certain
structural arrangements, that effectively “order” island states in geopolitical hierarchies. Islands’
sovereignties, are considerably fragile and intensely guarded, impacting regionalisation
productivities, and having potentially long-term deleterious effects on society and state. It is within
these fragile structures, geographies and histories, and amidst external and domestic agitations,
Trinidad and Tobago sought to defend its autonomy through sovereignty practices.
The smallness of island geographies and their capacity constraints are definite. Reeling from
economic downturn itself, the island nation saw Venezuelan migrants, particularly in such large
numbers, as an invasive threat to the island’s physical, economic and social resource capacities.
“New-immigrant fears” were invoked, causing agitations and tension among the public.
Meanwhile, the government’s general silences, but intermittent pronouncements on the issue, did
little to appease public uneasiness.
I approach the evaluation of T&T’s responses in two ways: first, I provide an overview of
the theoretical discourses that thread through the politics of island response in terms of sovereignty,
geopolitics, and migration on islands. Secondly, I engage in a critical discourse analysis, through
a structured narrative, grounding the previous literatures and concepts. The structured narrative
focusses on the unfolding positions of the major players, that have informed T&T’s responses,
including Venezuela, the United States, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The data comes from historical and policy records,
parliamentary hansard and an extensive survey of multi-media news and reports.
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3.2. Hauntings in Island Sovereignties & The Politics of Mobility
The Caribbean region, as a product of colonial and imperialistic experiences has retained the
trauma, fragility and dependence within the modern-day political, economic and social systems on
islands. Newly independent nations, like Trinidad and Tobago, continue to teeter from political
disillusionment and economic hardships because of the remnants of colonial structures that have
become part and parcel of the “modern” nation-state. Ann Stoler (2008, 2013) identifies colonial
and imperial “ruins” or debris left behind, as being manifested in the present in material, discursive
and embodied ways. She suggests the process of ruination, “weighs on the future and shapes the
present” (p. 194). In similar imagining, Gordon (2008) uses the verb “haunting” as a function in
daily life where oppressive forces are assumed to be historically “over-and-done-with” (p. xvi),
but which are effectively operating in the historical present. In a reconsideration of Gordon’s
conception, I launch “haunting” here as a conceptual strand that links not only the region’s colonial
experience but its later (neo)imperialist interventions, to the Caribbean’s present, as observed
through its modern-day structurations and geopolitical consciousness.
As a haunting of the colonial past, in T&T, positions of authority are felt to be incredibly
fragile – political stations that can be vacated at a moment’s notice. In these circumstances, the
state is considerably dependent on the projection and protection of nationalist rhetoric to concretize
popular support. Like T&T, other young democracies of the Caribbean are still navigating the
asymmetries of the plantation economy and scarce resources. This manifests systemically in
economic frameworks that are designed to cause nations to subscribe to less than favourable terms
in agreements, arrangements, unions etc., in attempts to build and sustain their economies.
Unevenness and dependencies across the region are continually perpetuated by colonial and neoimperialist hauntings.
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3.2.1. Caribbean Sovereignty
Globalization has transformed the orthodox and formal understandings of sovereignty (Sassen,
2008; Appadurai, 1996). The exacting notion of exclusive territorialized political authority by a
state, without external interference, is not reflective of present-day understandings and exercises
of sovereignty. Political geographer John Agnew’s (1994) work on the “territorial trap” has been
instructive in re-conceptualizations of sovereignty based on critiques of political theory’s ordered
spatial prejudices. Sovereignty has taken on a deterritorialized and more complex reading. Within
the Caribbean, the region’s historical contingency and specificity is essential in its understandings
of sovereignty. Caribbean sovereignty is not solely characterized by the political control of
territory; its practice is also significantly intertwined with economic development (Lewis, 2013)
and has implications for nationalism (Barrow-Giles, 2003; Lewis, 2013).
Agnew’s (1994) “territorial trap” characterizes the previously distinctive and limited scope
in conceptual, analytical and spatial readings of sovereignty. More specifically, Agnew’s
intervention dismantled the ontological and epistemological lures of the territorial trap, by
exposing what he called “the geographical assumptions of international relations theory”. As a
formative component of Agnew’s argument, he traces the disciplinary boundedness of the field of
International Relations (IR). He draws out the fixity and realist understandings of territory in
International Relations, highlighting the absence in considerations of how space and spatiality are
politically embedded in conceptualizations of territoriality. Agnew also underscores how scholars
of the IR field have been guided by the limiting notion that the world is neatly segmented into
mutually exclusive territorial states. Mamadouh and Dijkink (2006) confirm Agnew’s
observations through discipline mapping, noting the differences in scholarly thought between IR,
Political Geography and Geopolitics. The authors assert that in geographical analyses, the concepts
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used to characterise geopolitical discourses – such as representations, codes, worldviews,
perceptions and assessments of ongoing social developments across geographies– are broader than
similar IR concepts as international identity, security identity or strategic culture. Geographers aim
to underscore the import of geopolitical representations and logics in the wider public. In other
words, geographical and geopolitical representations are much broader in scope. Therefore, a
critical geopolitical interpretation of sovereignty offers a wider and more nuanced lens when
analyzing the relations between geography and politics, space and power.
The “territorial trap” is based on spatial critiques of three geographical assumptions. The
most fundamental assumption is the reification of state territorial spaces as fixed units of secure
sovereign space. The second is the division and distinctiveness of the domestic and the foreign
spaces, and the final assumption is of the territorial state as existing prior to and as a container of
society (Agnew, 1994). Through this analysis, Agnew views sovereignty as a concept that is
necessarily related to spatial frames, or produces space, and one that is not attached to a particular
scale. His reading of the geographical assumptions of territory sets the groundwork for the ways
in which practitioners of critical geopolitics interpret territory and sovereignty. Agnew (2005)
builds on regime theory as a key theoretical contribution of this work through the notion of
“sovereignty regimes”. Employing the category of a sovereignty regime avoids the territorial trap
of previous analyses while maintaining sovereignty as an important element in the construction of
the local, national and world scales. Therefore, sovereignty regimes are operationalized in space
but can function on different scales and can be shared by multiple actors. This pointed
conceptualization has yielded variegated readings of sovereignty. For example, Ong’s (1999)
notion of “graduated sovereignty”, “complex” (Grande & Pauly, 2005), “disaggregated” (Dean,
2010), and “waning” (Brown, 2010).
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On islands, state sovereignty plays out in varied ways, distinct from mainland territories,
given islands’ imperial, colonial and military histories. Islands are concentrated sites where
schemes of territorial controls are expressed and resisted (Mountz, 2014). This has impacted the
categorizations of their jurisdictions, which are hardly ever uniform (Baldacchino & Milne, 2006).
Within islands scholarship, sovereignty is launched across the dual categories of subnational island
jurisdictions (SNIJs) and sovereign island states (SISs). SNIJs disregard the latter configuration in
favour of unique forms of constitutional status within larger state or supranational bodies (Watts,
2000; Baldacchino, 2004; Hepburn, 2012). In addition to attempting to understand how autonomy
may be applied in these varied settings, political geographers also explore how island histories of
imperial and colonial pasts, manifest through power dynamics in the present (Sidaway, 2010).
Scholars also debate if islands are anathema to, or testing ground for, future sovereignties
(Steinberg, 2005) and the stretching of those sovereignties to new limits (Steinberg & Chapman,
2009). Histories, cycles and patterns of colonization, occupation, liberation, displacement,
dispossession, and militarization are island characteristics which determine their sovereignty
practice in complex jurisdictional arrangements (Baldacchino & Milne, 2006; Mountz, 2014).
Caribbean island territories, at independence, were expected to engage in selfdetermination. This assumed that island states would create their own destiny, and that their
existing economies would embrace development. For T&T, in principle, this meant using its newfangled political autonomy to harness the natural capacities of the island nation to fuel its economic
development, through the transition from a sugar to oil industry, and grow the social infrastructure
of the young state. This however, as detailed in chapter one, was slow and littered with adversity,
as the political directorate was still being weaned off the entrenched and prescriptive structures of
metropole-colony governance. This inevitably invited the partial surrender of the nation’s
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economic, and its tacitly affixed political autonomy to external entities. However, if the process of
self-development commenced on an asymmetrical footing, the capacity to progress will also be
uneven. There was therefore no room for the emergence of “novel communities” as independence
suggested – for survival, what existed, had to be utilized. What existed was political autonomy that
could not be effectively harnessed because of economic barriers and embryonic nationalism.
Griffith (2011) opines that the “sovereignty of Caribbean states was compromised from ‘birth’”
(p. 24) – transposing a European-centric idea of self-determination onto a postcolonial landscape
was unproductive (Lewis, 2013). Caribbean sovereignty, Lewis (2013) argues, has been
compromised by both external and globalizing forces, and the persistent system of hierarchy and
domination within postcolonial systems of governance. Colonial states were long considered ill
prepared for self-governance and not large enough to be effective players on the world stage (small
islands). Trinidad and Tobago, therefore, continues to grapple with these inherited
disproportionalities and fragility.
There is a prevailing conception that Caribbean sovereignty is now largely an “empty”
concept (Lewis, 2013) or that it has been “battered and bruised” (Barrow-Giles, 2003). Maingot &
Lozano (2004) however, do not agree that the underpinnings of sovereignty are dead. For the
authors, these underpinnings are “national identity and cultural-political nationalism”. They
suggest that these foundational elements are strategically defensively operationalized when
circumstances demand. For Trinidad and Tobago, defence of its already compromised sovereignty
has been commonplace, as evidenced by noted unpopular decisions that have pushed against
conventions, in economic and political spheres. The island nation guards its sovereignty as its last
“desperate shibboleth”.
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Postcolonial Caribbean territories are by default, disadvantaged in the processes of
development, that were initiated by self-determination. Therefore, in large part, understandings of
sovereignty are read within defensive conceptions. Both the “sovereignty preservation” and
“strategic operationalization” discourses acknowledge these formative and embedded
asymmetries. Barrow-Giles (2003) suggests that a rethinking of nationalism in a wider regional
framework, is necessary to reinforce what exists. This would require ideological shifting that
would allow for the erosion of some elements of national sovereignty for the greater regionalism
project. However, Caribbean leaders’ reductive appreciation of sovereignty is based on domestic
political contours or “petty nationalisms” (Bishop & Payne, 2010). They remain hard-pressed to
negotiate their already limited power.

3.2.2. Geopolitics of Migration
Migration pathways and the regulation of those mobilities is fundamentally a geopolitical exercise
(Nagel, 2002; Hyndman, 2012). The state is strategic in its control of migrant mobilities, operating
in specific places, times and geopolitical contexts (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2012). By capitalizing on
the ambiguity of laws, conventions and structures, states selectively interpret categories of persons
to include or exclude, in accordance with their political and economic agendas. Mechanisms of
control involve spatial strategies and territorial arrangements that not only regulate and control
borders (externally), but also impact how migrants are treated on the inside of those borders.
Schemes of control, or “migration management” characterize the ways in which nation-states (and
other non-governmental and international organizations) implement, cooperate and coordinate
(regional) migratory flows (Grugel & Piper, 2007; Betts, 2011; Koser, 2010). The amplification
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of regulations of migration and mobilities, their limits and consequences, has been categorized as
the “securitization of migration”.
Literature interrogating the means by which migrants are regulated has been expanding in
recent years. There are studies on the rhetoric of securitization and externalization projects with
focus on, for example, difficulties with access to refugee protection due to stricter asylum criteria,
and outsourcing and offshoring border control (Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Hiemstra, 2012;
Coleman, 2007; Squire, 2016; Jones, 2016); and varied forms of containment and detention
(Bosworth, 2014; Turnbull, 2016). The politics of the search for safe haven has also gained
currency with the perpetually shifting goalposts of immigration policies that impact, for example,
sanctuary cities or migratory movements inspired by evasion of military service (Yuval Davis et
al., 2005; Lippert & Rehaag, 2012; Mountz, 2020). Additionally, “crisis” considerations have
caused readings of forced displacement in terms of “survival migration” relative to the refugee
regime (Betts, 2013, 2019). In all of this work, political and economic agendas are unhidden, and
show the prevailing absence of a social-human element, where human rights are severely
diminished.
On islands, Mountz & Loyd (2014) suggest that migration management, plays out through
a constant reconfiguration of sovereignty that works to strengthen borders and further restrict
mobilities while infringing on human rights, particularly in instances of “crisis”. The language of
“crisis” however, is a means to a geo-political end. In part, perpetuated by media narratives, states
have engaged “crisis” as a conduit through which they can expand sovereign power and reach,
toward keeping the “threat” away and fighting it close to its source (Hiemstra & Mountz, 2013).
This has markedly altered the ways in which migration management is being practiced.
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Among Caribbean territories, regulatory migration regimes are largely tied to economic
motivations. The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) is an important attempt at a
regional migration management system. It is a labour mobility scheme for “CARICOM Skilled
Nationals”. However, there are several categories of persons, with different motivations, migrating
across the Caribbean region. Berta Fernández-Alfaro and Gerard Pascua (2006), whose work draw
heavily from meetings held between the IOM and Caribbean governments on the matter of mixed
migration flows, argue that there is not a “ready-made” migration management model, given the
uniqueness of each island. “Migrant communities do not all behave in the same way, evolve
socially or economically at the same pace, or develop the same relationship patterns with the host
society” (Fernández-Alfaro & Pascua, 2006). The deficiencies in accommodating different types
and categories of migratory flows are quite visible in islands’ immigration policies. State policy
and legislative positions on island migration management cannot be considered in abstraction.
Islands’ histories and geo- political and -economic configurations also weigh on decisions being
made.

3.3. Mapping the Response
In this section I document the events and circumstances that worked toward the eventual response
by the T&T government to the Venezuelan crisis and the Maduro migrations. I focus on the T&TOAS-US relationship and the actions by all stakeholders, causing T&T to articulate a formal
position on the crisis in Venezuela, that then facilitated tangible action in the islands’ domestic
context.
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3.3.1. Enduring Warm Relations between Venezuela’s Maduro and Trinidad and Tobago
Despite the deepening political divergence at the international level on the Venezuelan crisis,
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela maintained a cordial relationship. This was evidenced by
T&T’s endorsement of the Maduro regime in its foreign policy and the furthering of bilateral geoeconomic interests between both countries. In May 2016, Maduro made a whirlwind trip to the
Caribbean islands. His visit to T&T culminated with “historic” deals being brokered (Boothroyd,
2016). The preservation of Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela relations amidst volatile geo-political
circumstances, created diplomatic tensions among stakeholders: the situation was characterized as
T&T’s privileging of its economic capacity over human life. To justify the T&T state’s actions,
control of the narrative was important; the outward non-acknowledgement of crisis circumstances
in Venezuela, and the invocation of the island’s autonomy.
Coming out of Maduro’s 2016 Caribbean trip, T&T and Venezuela struck deals on
manufactured goods and the supply of natural gas. Through a USD $50 million revolving fund
Venezuela would purchase manufactured goods from T&T. In addition, a Memorandum of
Understanding secured T&T’s purchase of natural gas from Venezuela’s offshore Dragon Field.
By August 2018 however, T&T’s manufacturers were complaining that they were owed monies
from the Venezuelan authorities, amounting to US$979,000 (Harrinanan, 2018). The bilateral
commercial agreements between Trinidad and Tobago’s local manufacturers and the Corporacion
Venezolana de Comercia Exterior (CORPOVEX) were peddled to the T&T public as a beneficial
deal that would only redound to the betterment of the economy and specifically, local
manufacturers. However, with looming uncertainties around Venezuela’s capacity to meet their
economic commitments, the larger of the two agreements – the gas supply deal – came under
severe scrutiny.
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Ambiguities fuelled the critical reception of the Dragon Gas deal with Venezuela. When
asked about the terms of the “Dragon deal”, at its official announcement, the Prime Minister
indicated that he was not at liberty to disclose certain information; that the information was
“confidential”. At the backdrop of what was touted as a significant deal to sustain the health of
T&T’s economy, the media went into a frenzy. Capturing the next day’s news cycle was the
headline “Secret Dragon Deal” (Trinidad Express, 2018). The Minister of Energy and Energy
Affairs subsequently held a press conference to clarify the government’s position, stating that price
clauses like the ones to which inquiries were made, are not disclosed as standard practice.
Confronted with questions about the crisis circumstances in Venezuela, the Minister replied that
he was not aware of a humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. This appeared as an effort at reassurance.
The state was promoting a “business as usual” narrative, in light of the fresh economic
commitments made with Venezuela.
In February 2020, however, this highly publicized Dragon gas agreement with Venezuela
was rescinded. This was as a consequence of the imposed US sanctions on Venezuela’s PDVSA,
which has impeded its ability to operate with certain external stakeholders. T&T has been
obliquely impacted by this US sanction on its Venezuelan neighbour. Relations with Venezuela
continue to be friendly, however, T&T is carrying on with the gas project independently.
The attendance of T&T’s Foreign and CARICOM Affairs Minister at Maduro’s
contentious second inauguration in January 2019 crystallized T&T’s endorsement of the Maduro
regime. Maduro himself acknowledged Trinidad and Tobago in his inauguration remarks. The
T&T public was not initially made aware that a representative was sent to Venezuela for this event,
until the media saw the Minister on Venezuela’s TV coverage of the event. In a post-cabinet press
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conference, the Minister of Communications15 stated, “[w]e are a sovereign nation. The minister
going to represent TT at the inauguration today speaks for itself. We have consistently said as an
administration that we recognise the government of Venezuela and we stand as a neighbour ready
to assist in any way we can” (Bridglal, 2019). The political performativity attached to sending
T&T representative to the inauguration, and in such secretive circumstances demonstrates T&T’s
legitimation and support of the Maduro regime. It also suggests an attempt by the state to not
publicize its actions, so as not to agitate observers, given the prevailing sentiment about the
Maduro regime. This action however, sent a clear message to the international community. When
confronted about the impact of this event on the nation’s international reputation, the Minister
reiterated that as a sovereign nation, external commentaries have no impact on its independent
activities.
Further evidence of T&T’s enduring relationship with the Maduro government was
reflected in the way it chose to vote—or not vote—at the level of the Organization of American
States. See Table 1 for a summary of T&T’s Voting Record on OAS Resolutions in relation to
Venezuela.

15

T&T’s Minister of Communications also holds the portfolio of Minister of National Security.
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Table 1
T&T’s Voting Record on Venezuela Related Resolutions (2017-2019) at the OAS
Date
June 2017

Resolution
US-backed
Resolution

June 2018

AG/RES. 2929
(XLVIII-O/18)

January 2019

CP/RES. 1117
(2200/19)
CP/RES. 1124
(2217/19)

April 2019

Resolution Objective
- A call for mediation on the Venezuelan political
crisis and Maduro’s reconsideration of his intention
to rewrite the Venezuelan constitution.
- To declare that the May 2018 Venezuelan election
was undemocratic; not meeting international
standards.
- A call for member states to reject Maduro’s new
term as President of Venezuela.
- A call for member states to accept the
appointment of Juan Guaido’s envoy as designated
Permanent Representative of Venezuela at the
OAS, pending fresh elections.

T&T’s Vote
Abstain

Abstain

Abstain
Abstain

Note: Adapted from Johnson (2019)
T&T’s record of abstaining on any resolutions pertaining to Venezuela is consistent.
During this time as well, following the Maduro delegation’s threat to withdraw from the Permanent
Council, CARICOM member states proposed a resolution for Venezuela’s contingent to
reconsider their withdrawal position, frontally supported by T&T – it failed. What is of parallel
significance here is the voting dynamics attached to the failed US-backed Resolution in 2017 in
particular, where 20 member states voted in favour, and 23 against. CARICOM member states
constitute a major bloc of votes, 14 in number. On this specific Resolution, where only three more
votes were needed for a majority decision, Dominica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the
Grenadines voted against, while Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Haiti, Suriname and Trinidad and
Tobago abstained.
From the very outset, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago declared his strong
objection to the OAS’ Secretary General Luis Almagro and called for his removal. The Prime
Minister alleged that Almagro was not neutral on the Venezuela issue, having already adopted a
clearly visible stance. The Prime Minister felt quite strongly about the “very derogatory manner”
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(Hassanali, 2017) in which Almagro engaged Maduro. The relationship between T&T and the
Nicolas Maduro government remained steadfast.

3.3.2 The United States’ Fracturing Efforts in the Caribbean
Many instances of US intervention litter the history of Caribbean relations. The United States has
“interfered” during some of the more critical and vulnerable moments in the Caribbean’s history.
Through political maneuverings, these intrusions and interferences have often caused chasms
between Caribbean nations. While institutions such as CARICOM outwardly stand united on
regional foreign and economic policies, the US has frequently sneakily used economic
inducements to further its agenda, by engaging select countries. This essentially pits Caribbean
nations against one another. The United States actions in this Venezuelan crisis circumstance, is
replete with historical antecedence.
After President Trump’s declaration of Juan Guaidó’s recognition as interim President of
Venezuela, and the National Assembly as the only legitimate branch of government in January
2019, a firestorm of global responses and actions were set in motion. The T&T government, stated
in no uncertain terms, that the island nation recognizes Nicolás Maduro as the President of
Venezuela. This prompted a reaction from the US ambassador to T&T to comment on the country’s
position as “deeply concerning” (US Embassy in Trinidad & Tobago, 2019). Prime Minister
Rowley in a statement to T&T’s Parliament later stated:
“I take umbrage at the United States Ambassador in Trinidad and Tobago making a public
statement, criticizing the actions of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago as we take
action in protection of the interest of the people of Trinidad and Tobago…[w]e in Trinidad
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and Tobago under all of our government, we have preserved the sovereign position of the
people of Trinidad and Tobago.”
He continued:
“Until there is a change of government in Venezuela, as Mr. Patrick Manning [former
Prime Minister] said, ‘when you pick up the phone, is who answer the phone (is) in charge
of Venezuela.’ What they are asking us to do is to take sides largely contrived by external
forces. If you are going to have a change of regime in today's world post-World War 2 and
you want to do it properly, you’re required to go through the UN and sanction it. Trinidad
and Tobago will not be invited to take any interest that would damage our relations with
neighbours.” (HR Deb, 2019)
In his condemnation of the Ambassador’s comments and by extension, the United States
of America, Dr. Rowley insisted that T&T is maintaining its usual line of diplomacy between
countries, as was illustrated in the actions of a former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago.
More forcefully however, he reiterated the independence that a sovereign nation enjoys, separate
and apart from external forces in making country-decisions.
Amidst these developments, CARICOM held an emergency session to discuss the new
situation, and subsequently articulated a regional position on the matter. In a unified front, the
“Heads of Government reaffirmed their guiding principles of non-interference and nonintervention in the affairs of states, respect for sovereignty, adherence to the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and democracy” (CARICOM, 2019). The regional body cited the tenets
of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter and Article 21 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, which both speak to “territorial inviolability” and the non-use of force, in support

74

of its position. Grant (2013) characterizes this as a “statist approach” by CARICOM, and not
without historical precedence.
In its first direct engagement with the Caribbean, related to the Venezuela situation, the
United States deployed a traditional “divide and conquer” mode of operation. In March 2019,
President Trump invited five CARICOM leaders to his private residence in Mar-a-Lago for
discussions on “trade, energy and security issues”. The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Jamaica and St. Lucia were invited – four out of the five states were among the Caribbean nations
to vote in favour of the US-backed resolution to not recognize the Maduro administration in
January 2017. They are also all members of the Lima Group, whose objective is regime change in
Venezuela. No invitation was extended to Trinidad and Tobago. This strategic move by President
Trump is in keeping with historical moments where the US has sought to divide CARICOM
nations on issues.

3.3.3. The Politics of Re-Presentation: On Numbers & Shifting the Narrative
There was a significant absence of government acknowledgement of the Venezuelan migration inflow to T&T, in the first instance. Conversations on the ground in T&T, and amongst service
providers, were largely related the increase in the numbers of “Spanish refugees16”. After a
protracted period of governmental silence, the government in 2017, through the Attorney General
commented on the island’s “refugee” situation. He continued that refugee legislation “as a matter
of policy must be driven by data and the data has to come from the immigration authorities” (Lord,
2017). At this juncture, no data were made public by neither T&T’s government ministries, nor

“Spanish” is the collective term used by Trinidadians and Tobagonians to refer to persons originating from Latin
American and Spanish speaking Caribbean countries. In this context, it is not used to refer to nationals from the
country of Spain.
16
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the Venezuelan authorities. The AG continued, “[b]efore we even get to that venture (specific
refugee legislation) we have got to make sure that our most disadvantaged citizens have the kind
of access that they ought to have, first. So I can’t see that we can open a flood gate for refugees…”
(Lord, 2017). The Attorney General went on to cite resource and economic capacity constraints,
referring to the limitations of small island economies to help “foreigners”. Inherent in the AG’s
response as well, was the notion that the matter was not urgent for public and state concern. The
AG’s intervention is illustrative of a mindful disregard to the realities on the ground, to propagate
in the public’s consciousness a non-urgent, “business as usual” narrative. This dissonance is part
and parcel of a state politics of re-presentation.
The skillful use of less than reliable data to nurture and sustain a specific discourse, is
embedded in the character of statecraft. The state’s deliberate reworking of statistics in reaction to
contentions and challenges, fortifies the argument. In an October 2014 statement for example,
T&T’s National Security Minister, indicated that there were more than 100,000 undocumented
migrants in the country then, out of a total national population of 1.3 million. While a Global
Detention Project (2017) publication cited a UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
statistic in its Trinidad and Tobago’s profile, indicating that there were only 49,900 international
migrants in the country as of 2015. Admittedly, conflicting, inaccurate or missing data altogether
is an enduring problem in the general area of migration work, given the “undocumented-ness” of
a large proportion of these migrations. The data analysis made available for public consumption,
raises questions around the intentionality of the publicized data.
As another example, the Minister in the Ministry of National Security, in response to a
parliamentary question in June 2017 indicated that “based on the ministry’s records, for the period
January 1 to May 1, 2017, there were 15,042 illegal immigrants in T&T. He said of this total, 1,415
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were Venezuelans… [t]hese are people whose landed certificate has expired, and the records show
they have not left the country” (HR Deb, 2017). While elsewhere, the UNHCR divulged a number
specific to Venezuelans that was significantly larger than that quoted by the Minister. In response
to the published UNHCR figure, the substantive Minister of National Security in September 2017
commented that “[f]rom the early part of this year there has been a decrease in the number of
Venezuelans coming to T&T from over the last three years or so” (Kowlessar, 2017). In 2019, the
Chief Immigration Officer at a Joint Select Committee (JSC) of the Parliament on Human Rights,
Equity and Diversity, substantiated the Minister’s answer, stating that the numbers did in fact
decrease (see Table 2), however, she revealed that the mode of entry being used by Venezuelans,
had shifted to boat crossings, rather than use of the airport. This shift increases the unreliability of
the absolute statistics presented. The Chief Immigration Officer stated that “(a)t least 150 to 200
Venezuelan nationals arrive by boat every week from Venezuela” (JSC Report, 2019a). These are
numbers recorded at official ports of entry. In the same breath, she acknowledged “that more and
more of the (Venezuelan) individuals are entering the country illegally” (JSC Report, 2019a, p.
99).
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Table 2
Number of Venezuelan Immigrants who arrived in T&T for the period 2015 to 2017
Port of Entry
Piarco Airport
ANR Robinson Airport [Tobago]
Boading Stations, Port of Spain
(Queen’s Wharf)
Pointe-a-Pierre
Chaguaramas
Point Lisas
Cedros
Scarborough [Tobago]
Charlotteville [Tobago]
San Fernando
Claxton Bay
National Fisheries, Port of Spain
Total

2015
57,333
36
396

2016
28,853
90
99

2017
17,259
52
861

2,165
43
18
1,216
1
1
367
23
3
61,602

2,191
26
48
4,873
0
0
1,239
37
3
37,459

1,228
18
23
5,111
0
0
1,069
1
0
25,622

Note: Reproduced from JSC Report (2019a)
There have been several reports of boats being overturned in the Gulf of Paria, recording
the loss of life of entire families. When the journey is successful, some boats land at certain
unpatrolled points on Trinidad’s Western peninsula and persons make unauthorized entry into the
country. Therefore, the accuracy of the number of Venezuelans can reasonably be estimated to be
higher than the numbers cited by the government. The data on this migratory flow are not reliable.
The Trinidad and Tobago government modified its tone on the matter, specific to its
audience. On the one hand, the government stated that there was a decrease in the number of
Venezuelan arrivals, while at the same time, it discretely undertook an upgrade of the Cedros port
facilities in 2016, that paralleled with the heightened frequency in Venezuelan arrivals. At that
time, Chairman of the Regional Corporation responsible for the south western peninsula stated that
“at least 75 Venezuelans are travelling to Trinidad through the port in Cedros every two days for
the past six months…this is a 500 per cent increase in the past two years” (Wayow, 2016).
Triggered by the Attorney General’s 2017 comments, the government periodically reassured the
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public that it was refining the 2014 “Draft National Policy to Address Refugee and Asylum Matters
in Trinidad and Tobago” to make it into law. This was a common soundbite both inside and out of
the Parliament. The government’s “business as usual” narrative was interspersed by
“reassurances” over its control of the situation in the short term, to specific international and local
audiences.
In the politics of re-presentation, the state’s migration discourse also evoked questions
around “placing the migrant” in predefined legal categories with/out recognition of specific
circumstances. Implicit in Ministers’ statements and the (un)availability of data on the migration
stock and flows, the problematics with the categorization of migrants is pervasive. From the onset
of the inflow of Venezuelans, the state was focussed on two main and “uncomplicated” categories:
in the first instance, “illegal immigrants”, and to a lesser extent, refugees. The UNHCR and its
local partner, the Living Waters Community was vocal about the increase in asylum seekers
numbers. These agitations compelled the government to insist that refugee legislation was being
considered, and that the Ministry of National Security through the coast guard was engaged in
heightened border patrols in collaboration with Venezuelan authorities. However, shifting the
tenor of the conversation in 2018, during a Prime Minister’s speech, Dr. Rowley chose to “remind”
the public that many of the Venezuelans entering the country were “economic migrants”, many of
them illegal. He stated “[e]conomic migrants do not automatically or easily qualify for refugee
status…” (Bridglal, 2018). The state’s categorization here, was deliberate. Categories render some
people visible, and others invisible, while at the same time standardize and normalize practices
(Allen et al., 2018). It should be noted that as time progressed, it would become clearer that the
Prime Minister set the foundation for a complete erasure of “refugee” from the Venezuela
migration conversation.
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In the “absence” of reliable data, the T&T state sought to craft a narrative that the situation
of the Venezuelan inflow to the country was of no urgency and did not occupy the state’s
immediate attention. The realities on the ground were starkly different to the government’s
representation. It would be learned however, that a “business as usual” environment was necessary
to facilitate and sustain geo-economic interests with the country of Venezuela. This politics of representation that the T&T state engaged, did not only have implications for the economic
environment, but also the messages that were filtered down to the T&T nationals on the matter.
With these kinds of mixed narratives, inconsistencies and conflicting statistics gave rise to
agitations on the ground and tense commentaries toward Venezuelan migrants in the country,
regardless of their immigration status.

3.3.4. “T&T Not [A] Refugee Camp”
In the face of an in-flow of Venezuelans from 2015 onward, the state’s response can be
characterized as lethargic, but strategically reactionary. In addition to the unfolding events on the
international scene, burgeoning issues and agitations at home also impacted the state’s response.
There was a slow and incremental build-up, which then saw the deportation of Venezuelans,
followed by the implementation of a temporary work-exempt permit programme – abdicating
efforts at refugee protectionism – and ultimately, the installation of a visa regime specific to
Venezuelan immigrants. Throughout these developments, T&T’s coast guards were mandated to
increase patrols along the island’s Western peninsula, while at the same time, police and
immigration officials would undertake “raids” or “searches” in specific places in-land. The state’s
“policy in practice” was, and continues to be, exclusionary and restrictive.
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Refugees and refugee protection were prominent among early narratives in discussions
about the inflow of Venezuelans to T&T. These were important issues because the island nation
was devoid of any domestic legislation to activate the protections enshrined in the 1951
Convention, to which it subscribed. A suite of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) outlined in
a 2014 “Draft-Working Document”, and later revised in 2017, was operationalized to facilitate
asylum-seekers, in the absence of local law. These SOPs laid out the practices and procedures to
be followed when registering an asylum-seeker. The UNHCR and the Living Waters Community
were mandated to inform the local Immigration Division of all asylum seekers that were registered
with them. Asylum-seekers, once made known to the Immigration Division, would undergo
background checks. If cleared, they would then be issued an Order of Supervision17. These are
certificates that register the individual with the Ministry. This documentation also details the
mandatory times when registrants are expected to meet with Ministry officials for updates and
check-ins. In these existing circumstances, asylum-seekers are not allowed to work or access social
services such as second tier health services or the public education system. They are essentially in
limbo, while waiting on their assessments.
The footnote attached to the revised Draft Policy in 2017 is a permanent snapshot of the
progress of the T&T government on the refugee issue, at the time of this writing:
“These SOPs were developed by the International Affairs Unit, Ministry of National
Security, UNHCR and LWC have not been approved by Cabinet. Some procedures have
changed since the introduction of these SOPs. SOPs will remain in effect until legislation
is enacted and/or official approval of the National Policy to Address Refugee and Asylum
Matters in Trinidad and Tobago.” (My emphasis)

Orders of Supervision, depending on the case, are also offered to immigrants who are deemed to be “illegal” in
lieu of detention.
17
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Beyond the revised SOPs in 2017, and despite consistent reassurances by the government,
the situation remained unchanged. Over this period, no refugee legislation went to Parliament to
be debated.
Legal non-acknowledgement by the state, amplified the precarities of Venezuelans on the
island. Although Venezuelan migrants who sought asylum were facilitated by the SOPs, other
immigrants were subject to the regular immigration laws of the land, where, if they decided to stay
beyond the three months allowance, they had to seek the authorization of the Ministry.
Venezuelans who “became illegal” as per the definitions of the local laws, or those who arrived at
the island “irregularly”, were forced to maintain an incognito lifestyle, since there were absolutely
no protections or allowances afforded to them. Societal antipathy and the state apparatus were in
overdrive. The immigration division and police would routinely engage in “raids” or “searches”,
targeting areas that they suspected housed “illegal Venezuelans”. This was divulged by the Chief
Immigration Officer at a JSC, where she stated that the number of detainees changed quite
regularly at the Immigration Detention Center (IDC), depending on the frequency of “exercises”
that were undertaken. (The lived experiences of Venezuelans migrants in Trinidad will be
discussed in the Chapter 4).
The Prime Minister’s 2018 actions of deporting a plane-load of Venezuelans, and his
subsequent retort to the United Nations’ condemnation, brought the twin-island into world focus.
82 Venezuelan immigrants, 53 men and 29 women, who were held at the island’s IDC were
deported in April of 2018 (Sunday Express, 2018). However, there were major contentions
surrounding the circumstances of their repatriation. The government stated that the 82 individuals
volunteered to be sent back to Venezuela. Deportees’ relatives on the other hand, contended that
the deportees were forced to sign documents that they did not fully understand. The UNHCR also
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charged that 13 of the 82 Venezuelans were asylum-seekers and 19 others were in the process of
becoming asylum-seekers (UNHCR, 2018). The government indicated that this was a collaborative
exercise with the Venezuelan embassy, where the deportees were transported on a Venezuelan
aircraft. The UNHCR stated that the actions by Trinidad and Tobago, being signatory to the 1951
Convention, went against the principles of non-refoulement and asylum-seekers’ confidentiality.
Information was obviously shared with the Venezuelan authorities in this “transaction”. The Prime
Minister in swift and almost combative language, wrote to the UN and publicly stated that the
country “will not allow without protest any international agency to misrepresent our circumstance
to the world and stay in TT” (Bridglal, 2018). His statements causing the fraught news headline
the following day, articulating Trinidad and Tobago’s position: “TT Not Refugee Camp” (Bridglal,
2018). The Prime Minister continued, “(b)earing in mind we are not China, Russia or America, we
are a little island. We have limited space. 1.3 million people. Therefore, we cannot and will not
allow UN spokespersons to convert us into a refugee camp.” The Prime Minister, like his Attorney
General earlier, invoked the limitations of small island geographies, but went a step further to
lambast the United Nations for interfering in the domestic affairs of the nation – a theme that is
pervasive in this response mapping.
The state began changing the tone of the Venezuela to Trinidad migration discourse, by
shifting focus away from refugee references to “economic migrants”. It came as little surprise then,
when in 2019, the government initiated a one-year work-permit exempt scheme to all Venezuelans
in the island. This “Migrant Registration Framework” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2019)
effectively placed all Venezuelans in the neat and manageable category of “economic migrant”.
The Minister of National Security confirmed this position, when he declared in Parliament that
‘“refugees’” is simply a ‘“buzz word’”, further claiming that ‘“…we do not have refugees here,
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we are dealing with migrants’” (Senate Deb, 2019). Not only does this stance by the government
discount the complexities of migration flows and the different motivations for Venezuelans’
migration, but it allows the state to circumvent its responsibilities to migrants enshrined in
international law and conventions. It also ascribes a degree of temporariness to the situation, to
which the state has a limited commitment.
The Migration Registration Framework was operationalized in June 2019. This exercise
enabled Venezuelan migrants to work legally in Trinidad and Tobago for a period of up to 6
months in the first instance, and after a follow-up interview, potentially another 6 months would
be granted to them (Ramdass, 2019) The government extended a 2-week amnesty to all
Venezuelans on the island to present themselves to “register”. If the registrants qualified, after
having gone through background and health checks, they would later be furnished with a special
identification card. Although this framework allows migrants to work, they are still not allowed to
access the full complement of social services, including follow up health checks and the public
education system (as noted about asylum-seekers earlier).
Critical readings of this governmental action suggest that this short-term measure serves as
a rudimentary counting and surveillance mechanism and was an attempt to appease international
and domestic agitations while maintaining political expedience. After the much-publicized
deportation situation in 2018, statistics on Venezuelans in T&T ranged from 40,000 to 60,000
people (UNHCR, 2019; Vice News, 2019). The government sought to challenge these figures,
stating that the cited numbers were comparable to the total population of the isle of Tobago, and
there was no possible way they could be accurate. After the “registration” exercise, it was revealed
that 16,523 Venezuelans were registered (Senate Deb, 2019) during the two-week amnesty.
However, there are several factors that could be attributed to this low figure, for example, it is a
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noted fact that the two-week period could not accommodate all the Venezuelans presenting
themselves to register. In addition, there were reports of persons being fearful that their
information was going to be shared with the Venezuelan authorities to be “verified”, possibly
acting as a disincentive to make themselves visible to the state for identification. These were clear
evidence supporting the notion that government’s action was devoid of any consideration of the
happenings in Venezuela.
There was pervasive opposition among the electorate in T&T, who did not welcome the
work permit exemption for Venezuelans. With an impending general election in late 2020, the
government has faced significant pressure from the opposition to take a position on the Venezuela
situation. Immediately following President Trump’s declaration that the US recognized Juan
Guaidó, the T&T opposition party made its own declaration in the same vein.
Immediately at the end of the amnesty period, and in a historic move in T&T and Venezuela
relations, the government announced that it would implement new requirements to Venezuelans
seeking to enter the country. The new requirement is a visa. Venezuelans were instructed that
applications could be made at T&T’s embassy in Caracas. Over the months, there has been some
reporting that the embassy stopped issuing visas. In an October 2019 press release however, the
government stated that it had issued 403 visas at the embassy since June 2019, and operations were
ongoing.
Further evidence of the state’s non-alignment and non-complicity with external entities
came in May 2019, when the state had cause to issue a press release refuting claims that it accepted
funds from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This was in
reference to US$1.6 million in USAID funding made available to T&T to assist Venezuelans.
Although the US Embassy’s earlier press release indicated that the T&T government was present
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at discussions, the government later denied claims that it accepted the monies, calling the
assertions “mischievous”. The USAID funding was instead dispersed to NGOs and other Civil
Society Organizations. Such an energetic response from the government is telling of the narrative
that it attempted to maintain— rejecting external support from the US. The disrupting event gives
the perception that the T&T government was taking instruction from the hegemon US relating to
the treatment of Venezuelans. In addition, the message it sends to its Venezuelan neighbour would
be duplicitous.
The issues to, and the scales at which the T&T state responded differed but were
processually linked. T&T has made it clear that it continues to recognize the Maduro
administration as legitimate. However, it’s position to the resolution of the Venezuelan “crisis” is
the non-intervention and non-interference of external forces, that is, military intervention directed
by other nations to force regime change. It believes that the people of Venezuela, will for
themselves, determine the political future of their own country. In so doing, Trinidad and Tobago
has offered to act as mediator between Venezuelan parties, along with CARICOM. The island
nation has decided to circumscribe Venezuelan migrants in its domestic space to the category of
“economic migrants”. I have shown how this action is short-sighted, but necessary to restrict
governmental commitments to the migrants and diminishes pressures of external directives. The
government’s actions continue to be reactionary, but expedient.

3.4. An Island’s Defence
The long-held view that the size of island states is a direct measure of their voices and impact is
weakening. The complexities of the current global circumstance rejects the idea that islands are
merely geopolitical pawns on the world stage. In the postcolonial and globalized contexts, islands
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occupy important positions in foreign affairs and harness capacities to facilitate or impede global
advancements. Trinidad and Tobago state’s response to the Venezuelan crisis and the Maduro
migrations, in the face of domestic and international pressures, supports this notion. The island
nation situated itself as a defender of its sovereignty through its definitive pronouncements and the
ways in which it chose to exercise the freedoms and privileges that are entrenched, when it
presumed that its territorial and political autonomy were being challenged. As observed in the
unfolding of events, there were two declarations or arguments consistently invoked by state
spokespersons, that is, T&T is a sovereign nation, and it is a small island with limited resource
capacities. These declarations can be characterized as island’s assertion and defense of its
territorial and political sovereignty in an environment where the established expectation is to defer
to the larger, “more powerful” entities.
T&T’s response also illustrated the strategic use of existing geopolitical infrastructures to
operationalize and launch its defense. In its current formation, Small Island Developing States
(SIDS), are still victim to the asymmetries that exist in the geopolitical landscape. Therefore, to
engage in a forceful response or position on certain matters, SIDS must engage the political outlets
that exist. T&T made representations to the United Nations through the regional CARICOM body,
in its efforts toward acknowledgement. Inherent in the island’s response however is a variation of
a politics of convenience, which can be read as a default position of islands. Without much latitude
or many options, T&T’s response was littered with incongruities, namely 1) its action of
lambasting the United Nations for its criticism of the country’s handling of the Venezuelan
immigrant situation, yet using the United Nations’ charter principles to justify its own position
and, 2) the island nation’s vacillating position on the reception of Venezuelan migrants, as
compared to its record with migrants from different countries in “crisis” situations.
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3.4.1. In defence of island sovereignty and economy
Trinidad and Tobago privileged its domestic geo-economic interests despite the devolving
hemispheric geopolitics on the internal Venezuela matter. One must consider that T&T, like
Venezuela, is also a single commodity economy, and it too was impacted by the sudden drop in
world oil prices. Even as the situation in Venezuela continued to deteriorate, and international
clamourings were amplified, Trinidad and Tobago sought to enter into a significant and long -term
gas deal with Venezuela (now terminated). It was, however, a deal that would have impacted the
future economy of the nation. Despite the noisy political backdrop, this new geo-economic
arrangement was a symbol of its sovereignty exercised – on its autonomy and right to selfdetermination in the face of global oppositions. As a further exercise of this sovereignty, the
nation’s voting record at the OAS also sent a clear message to the global community and in
particular, the United States of America. At both scales of response: to the OAS’ resolutions, and
to the UN on the deportation situation, the island nation was characterized as a “non-supporter” of
humanitarian and peace efforts in a time of “crisis” in international affairs. Critics can also argue
that this voting record made T&T an “ally” of the Maduro regime, a kind of castigation for the
nation’s non-compliance in these matters. Of course, there are many nuances attached to the
alarmist term “crisis” and the extended allowances that its usage facilitates in “acute” moments
(Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014).
Trinidad and Tobago’s apprehensiveness to the dictates of the United States towards
Venezuela, and marked by Trump’s fracturing efforts in the Caribbean, is not discrete, rather it is
steeped in historical precedence that haunts the everyday of the island, and the Caribbean region.
When President Trump invited the 5 Caribbean leaders for a private visit to his residence, in the
face of an already articulated regional position on Venezuela, it was quite reminiscent of the
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circumstances around the US led invasion of Grenada in 1983. At that time, some CARICOM
nations supported Maurice Bishop’s revolutionary government in Grenada, however the US
worked to garner the support of the smaller, conservative-led six-member Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS). In the end, the leaders of the OECS supported President Reagan in his
invasion of Grenada (Lewis, 1999). After three days, and hundreds of casualties, the island was
“recaptured”, and a new US-backed representative was installed. The US invasion of Grenada
boosted Ronald Reagan’s popularity ahead of the 1984 US presidential election. Trump’s recent
encounter can be viewed in the same vein, taking a page from his predecessor’s “playbook”. In the
geopolitical circumstances, the urgency with which the Caribbean leaders accepted the meeting
with the US President, is an indication of the internal divergences in the region and the continued
influence of the United States of America in the Caribbean.
History and situational geography are the axes upon which contemporary trajectories are
fashioned on islands. The US involvement in the Caribbean during previous moments of
uneasiness and wars, left bases and military and socio-economic ruin on some islands. Haunting,
ruination and ruins are part of islands’ everyday. With the understanding that regime change is the
objective of the US in Venezuela, where “all options are on the table” (White House, 2019), T&T’s
situational geography will undoubtedly be a strategic point of location for a potential intervention
into the north eastern segment of the Venezuelan mainland. Trinidad and Tobago is a prime geostrategic island. T&T’s reaction to the US’ position is unsurprising. This apprehensiveness,
therefore, is rooted in scenarios that have played out in the region previously.
Further, small islands are romanticized as helpless and needy contexts, however, in this
“crisis” instance, T&T sought to actively subvert this characterization by disentangling itself from
the views of external observers. It is apparent that the political philosophy of the T&T state on this
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matter, is that once allowance is provisioned by external parties to intervene in domestic issues,
the country’s ability to be autonomous and self-determining is automatically eroded.

3.4.2. Island geographies: In defence of its borders
How does an island – land completely surrounded by water – defend against the perceived erosion
of its sovereign borders? It discursively produces a wall. The state engaged its physical and policy
resources to disincentivize Venezuelans from making their way across to the island nation. The
Ministry of National Security, through its coast guard fleet, intensified its surveillance efforts at
designated ports of entry, and along the western coastline of the island. Venezuelans attempting to
make their way across to Trinidad by plane or by boat faced tremendous difficulties. There were
several reports of boat deaths occurring in the Gulf of Paria during this period. All along, the
government continually assured the public that refugee legislation was being considered, however
the eventual outcome was an absolute obliteration of this focus, to the more manageable and shortterm economic migrant scheme. This is akin to Wendy Brown’s (2010) conception that states
engage in “programs of wall-building” to offset the idea that there is an erosion of nation-state
sovereignty. Of course, the physical geography does not allow for the construction of a physical
wall, therefore, through restrictive policies and enforcement practices, it discursively constructs
one.
This very slow, restrictive and hard-lined approach to the Venezuelan in-migration
scenario is curious. I contrast this to the “crisis” situation on the island of Dominica, when it was
hit by Hurricane Maria in 2017. The response to the influx of Venezuelan migrants in the domestic
context is a lucid example of the vacillating nature of the T&T’s immigration policy. Immediately
after Hurricane Maria’s passage, the Prime Minister of T&T extended an invitation to Dominicans.
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He stated, “given the fact that there are tens of thousands of Dominicans who have neither shelter
nor sustenance…we will waive all restrictions for the next six months to any citizen of Dominica
who finds his/her way to Trinidad and Tobago” (Ghouralal, 2017). Dr. Rowley added that despite
the current economic challenges faced by the country, Trinidad and Tobago must be its “brother’s
keeper”. The Prime Minister’s concerns over the economic capacity or space to accommodate the
“tens of thousands” of Dominicans were smoothly played down in this instance.
Notwithstanding institutional ties to Dominica, pregnant questions related to why the T&T
instituted such an open and flexible policy to Dominicans, but not to Venezuelan immigrants arise.
Do the migration consequences of a politico-economically motivated “crisis” versus a natural
disaster differ? Is there more solidarity among island nations, given their shared histories, in
“crisis” times? Is there a phenotype and language similarity factor in considerations of the
Dominican-TT dynamic versus Venezuela-TT context? Interestingly, there significant outrage was
registered amongst T&T public toward the Dominican migration scenario, similar to what was
being directed to Venezuelan migrants, bordering on racist and xenophobic commentaries. In
responding to citizens’ commentaries, the Prime Minister said that he was “disappointed”. He said
that this situation was a question of humanity and he was hopeful that citizens would put their
personal reservations aside and try to help (Chan Tack, 2017). Dimensions of these fraught
questions will be examined in Chapter Four.

3.5. Conclusion
Contemporary political struggles demonstrate that islands remain sites of national anxiety,
imperial desire, and conflict over local and geopolitical struggles for autonomy and territorial
control (Mountz, 2015). Trinidad and Tobago’s response to Venezuelan crisis and the Maduro
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Migrations serves as a naked illustration of the everyday ambitions of islands in the globalized
context, that is, self preservation through sovereignty practice. Political geographers and migration
scholars have focussed on the metaphors, uses and manifestations of the political on islands,
however the case study of Trinidad and Tobago’s response to a new geopolitical and migration
circumstance can be viewed as key example of islands harnessing their power, and exercising their
sovereignties, to the point where they appear to be asserting or imposing said sovereignties in
certain matters.
Sovereignty in the Caribbean, some argue, has maintained a colonial hierarchical structure,
that is, a configuration that separates the people from the state. In this instance, T&T’s sovereignty
exercises have privileged the economics and the political, and has discounted the people, its
nationals and the Venezuelan immigrants themselves. Despite the island nation’s posturing
through messages and actions of political and territorial sovereignty defence, it is clear that
hemispheric geopolitics did have an impact on the domestic decisions in Trinidad and Tobago. At
the hemispheric level, the OAS and the US shaped the way in which the country responded to the
external Venezuela crisis question, while being critical of the way immigrants were being handle,
and at the regional level, CARICOM was the necessary vehicle through which Trinidad and
Tobago ventilated its positions up the diplomatic channels.
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CHAPTER FOUR
An Examination of the Lived Experiences of Venezuelan Migrants in Trinidad & Tobago
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the everyday lived experiences of Venezuelans who emigrated to
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) in response to the crisis situation in their home country. Venezuelan
migrants characterize their reception and treatment in T&T as discriminatory, exploitative and
violent. Their everyday experiences are shaped by restrictionist immigration policy, legislation
and rhetoric, that rouses already underlying anti-immigrant sentiment across the island nation. I
argue that the very regulations designed to protect migrants work against them by re-producing
colonial hierarchies of difference through racialized and gendered imaginaries. Corporeal and
cultural dissimilarities between the local population and Venezuelan migrants, for example,
perceived physical resemblances and language difference, remain material to these hierarchies.
These are colonial readings and representations of the Caribbean body, re-cast. The Maduro
migrations present a key demonstrative moment for state engagement in sovereign exercises of
control and containment of the migrant population in its domestic space, generating wider political
implications. In this chapter, my analysis addresses the outcomes of these processes through
readings of the migrant body. In particular, it details the challenging circumstances that female
Venezuelan migrants live, as they are subjected to gendered processes of “othering”.
Structural processes and historical continuities in the T&T landscape work systematically
toward heightening the quotidian vulnerabilities and challenges of the migrant. Preventative and
constraining legislation force Venezuelan migrants to live incognito lives, without access to
necessities, causing them to engage in covert labour schemes, among other illicit activity, for daily
survival. The state’s regulatory mechanisms render migrants’ bodies perpetually vulnerable and
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invigorate anti-immigrant discourse. In addition to the arguments of migrant-induced economic
erosion and socio-cultural dilution in the receiving context, gender and the sexualization of the
Latin American body are central themes in the Venezuela-T&T migration conversation. Embedded
in the long history of the small island as a hub for human and sex trafficking, Venezuelan women
commonly called “Spanish” or “Vene”, endure intense objectification and malice by both local
men and women. I will demonstrate how readings of the migrant body are drawn from the enduring
divisive and structured hierarchies of the colonial project that have exerted physical and
psychosocial violences onto the Caribbean populous. In the present context for Venezuelan
migrants, it is as if the formerly colonized have taken on the profile of the oppressor, toward an
“outsider” body, in a visceral kind of way.
Data comes from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with 31 Venezuelans who
emigrated to T&T between 2015 and 2018; including 13 males and 18 females. Interviews were
thematically coded and analyzed to weave threads through the various challenges encountered,
and coping strategies operationalized, by the migrants. The data reveal how migrants’ bodies are
surveilled, disciplined, objectified and marginalized. In analyzing these experiences, the coconstituting rhetoric and action between the state’s “control” agenda and societal prejudices that
fuel the exclusions of migrants are underscored.
This chapter is organized as follows: I firstly engage previous literatures that interpret and
code the themes and findings of this inquiry. I focus on literatures of race, racism, gender and
migration, and interwoven with readings of Caribbean sexualities. I consciously privilege the
robust body of work emanating from Caribbean scholarship and other Global South scholars that
dictate and/or inform prevailing conceptualizations of these issues. I analytically launch Erel,
Murji and Nahaboo’s (2016) nexus “Changing Migrations – Continuities of Racism” and
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operationalize intersectionality as critical reflection. This framework not only contends with race,
gender and migration, it also works to center the body as its analytic focus. It answers calls by
feminists and feminist geographers to situate the everyday disciplining, traumas, resilience and
navigation of experiences at the scale of the body, and at the center of research. I then focus migrant
narratives that illustrate the challenges presented by the state through its legal and policy
prescriptions, which inevitably filter down to shape and fortify societal discourses about
Venezuelan migrants on the island. This is followed by a discussion of these findings and
conclusions.

4.2. Race, Gender & Sex: Hierarchies of Difference in the Caribbean
Migrant exclusions are drawn from difference. The lenses through which, and thresholds where
these differences manifest, have preoccupied the academic study of migration for some time (see
for example Kasinitz, 1992; Foner, 2005; Andersson, 2014; Calavita, 2005). In populist
immigration discourse, race as an analytical category has waned, parallel with the advance of
“colour-blind” and “post-racial” rhetoric. Racial inequalities and asymmetries, however, continue
to be socially pervasive and are now much more magnified. This has bolstered calls by academics
and anti-racist activists to re-engage with the race and migration relationship in the academe
(Davison & Shire, 2015; Sáenz & Douglas, 2015; Treitler, 2013). The “race – immigration nexus”
(Kibria, Bowman & O’Leary, 2013) is a conceptually productive channel to facilitate such
analysis. The nexus is described as “a fluid and intertwined bundle of linkages between race and
immigration, specifically among the institutions, ideologies, and practices that define these arenas”
(Kibria, Bowman, and O’Leary 2013, p. 5). Here, the authors understand race to be a socially
determined construct and view it as a political project tied to colonial and imperial histories that
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establish hierarchies of difference. Following from this formative intervention, Erel, Murji and
Nahaboo (2016) engaged in a categorization of race and migration scholarship in the UK and EU
contexts, conceiving three overlapping nexi: 1) ‘Changing Migrations – Continuities of Racism’,
2) ‘Complex Migrations – Differentialist Racialization’ and 3) ‘Post-racial Migrations – Beyond
Racism’. These nexi represent specific readings of how race and migration converge in the
scholarship, across space and time. While the “race – immigration nexus” asks instructive
overarching conceptual questions, its latter interpretation articulates frameworks in which these
important questions can be explored. Both pieces of work are important guides toward the
conceptualization of migrant exclusions in the Caribbean region. An analytical launching of the
‘Changing Migrations – Continuities of Racism’ nexus is particularly germane in the Caribbean
context.
The Caribbean region is a distinctive geography that offers conceptual proximity to
essentialist ideas around race and racism. The region’s colonial history presents a “white and
everyone else” structuration that have laid the foundations upon which complex hierarchies are
expressed through the more contemporary mixed configuration of Caribbean societies (Brereton,
1989; Knight & Palmer, 2014; Beckles & Shepherd, 2000). Colonial processes and discourses used
“race” and “racism” as fundamental organizing principles to create asymmetries and foster
difference in Caribbean life, which manifested in its economy, cultures, class and gender relations.
With persistent “reinforcement”, colonizers’ systems were validated, while alternative worldviews
of the existing and introduced populations in the Caribbean, were de-legitimized. These rigid
systems were utilized to create and sustain order among the population through divisiveness and
subjugation. Post-independence, the Caribbean struggled with the precepts and actualization of
self-determination, as highlighted in the previous chapters. The colonial hierarchical foundations
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continue to deepen the cleavages among Caribbean societies. These hierarchies exist in “modern”
Caribbean societies, and the inequalities and superior/inferior complexes continue to be manifest
in relations of class, race and gender. Therefore, toward understandings of how race and migration
are configured in the Caribbean, the focused approach on ‘Changing Migrations – Continuities of
Racism’ that “emphasizes the continuity of historic linkages between post-war race-making and
migration, underlining similarities between racialized citizens and noncitizens” (Erel, Murji and
Nahaboo 2016, p. 1341) is useful. Here, racialization is launched to show how history has shaped
race, and how it is used to justify exclusionary practices through socio-cultural and political
processes.
In this chapter, I build a conceptual framing of migrant exclusions through a feminist lens,
that privileges an intersectional reading of the Caribbean’s context-specific histories and
geographies accounting for race, gender and migration scholarship. The following sub-sections
will briefly traverse the literatures on the colonial histories of racism and racialization of the
Caribbean and the gendered geographies of migration. The survey of the literature and the
discursive construction of the Caribbean here, will not only inform the evolution of, among other
things, the historical and psychosocial conditioning of the Caribbean gaze, it will also emphasize
the distinctiveness and divergence in analytical context, from the “race-immigration nexus” as it
is operationalized in the global north. This engineers a structure that effectively adds to the
convergence of feminist epistemologies and socio-cultural and political geographies, in scaled
conversations of migration, specific to the Caribbean context. Further, given the geographical
arrangement of the literature, this inquiry offers a necessary contribution to race-immigration
scholarship—(re)placing race into contemporary readings of the migrant experience in the wider
Caribbean.

97

4.2.1. Modes of Discrimination
Central to understandings of the discrimination, exclusions and antipathy toward migrants in the
Caribbean, is an appreciation of the historical constructions of “modern” Caribbean societies,
particularly through the conceptual “organizing principles” of race, gender and sex. Over the past
decade, however, the term “race” atrophied in Caribbean scholarship, being replaced by
“ethnicity” (Reddock, 2014). I suggest that this trajectory is a sanitizing exercise, to attach a less
pejorative framing to Caribbean expressions and writing. Whatever the intent, “race” and its
myriad manifestations, are key underpinnings in migration discourse in the Caribbean. Colonial
hierarchies of difference constructed through race persists in the modern Caribbean, and have
manifested in many forms and scales, shaping the views of “Caribbeans” toward “outsiders” or
“foreigners”. In the early instance, the imposed binary of “white/coloured” was instructive in
fostering difference and persisted in the differentiations between and amongst collectivities as
geographies shifted, post-Independence. These hierarchical constructions and understandings of
difference have significantly impacted gender relations and sexualities, through for example,
performances of masculinities and appreciations of attractiveness in the Caribbean (Kempadoo,
2004; Mohammed, 2004; Reddock, 2003; Hope, 2010). Here, skin colour and its gradations are
dominant racial markers of difference, and work to code the “other”, encouraging negative racial
stereotyping, xenophobic framings and racialized exclusions which feature in discrimination and
violence against migrants.
A review of the literature indicates a small but important body of work emanating from
contemplations of discrimination in intra and inter island migrations in the Caribbean. The key
case study of Haitian migration constitutes a major part of this: Haitian migration to the Bahamas
(Craton, 1995; Fielding et al., 2008), related developments in the Dominican Republic (Ferguson,
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2003; Wooding & Moseley-Williams, 2004) and in other territories in the Caribbean basin (Zacaïr,
2010). In more recent work, the term “anti-Haitianism” has emerged, denoting an increase in
prejudice and “anti-Haitian violence” tied to issues of identities and identity negotiations in
receiving states. Fresh contemplations also arose with the highly publicized Shanique Myrie versus
Barbados18 court case about the operationalization of the Free Movement arrangement through
CARICOM (Gonzalves, 2015) and more broadly, encouraged legal debates on the protections of
migrants in the region (Bush-Joseph, 2015). Known commentator on Caribbean relations David
Jessop (2018) acknowledged a marked shift in attitudes toward migrants in the Caribbean. He
noted, against the backdrop of weather-related emergencies in CARICOM member states, regional
sentiment was warm, but follow-up actions were wanting. Also referencing both the Haitian and
Venezuelan circumstances, Jessop (2018) states that in the Caribbean “sympathy [has] morph[ed]
gradually into concern and intolerance”.

4.2.2. On Race and Racism
Rhoda Reddock (2007) suggests that the history of racism started at the moment of encounter
between Europe, Africa and the New World. What is race? The term “race” is complex with many
conceptual limitations, however its usage is ubiquitous in social analyses and everyday discourse.
In its simplest distillation, race is used to refer to groupings of persons differentiated by phenotype
and physical characteristics. This static concept is widely operationalized through “racism”.
Ramon Grosfoguel (2015) offers a definition of racism as “a global hierarchy of human superiority
and inferiority, politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by

18

Jamaican Shanique Myrie filed a lawsuit against the state of Barbados after claiming that she was subjected to a
dehumanising cavity search by a female immigration officer at Grantley Adams International Airport, locked in a
filthy room overnight, then deported to Jamaica in March 2011.
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the institutions of the capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/ colonial
world-system” (p. 636). Therefore, persons above the dividing line are superior, and are
acknowledged as human beings, enjoying access to rights (in all its iterations) and social
recognitions, while those situated below that line are sub-human or non-humans; humanity here is
questioned, or in Fanon’s (1967) view, negated. Grosfoguel’s definition provides a framework
through which various forms of racisms can be conceptualized. He warns against the tendency of
adopting a reductionist understanding of racism as simply biological differentiation. He suggests
that depending on the colonial histories of specific contexts, hierarchies are identified by specific
racial markers, one of the more dominant being colour racism, that is, skin colour differentiation.
Grosfoguel’s acknowledgement of different “racisms”, echoes the sentiments of Anthias and
Yuval-Davis (2005) who suggest that racist discourse has shifted from biological determination to
cultural forms of racism. Here, these superior/inferior hierarchies have allowed for racialization to
occur, by ascribing specific identities and meaning to groups that do not necessarily describe
themselves as such, or in Grosfoguel’s (2015) words “the marking of bodies”.
Contemporary expressions of racism in the Caribbean are observed in diverse forms and at
varied scales. This is heavily attributed to the transformed human geographies of the Caribbean
region post-independence. The structured white and “coloured” construction, significantly shifted
to more inward focused dynamics, that is, internal group relations, and among various ethnic
groups and nationalities that populate the region. This has yielded scaled expressions of racisms
through offshoots such as colourism within collectivities. Colourism, as a process of
discrimination, is tied to larger discourses of beauty and desirability, that are deeply seated in
colonial history. According to Hunter (2007) colourism “privileges light skin people of color over
their dark skin counterparts. Colourism is concerned with actual skin tone, as opposed to racial
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and ethnic identity” (p. 237). This has been widely researched by Caribbean scholars through
mixed race conceptualizations (Mohammed, 2000), and more recently through investigations into
skin bleaching (Hope, 2011; Brown-Glaude, 2013). Theories suggest that the reason for skin
bleaching is self-hatred or mental pathology (Shepherd, 2000). However, Christopher Charles’
(2011) work shows how skin complexion hierarchies are intimately linked to sexual attraction,
citing an aspirational Eurocentric standard of beauty by Caribbean women, and the heightened
attractiveness of this standard to Caribbean men.

4.2.3. Race Relations and Social Hierarchies in Trinidad & Tobago
T&T’s contemporary race hierarchies and relations are rooted in colonial structurations that were
made especially visible in the Post-Emancipation era. These colonial structurings were guided by
the uneven logics of plantation economics that served to maintain the benefits accrued exclusively
within the pockets of the white elite planter class. Legislation and policies in Trinidad, and by
extension, the British West Indies, were crafted to preserve the structure of a segregated society
that privileged white Europeans, and to manipulate and control black and brown bodies.
Entrenched in racist ideologies and hegemonic philosophies, these regulatory mechanisms aimed
to: limit ex-slaves’ mobilities and their options to desired employment and workplaces, and to
introduce a new workforce of bonded labourers into the colony (Brereton, 1979; Singh, 1994;
Wood, 1968; Moore, 1995). The overarching justification for these actions was a fundamental
objective to “civilize” the colonized races (Moore, 1998; Bryan, 1998). Measures introduced were
covert mechanisms of control, circumscribing each race to specific designations, and causing
frictions where necessary, to maintain the status quo. This latter point proves particularly
instructive in consideration of the present-day manifestations of race relations and their
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arrangements among T&T’s various groups – the majority ethnic groupings of Afro and Indo
Trinidadians, and minority populations of the Chinese, Portuguese, Syrian and Lebanese.
Colonial legacies of uneven mobilities filter into contemporary political-economic
configurations in T&T. Colonial structures allowed the small contingent of white planters to
maintain their privileged economic, social, and political ascendancy over their large populations
of non-white residents (Bolland, 1981).While post-emancipation colonies could not use overt
methods for keeping ex-slaves near estates, the intentional limiting of alternatives, forced people
back onto the plantation and into wage labour at subsistence level. The estate was an institution
that controlled and contained mobility, physically and otherwise. Colonizers rationalized this as a
civilizing strategy to impart the British values of industry and thrift (Wood, 1968). Bryan (2000)
asserts that this was a form of racism based on a status quo ideology, and propelled by Britain’s
paternalist rule, predicated on dominant efforts against colonial “savagery” (versus metropolitan
“civilization”). These constraints and limitations kept ex-slaves impoverished and within the
plantation economy, with little means for upward mobility. Unsurprisingly then, the “merchant
class” was composed of powerful white planters. What might be considered T&T’s present-day
“merchant class” is largely composed of persons of Chinese heritage and the “Syrian (and
Lebanese) community” (Besson, 1992; Barclay, 2002). The latter is pejoratively referred to as
T&T’s “one-percent”; a representation of a small, powerful, elitist community that owns and
controls most of the large corporations and businesses on the island.
The relational identities of the two majority ethnic groups in Trinidad were mediated by
planters’ contrived narratives, that generated significant interracial antipathy that endures in the
present-day. The introduction of East Indian and Chinese indentured labourers to Trinidad was
premised on claims by the planter class of a “labour shortage” in post-emancipation colonies.
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Historians contend that this was not the case (Kale, 1996). Through distorted assertions, planters
claimed that ex-slaves were not productive and unwilling to work, hence the need for a new source
of labour. However, the situation was that Trinidad’s planters failed to properly engage and form
working relationships with the freed Africans (Kale, 1996). The British scheme channeled about
one-third of 1.3 million East Indians or “coolies” to plantation colonies in the Caribbean – 238,909
to British Guiana, 143,939 to Trinidad, and 36,412 to Jamaica. Trinidad also received 1,152
Chinese people. The majority of East Indians in Trinidad eventually settled there, with only
approximately 29, 448 returning to India (Roberts & Byrne, 1966). The introduction of East
Indians to Trinidad therefore, considerably altered the island’s demographics. The manipulation
of black and brown bodies and identities continued to be motivated by planters’ economic
aspirations and goals to civilize the “foreign race”. To justify the continuation of the indentured
immigration program, the Sanderson Commission of 1909 formulated slanted narratives on the
successes of civilizing the Indian population, and the failure of the Africans to respond to
civilization. Reverend John Morton, for example, head of the Canadian Presbyterian Mission in
Trinidad, as an “expert witness on East Indians”, insisted that indenture changed the Indians in a
positive way, causing them to bear children of a “stronger and more vigorous race”, with
substantively more civilised habits (than the Africans) (Jacklin, 2009). This kind of divisive
discourse was reflected in considerations meted out to the Indians versus the Africans in Trinidad.
Its fragmentary purpose also seeped into, and eventually fashioned the interactions between both
populations. The “stay in place” philosophy of the British planters worked productively to create
tension and antipathy between the two ethnic populations.
In “modern” T&T, race relations and interracial tensions still constitute a thorny dimension
in national discourse. However, race relations and racialized identities occupy a space of
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uncomfortable silence in the everyday, rarely addressed directly. As I mentioned in Chapter One,
stark representations of Trinidad’s racial division are illustrated in the constitution of the nation’s
two major political parties – Afro-Trinidadian dominated on one side, and Indo-Trinidadian
dominated on the other. Of course, more nuanced readings of racial and social hierarchies are
connected to my previous discussion on how race and its offshoots, for example, colourism, are
launched. There exists a commonality in conditioning between the two majority ethnic groups in
T&T. Hierarchies of difference have followed the Indo-Caribbean community from the Indian subcontinent through colourism discourses, and of caste. These divisions were compounded by the
colonial experience in the Caribbean setting. For example, preferential treatment received by
mulattoes19 was fuelled by the combined idea of white supremacy and black inferiority. These
interfaces fostered the notion that persons with lighter complexions had enhanced beauty, greater
mobility and occupied an elevated economic positionality – viewed through and against European
standards.
Colonial structurations premised on capitalist, racist and patriarchal dictates have persisted
and are launched in the everyday race relations and social hierarchies, in modern T&T. Racism in
all its forms segments a population, enabling certain categories of life to be excluded such as the
“foreign race” – allowing them to die both literally and metaphorically – in order to purify and
strengthen society as a whole (akin to bio(necro)politics: Foucault, 1978, 1997; Mbembe, 2003).

4.2.4. On Gender and Migration
The shift in understandings of “gender” situates its construction beyond the narrowed variables:
male and female. Gender is a much more layered concept that demonstrates how cultures attach
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meanings to male/female biological difference, within and through prescribed roles, spaces, time,
dress among other things (Pessar & Mahler, 2003). The ways in which gender is represented and
analyzed in migration discourse vary tremendously. In their seminal work The Age of Migration,
Castles and Miller (1993) engaged in the periodization of European immigration, popularizing the
concept: the feminization of (labour) migration. The authors’ framing recognized that following
the cessation of large-scale labour migrations (which were overwhelmingly male), females then
migrated with the aim of family reunification. The concept of feminization of migration is
contested in the literature however, through various discipline-specific epistemologies, and on the
grounds of absolute number disparities (see for example Abel, 2018). Zoltnik (1995) for example,
counters Castles and Miller’s (1993) proposition, stating that although there is apparent visibility
on the issue of female international migration as workers, “the fact remains that the majority of
women who migrate internationally do not do so for work purposes” (p. 230), and that female
migration is impacted by immigration policies in destination countries. Zoltnik also notes the
vagaries around quantification methodologies and characterizations of the female migrant that
requires more conceptual specificity. The reality is, women have been migrating for a very long
time, and in substantial numbers (Donato & Gabaccia, 2015).
The scholarship has shifted attention to the causes and consequences of the migration
gender (im)balance, that changes over time, and varies considerably over cultures and space.
Scholars have made innovative theoretical contributions to understanding gender and power
relations in response to the shifting geographies of migration (Silvey, 2004). Much work has been
done in the areas of care and domestic work (Huang and Yeoh, 2010; Ramirez and HondagneuSotelo, 2009; Kofman & Raghuram, 2010; Walton-Roberts, 2012), borders and borderlands
(Segura & Zavella, 2007; Deeb-Sossa & Mendez, 2008; Solis 2016), sexualities (González-López,
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2005; Cantú, 2009), sex trafficking (Agustín, 2007) and with gender and children (Pavez Soto,
2010; Estrada & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2011). As the global migration regime becomes more
complex and convoluted, Boucher’s (2016) work is particularly instructive. She focusses on how
gendered barriers impact migrant women. More specifically, she examines gender bias within
immigration policies, asserting that skilled women are under-represented in highly skilled
immigration flows – a dynamic that better captures the gender implications of immigration
policies. The multidimensional scholarship on gender and migration ensures that the fluidity of
gender composition and women migrant stories are rendered visible.
People internalize the social constructions of meaning through gender that are specific to
the cultural and economic histories sustained across generations. Mohammed (2000) asserts that
“gender relations at present must be constantly measured against the construction of gender and
sexuality in the past” (p. 24). In the colonial epoch, through the prevalence of patriarchal structures,
women were (re)presented as reproducers (Morrissey, 1986; Bush-Slimani, 1993) and dependants
(Noble, 2016). They were controlled through coerced sex and reproduction, the sexual division of
labour, multiple types of interpersonal and institutional violence, and repression of women’s
autonomy and leadership (Razack, 1995; Reddock, 2003; Bahadur, 2013), which remain
significant today (Hosein, 2019).
Gender inequality, manifested through violence against women, is often cited as one of the
Caribbean’s largest problems (O’Connor, 2014). Structural inequalities entrenched in T&T’s
socio-economic systems have resulted in unequal access to social mobility and a general lack of
economic independence, which has sustained women’s dependence on a male figure. Inherently
problematic, this is aggravated by heteropatriarchal, masculinist and misogynistic assertions that
provoke a certain hostility toward women. A UNDP qualitative study on Gender-Based Violence
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in Trinidad and Tobago (Hosein et. al, 2018) reveals that women are exposed to “moderate and
severe acts [of] emotional abuse, controlling behaviours, threats, stalking and sexual and physical
violence.” (p. 5). Rates of violence of women appear to be on a perpetual increase on the island.
For example, it was reported that for the period 2009 to 2012, almost 12,000 domestic violence
applications were made in the Magistrate’s Court (Ali, 2015). At a press conference in April 2020,
the T&T’s police commissioner shared data confirming a steady increase of incidence of domestic
violence, where cases increased from 232 in 2019 to 558 in 202020 (thus far). The 2018 UNDP
Report confirmed earlier conceptual assertions that in T&T and the wider Caribbean that gender
roles are rigidly defined and enforced, and that the concept of masculinity is linked to toughness,
male honour or dominance. The study also found that violence against women was normalized in
T&T and formed the basis for the notion that men “own” women. Socially, women are expected
to tolerate catcalling and casual harassment, with men seeing it as simply complimentary.
Incidence of sexual violence and rape are offshoots of this (Muturi & Donald, 2006). The
scholarship has compellingly determined that colonisation is considered to be the structure within
which masculinist authority, gender inequality, and violence against women was established in
Trinidad and the wider Anglophone Caribbean (see for example Danns & Parsad, 1989;
Mohammed, 2004; Beckles, 2010).
A prevailing migration discourse in the Caribbean, framed by gender, is sex trafficking.
The usual barometer for gauging this migration phenomenon is the annual Trafficking in Persons
(TIP) reports from the US Department of State. The Caribbean region is characterized as a space
with a long history of human trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution. In the
contemporary setting however, “trafficking” has subsumed the “prostitution” narrative in the wider
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discourse. Catherine Benoit (1999) through her study of sex tourism on the island of SaintMartin/Sint Maarten, draws historical connections of prostitution with the present day, citing the
importation of women to service the domestic population since the period of colonization21.
Kamala Kempadoo (2007) is critical of the trafficking narrative. She argues that the Caribbean has
been morally wrangled into this “global panic”. She asserts that, through prompts from the US,
Caribbean nations have fundamentally conflated undocumented migration and forced labour
(human trafficking) with the sex trade. Notwithstanding Kempadoo’s strong arguments, sex work
and human trafficking remain illegal in countries like Trinidad and Tobago, in spite of migrants’
motivations or (un)intentionality. Since the in-flow of Venezuelans into the island, there have been
increased police raids at brothels and known “sex dens” where undocumented Venezuelans and
other Latin American women have been found. These discourses have worked to fortify the
sexualized stigma of women migrants in T&T, especially those from Latin American source
countries.
Trinidad and Tobago’s slow progress to articulate policy and pass legislation on human
and sex trafficking has allowed for a flourishing enterprise sustained by high demand for sex –
which has apparently become the norm. The “Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children” (2000) was ratified by the T&T
government in 2007. The nation’s domestic anti-trafficking law; The Trafficking in Persons Act
was proclaimed in 2013. I reference two recently publicized reports: 1) the T&T Parliament’s Joint
Select Committee (JSC) report into the Treatment of Migrants with specific focus on the Rights to
Education, Employment and Protection from Sexual Exploitation (July 2020) and, 2) a recently
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concluded CARICOM commissioned eight-month investigation into human trafficking in the
Caribbean, that took place between July 2019 to February 2020. The Human Trafficking report22
revealed that “Trinidad and Tobago [has] the highest demand for sex and prostitution services in
the region which is estimated at 81 percent” when compared with other English-speaking
CARICOM nations (Pierre & Rodriguez, 2020). The report also estimates that “close to 4,000
victims in the Güiria area only [of Venezuela] have been sold by Venezuelan human trafficking
cartels to Trinidad and Tobago over the last four to six years”. From the JSC Inquiry, according to
the T&T Police Service investigations into cases of migrant sexual exploitation in relation to
sexual, labour and domestic servitude, for the period 2015 to April 1st, 2020, the number of reports
received was 429, while the number of persons charged with the related offences was 57. The 2020
Trafficking in Persons Report once again placed T&T on a Tier 2 Watch List, indicating that the
country does not meet the minimum standards for elimination of trafficking, however, is making
efforts to do so.

4.2.5. Intersectionality & the Geographies of Race
While the meanings of race and space are generated from the interactions between culture and the
material world, racial and spatial processes can be also be read as co-constitutive and dialectical
(Neely & Samura, 2011). In similar ways that racial interactions and processes are made and
remade over time in the spaces that we inhabit, the converse is true. The scholarship on the
geographies of race has moved away from race as simply a demographic category in quantitative
analysis. More contemporary work has considered the complexities in the mutually constituting
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production of race and space (Dwyer and Alderman, 2008; Kobayashi, 2014; McKittrick, 2011;
Peake and Schein, 2000; Price, 2010). The literature also discusses the impact of race and racial
scholarship for scholars of colour within the discipline (Domosh, 2015; Kobayashi and Peake,
2000; Mahtani, 2006, 2014; Peake and Kobayashi, 2002; Pulido, 2015). There has also been a
recent growth of Black geographies in the literature (Ramírez, 2015; Bledsoe, Lawhon and Pierce,
2019). This line of inquiry follows from the foundational epistemologies of intersectionality itself.
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intervention to show how race and gender are analytically neither mutually
exclusive nor separate from each other in her attempts to elucidate particular experiences of black
women, has contributed to a more complex and dynamic understanding of social relations and
power structures (Rodó-de-Zárate & Baylina, 2018).
Intersectionality is not a method and there is no one specific method associated with it
(Hopkins, 2018). For the purposes of this inquiry, intersectionality is operationalized as a critical
reflection. It answers Hopkins’ (2018) call for focused attention on social context, that is, the
historical, intellectual and political forces that work to inform locality and place (Collins & Bilge,
2016) in intersectional reflections. Thinking about race through an intersectional lens not only
helps in situating racial processes but also lays bare the potential for structural changes in power
and resistances that already exists in those structures (Erkamp, 2019). The racial and spatial
politics of immigration legislation, policies and the everyday continue to reveal how migrants and
migrant advocates have mobilized to make rights-based claims and challenge their racialized
exclusions. The Maduro migrations to T&T provide a key moment and geography to engage
critical intersectional reflections on racial and gendered positionings, access and engagement
through politics and the struggles to maintain or resist hierarchies of difference.
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4.3. Lived Experiences on the Continuum of Discriminations
In this section, I present thematic narratives from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with
Venezuelan migrants in T&T. Drawn from these narratives23 are key illustrations of the relentless
challenges, precarities and vulnerabilities that individual Venezuelan men, women, and their
families face on a daily basis in T&T. These recorded accounts demonstrate the scope and nuances
of a racialized and gendered gaze toward the Venezuelan migrant, that is compounded by inept
and prohibitive policy and law. Physical appearance and language are the definitive markers of
difference in readings of Venezuelans. This has manifested into several forms of discrimination
and violence, which participants have spoken about in both systemic and interpersonal terms. Their
narratives conjure a T&T- Venezuela hierarchy, where Venezuelans are inferiorized and othered,
while simultaneously being read as exoticized – as the paradoxical “exoticized other”. Embedded
in this asymmetry and fraught gaze, is a projection of locals’ internalized insecurities and traumas
that have shaped their racialized views of the “other” and importantly, a presentation of the rescripting and re-casting of the colonial gaze of difference onto Venezuelan migrants.
The hypersexualized gaze that is focussed on the Venezuelan woman, is deep-seated in the
hegemonic patriarchal discourses of desirability, that were pervasive and conspicuous in colonial
times. Females with lighter complexions were generally regarded as more desirable. In the
contemporary context, there appears to be a continued affinity among Trinidadian males toward
lighter skin females. Therefore, lighter skin Venezuelan women are desired and targeted by local
men. The Venezuelan woman, who has little agency, creates intense anxieties within the local
population, and is subjected to shaming, malice and exploitation because of the ways in which she
has been racialized and sexualized. These kinds of interpersonal and intimate violences impact the
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everyday, for all Venezuelan migrants. The ultimate form of violence within the lives of
Venezuelan migrants, and perhaps its most powerful manifestation, is the inability to be
themselves. They are forced to negate their own identities to “fit in”.
The following narratives provide examples of discriminations that can be read along a
continuum, from subtle forms of harassment and violence to outright exclusion.

4.3.1. Rules & Realities: Institutionalized Discriminations
Interaction with border agents at ports of entry, either by air or sea, marks the moment where
discriminatory discourses are launched into readings of the Venezuelan migrant body. This first
pointed interaction with the state, through interrogations by a Trinidadian or Tobagonian border
agent, sets the tone for the future experiences of the Venezuelan on the island. Marco, 28,
emigrated to Trinidad in 2016:
To come here, the immigration officer was very harsh to me. I felt really bad, because
I saw how she treated other persons in the line ahead of me, compared to me, she was
very nice to them. I was there standing very long at the counter, while other people
were walking past me. She was asking me a lot of questions, like where I got money
for my ticket, and she kept on asking if I was here for work. She was actually shouting
at me, I would say. I answered all her questions, but then she sent me to a private
room, and told me to sit and wait. I think I was in that room for maybe 3 hours. She
then came into the room and seem very annoyed. She said that my passport is
stamped, and I can only remain until that date, otherwise “is jail”.
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Marco’s engagement at the border, through the state’s filtering and organizing mechanism
was an extended “spectacle”. Having Marco stand at the counter for a such a protracted period,
while shouting questions at him in clear view of other passengers, who were undoubtedly both
locals and foreigners, overtly shamed or belittled him into submission. To compound this, sending
him to an enclosed or “private room” for such a long time, parallels with experiences of being
criminally detained. Although the questions posed to Marco appear to be reasonable and necessary,
the officer’s tone and expectation can be characterized as antagonistic, biased and even malicious.
From most accounts, this is a routinized performance of the state, sending a laden message not
only to Marco, but other Venezuelan migrants in the immigration processing line, and beyond.
Marco’s experience at the border illustrates the tangible reinforcement of the state’s legal
prescriptions through acts of shaming and “detention”. The state’s veiled discriminatory tactics are
played out through the codification of the Venezuelan as undesirable. It sets a tone that is persistent
and consistent in the themes arising out of migrants’ narratives and experiences.
Additionally, antiquated and deficient immigration legislations and policies significantly
limit migrants’ access to social services and other supports. Venezuelan migrants’ daily
experiences are made difficult by the country’s very “legal protections” afforded to them. As stated
in the previous chapter, Orders of Supervision are proof that the migrant is registered with the
Ministry of National Security and has been granted permission to legally stay in the country, under
certain conditions. In practice however, Venezuelans are very uneasy to leave the confines of their
homes, for fear of being arrested, detained and deported, in spite of having the document on their
person. This is because there is a high incidence of Venezuelans “with papers” being arbitrarily
detained. For instance, Monica, 22, relates the story of her brother’s arrest: while he was walking
along the popular Ariapita Avenue in Port of Spain:
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He and his friend were walking home from work that night when police approached
them and made them lie down on the pavement with hands behind their head. My
brother could only speak a little bit of English, and he was pulling out the yellow
paper to show the police. People said they heard the police say to him “What is
that? That can’t help you”.
At the time of this interview, Monica’s brother was detained at the Immigration Detention
Centre (IDC), where he was held for “processing”. Monica’s brother alleges that the Order of
Supervision was taken from him and after numerous pleas, it had not yet been returned to him.
Monica’s efforts at the Immigration Division to clear her brother’s name appear ineffectual. To
further validate her story, Monica then proceeded to show me a video clip of the incident, which
she says had been circulated on social media. Upon review, the video did show images of two men
lying on the pavement and a conversation happening between one of the men and the police,
however the audio is unintelligible.
Another participant, Camila, 31, relates an incident that took place while she was in a taxi,
that was stopped during a police roadblock exercise:
The policeman watch everybody in the car, and then turn to me in the back and ask
for my ID. He only ask me. I show him my paper and my ID. I get frighten. He take
my paper and gone by other police and come back and say “you legal?” I tell him
that is the supervision paper, and like he didn’t know what I mean. I don’t know if
my English good? And then he tell the driver to go ahead. Meanwhile eh, everybody
in the car making noise, one watch me and say “allyuh damn Vene!”
These narratives demonstrate the constant state of precarity in which Venezuelan migrants’
live daily. They illustrate layered ways in which fears are produced within the migrant community,
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through “spectacle” and “deportability” discourses (De Genova, 2002). Venezuelan migrants live
with persistent fears of being detained and potentially deported, in spite of having a legal document
that gives them permission to stay. Policing and surveillance have entered into the everyday. This
follows Coleman’s (2007, 2012) argument of the intensification of interior migrant policing that
allows for the deployment and enforcement of immigration law, selectively. Immigration laws, or
in this case, regulatory policy, works in effect, as a kind of “(permanent) state of emergency” (p.
62) on migrants’ bodies. Living in this constant state of fear, dissuades Venezuelan migrants from
even leaving their homes, which results in their inability to secure necessities, that are as well,
constrained by legislation. These narratives also show an apparent disconnect between the various
governmental agencies. The police in their everyday enforcement do not appear to be
knowledgeable about what the “order of supervision” certificate provides for its holder. This lack
of knowledge suggests that the larger immigration framework is deficient and in fact, ad hoc,
supporting my earlier arguments about the deficiency in comprehensive law and policy. However,
what these fragmented circumstances also does is craft slippery conditions of “illegality”
(Hiemstra & Mountz, 2015). Inherent in these commentaries as well are codes of racialization that
are strategically operationalized by the state and its agents. By isolating specific individuals based
on the way they physically appear and how they speak while interrogating them in a very public
way, shows prejudice toward Venezuelans. The larger political moment in which the Venezuelan
migrant is embedded however, also points to a politics of convenience, where the Venezuelan
migrant provides an opportune target to exercise the sovereign’s authority.
Immigration laws also restrict migrants’ access to crucial social services. These legal
exclusions become particularly challenging in the areas of education and health. Migrant children
are not allowed to access the public-school system. This is an important issue for Venezuelan
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migrants, as entire families inclusive of primary school-aged children have migrated with their
parents. Michael, 32, relates his story of attempting to get his 8-year-old daughter enrolled in the
primary school system. It should be noted that Michael and his family are registered asylum
claimants. He shares:
I went to the principal of the school two streets away from the apartment. The
principal asked for her birth paper and immunization card. I showed her my
daughter’s certificate, but she said, “Your child is not a national, we cannot help
you”. I asked her for her help to figure what I should do. She repeated, “I’m sorry,
I cannot help you.” My daughter has now missed an entire 7 months of school. It’s
really bad because I cannot afford to pay to send her to a private school. She speaks
better English than me, and her mother teaches her what she can.
Mariana, 27, and her husband went to enroll their two kids at the beginning of the new
school term:
The principal looked at us and say no “one time” (immediately). There was no
talking, no questions, no nothing. My heart break in pieces for my children.
It is the common case where migrant children are required to be in possession of a student
permit and certain immunizations to be registered in local schools – both of which are difficult for
Venezuelans to acquire. Interestingly, the arguments also being cited by the Teachers’ Union and
other commentators regarding non-admission include the lack of placement spaces for the migrant
children, and the challenges for the Venezuelan child to learn in English, since instruction is not
in the Spanish language. The Catholic Church, through the Living Waters Community and other
NGOs, have been making efforts to accommodate these excluded students. Occasional instruction
is provided to students, sometimes, four days per week. These classes however are not sanctioned
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by the Ministry of Education. The alternative for Venezuelan parents is to have their children
enrolled in private institutions. However, most cannot afford to do this because of the high tuition
fees.
Access to healthcare is also constrained by immigration laws and presents a major
challenge for migrants. One poignant example is that of a pregnant Venezuelan woman who
migrated to Trinidad. She went to the San Fernando General Hospital (South Trinidad) to give
birth. She comments:
I went to have the baby. I wait the very last to go to the hospital, because I didn’t
know if they would take me or not. When I went there, everyone was very very
kind to me. The nurses and doctor were very nice. I had the baby natural. A baby
boy. I stay in the hospital for one night, and the next day the new nurse, tell me I
have to leave. They give me a card to come back for baby clinic. I went to the clinic
and ask if I can get check up on myself. They say they cannot allow for follow up
check on me. I end up going to pay at a private doctor.
This represents a closely followed legal and policy prescription that is potentially
detrimental to the health of migrants and in extended circumstances, the country at large. Under
current law, migrants’ access to health services is restricted to emergency or tier one services, not
follow-up or continuous service. This specific narrative above can be read in two ways: that access
to health services is exclusive to T&T born nationals, as is suggested through the healthcare
provisions for the newborn baby who is a citizen by birth, but not the mother. In addition, these
exclusions can potentially create an untenable situation in the country. Without access to health
and medical resources, Venezuelan migrant children are falling behind in their immunizations,
which could build up to a health emergency in the country. Further, as expressed in the earlier
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narrative, there exists a degree of apprehensiveness and deep fear amongst the Venezuelan migrant
population that they can be arbitrarily arrested, detained and deported, if reports are made to the
police and immigration division by nurses and doctors who attend to them. Therefore, within this
kind of climate of trepidation, one can argue that the limited access to healthcare services on the
island is self-reinforcing and gendered.

4.3.2. Employment & Exploitation
Migrants are not allowed to pursue employment in the country, without the requisite permissions.
In these circumstances, Venezuelans are forced to seek out, and take up jobs offered by T&T locals
under-the-table, with them being underpaid, undervalued and resulting in their underemployment.
Venezuelans are resigned to accept these kinds of exploitations, because of the limited options
available to them, and having to accede to the demands of their employer, for fear of being reported
to the authorities.
Maria, 24, and her husband Luis, 27, worked at a local grilling restaurant in Arima (East
Trinidad):
Maria: My husband started working first as a chef in the kitchen, and he asked the
boss if I can help out. The boss tell him yes.
Me: How much were you being paid?
Maria: I used to get $10 an hour, but Luis used to get $11. Anyway, we don’t work
there anymore.
Me: Was it because of the money?
Maria: No, it was because one evening the main cashier was late for work, and the
boss tell me to cash in front. I think is because my English is good. When the
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woman reach to work, she start to curse me and was angry that I was cashing, and
she wanted to fight me. She shove me, and my husband saw that and tried to defend
me. At that same time, the boss tell us to leave and not come back to work. He
didn’t even pay us the work day.
Sofía, 33, a former parliamentary clerk in Venezuela related her experience:
I used to work for one of them bosses as a house maid, and he would treat us like
shit. We had to bring our own water or drink from the hose outside. [Sofía crying]
I see when he was going on a trip, how he kiss his dog and was talking to it very
very nice, and we, we just is nobody in his eyes.
Venezuelan males are also exploited on the job. This is noted particularly in examples
coming from the local construction sector, where T&T contractors broker deals on Venezuelans’
behalf, for work. Martinez, 36, a former engineer in Venezuela stated:
What I know he (the local contractor) used to do is estimate a big price for the job
and only give us only some of the pay. I figured out what was going on there. Even
the Trinis working with we used to get more money than us. I know cause my Trini
friend say so. He used to end up giving me a extra hundred dollar and buy a beer
for me.
Tethering these narratives is a thread of precariousness. This is a tell-tale sign of the
intensities of fears and lack of options that Venezuelan migrants have in T&T. Here they are
acutely aware that they are being exploited and belittled but endure the shaming and denigration.
They have no recourse. The constant anxieties of potentially losing one’s source of income and be
reported to the authorities severely restricts any measure of protest.
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Venezuelan migrants end up working in menial and underpaid jobs, in positions such as
maids, kitchen staff and custodial workers. There is a significant disparity between migrants’
actual qualifications and work experience, and the jobs that they are able to secure. Local
employers use the leverage of migrants’ fears to regulate and discipline them, knowing fully that
migrants’ do not have many alternative income sources.

4.3.3. Sexualization & Gender Based Violence
Sex has become the mediator between Venezuelan women and local males. The “how much?”
question is an almost instantaneous refrain at the points of interaction. It is a transactional inquiry
with the “Spanish” woman about the cost one has to pay, in exchange for a sexual favour. This is
the customary mode of interface with Venezuelan women, in the everyday. She is viewed as an
uncomplicated, sexual object of desire that can be purchased. The Venezuelan female is essentially
objectified and dehumanized. A significant observation in this research has also pointed to an
increase in the number of Venezuelan women working at bars or “rum shops”, as they are known
locally, as servers. Some women are also involved in “entertainment” at different locations across
the country. For example, there has been a noted increase in the staging of “Bikini car washes”,
where Venezuelan women dress-up in swimwear, and are instructed to dance provocatively while
washing patrons’ cars. These events are usually coordinated by a procurer. The bikini car washes
prove very beneficial for the bars’ sales, while serving as both “entertainment” for local men, and
a space where they can arrange for sexual favours from the Venezuelan women – approved by the
procurer. In these situations, the coordinating individual provides a means of shelter and other
resources for the women, while restricting their mobility by force or other ways mentioned above.
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The sexualization of the female Venezuelan body, and the sexual transactional relationship
with local T&T men dominate this discourse. These pernicious interactions with Venezuelan
women are not only situated in the sexual advances of local men, but they also sit with the ire of
local women who believe that Venezuelan women’s intentions are primarily to appropriate their
male partners.
Alma’s, 28, experience is telling of the objectified and sexualized gaze of local men toward
Venezuelan women. Alma, a former nurse in Venezuela, works at a village bar close to her
apartment:
Alma: I have to deal with the same thing everyday. All the men that come in keep
asking, “How much?” “How much?” I pretend I do not hear them. When they
realise I’m not paying attention, they shout nasty things and say “Fuck you Spanish,
fuck you!”
Me: Have you ever complained to your boss?
Alma: He’s around and hears them. He tells me that it is just fun. He’s just as bad
as them…I choose not to dress up fancy or sexy, and I just pretend the only words
I know are Stag and Carib [local beer]. I try to ignore them, but sometimes they like
to grab me, and I get very upset.
Olivia, 38, recalls a traumatic incident with her and her sons:
Listen, some weekends ago, my son was saying, “Mummy take me somewhere!
Please take me somewhere!” I say “Ok, let’s go to the zoo.” We came to town, we
take a taxi in the taxi stand. And, when we take the taxi, the taxi man start to ask
me for sex, and then he was offering me money. As I see myself, I feel as if I am
not someone who looks…looking…or showing. You understand? I look, and I
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believe that I look like a serious woman. And being with my two children, how can
I be trying to date or exchange sex for money in front of them? So I just saw the
man and I pretend not to understand. Many time, I pretend I do not know English.
That man take another road…there is a road that goes up into a hill. That man was
taking us there. And I start to shout and be very “Stop the car! Stop right now!” But
very angry. And he was saying “Be quiet slut, be quiet slut!” and he keep driving
up the road. And I start to shout like showing him I am strong. And he keep driving.
In Spanish I had to shout to my sons “Run, open the door and run!” The car wasn’t
even stopping, and I say “open the door and run”. And I did the same. Every time,
all the women are disrespected.”
The aggressive pursuit by local men of Venezuelan women are seen as “just fun” through
the local gaze. In effect, trivializing the intimate violences and trauma enacted on the female body.
This is in keeping with the ways in which masculinities are conceptualized and launched in the
domestic space, tied to colonial histories. When the Venezuelan female pushes back, denying
advances, she almost instantly retreats into her position of inferiority, through shaming. On the
other hand, she is exoticized and desirable, while also inferiorized to the local – the “exoticized
other”. Also noted in the two narratives, were the women’s strategic defenses, for example,
pretending not to speak English or attempting to ignore the situation, or through urgent physical
(re)action. This suggests some measure of resilience, where even in such daunting circumstances,
the inferiorized woman can still manoeuvre her already limited agency.
Venezuelan women are not only the focus of attention by local men, but local women as
well. Alma, and similar commentaries reveal a kind of hatred and revulsion that T&T females
harbour toward Venezuelan women, based on the treatments received. Alma reveals:
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“The Trinidadian women don’t like we. One time a wom[a]n ask me why we come
Trinidad to take the man, why is it they like we so much? Before I can even say
reply, the wom[a]n say “allyuh Vene like to take it in allyuh bottom, that is why!
You cannot take my man though!” I was shame and disgust[ed].
Skin-colour hierarchies remain true for Caribbean women as well. They too engage in acts
such as skin bleaching, and ascribing gradations of lightness to enhanced physical beauty. These
specific views on phenotype, in part, strengthens the formulations of the pejorative view of the
Venezuelan woman in T&T. For local women, the Latina body is read as a source of disruption
characterized by immorality and promiscuity. Venezuelans are read as threats to the wellestablished dependence that local women have attached to their male counterparts. The underlying
assumptions of the “Vene” as sexually liberal, adventurous and ultimately manipulative, also feeds
into the negative stigma attributed to the migrant. T&T women assume that Venezuelan women
would “steal” their partners through sex, for economic gain and even status in the country, through
marriage. There resides entrenched jealousies and prejudices by local women toward female
Venezuelans that are manifested into antagonistic readings of the migrant body.
Sex work recruiters oftentimes engage mundane modes of marketing which has taken trend
in the employment landscape for Venezuelan migrants in T&T. Females are being lured into sex
work, when they respond to advertisements posted in the daily newspapers. These ads carry very
generic headings such as “Female workers wanted: cleaning services”. A number of interviewees
stated that they were wary about newspaper advertisements, because they had been made aware of
the situation by other migrants about such schemes resulting in captivity and sex work. Agustina,
20, almost fell victim to such a scheme. She was lucky however to have escaped from the
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dangerous situation. She responded to a “help wanted” newspaper ad, and met up with a woman
to discuss the job:
The lady on the phone told me to meet her by the grocery near the Chasevillage
flyover [Central Trinidad]. I met her there. She asked me if I have a work permit, I
told her no. She said that’s ok, it’s just to clean some hotel rooms and reception
four times a week, but the manager will have to see me first to make sure everything
is ok. She said we should walk to the hotel just around the corner, it would just take
15 minutes. I went with her to an enclosed building with a huge gate, but it seemed
like the hotel was closed, until a man came out. He told us to come in, but as soon
as I entered, I felt like something was wrong, and I told the lady I had to go, and I
quickly left. I just was not feeling good, the place just didn’t look regular at all. I
ended up telling my friends about what happened, and the very next week they
showed me newspaper how a hotel got raided for sex work. It was that very building
I went to for the interview!
Agustina’s experience is one way in which Venezuelan women become ensnared in the
underground sex culture on the island. It is a clear demonstration of how the immigration status
of the Venezuelan migrant is a marker of vulnerability. T&T’s restrictive laws and policies render
migrants vulnerable and exploitable, channeling them into clandestine and dangerous “avenues”
for work. Venezuelan women are also duped with promises of a better life in T&T, and
subsequently shipped from the mainland to the island for the purpose of sex work. Some females,
those “recruited” internally or directly from Venezuela, find themselves locked into those
situations because they are held to pay off a debt, or their passports are seized by their procurer,
paralyzing their mobilities. In some instances, migrants in these scenarios are resistant to exit the
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situation guided by the presumption that they will receive no attention from authorities, outside
of being deported.
Following up on Agustina’s story, I searched for the average time and location of the raid
story in the media archives. Validating her claims, there were published media headlines stating,
“Police detained 35 foreign nationals suspected of prostitution during a raid at a hotel and bar in
central Trinidad” (CNC3, 2018).

4.4. Recasting Codes of Difference and Control
The narratives above generate grim realities in the daily lives of Venezuelan migrants in T&T.
Migrants’ everyday acts are marred by myriad forms of racism, discrimination and violence,
compounded by persistent precarities. The actions toward Venezuelan migrants emanate from
constructions of difference through varied racial and socio-cultural hierarchies in which T&T is
historically embedded. Moreover, the experiences of Venezuelan migrants are configured by the
very laws and policies that are meant to protect them. The operationalization of these regulatory
mechanisms work: 1) to render the Venezuelan migrant vulnerable; exposed to exploitation, abuse
and violence and; 2) to agitate and encourage race and gender prejudices, manifested in the form
of anti-immigrant sentiment and actions, and 3) as the sovereign’s exercise of control and authority
out of political necessity given the fraught circumstances surrounding the Maduro migrations.
Systemic exclusions and restrictions manifest in the island’s immigration laws. Without
proper provisions to regularize status, while at the same time denying migrants access to
necessities, the state places the migrant in virtual limbo. Without access to social services and
employment, in most instances, out of sheer need, migrants must subvert the restrictive laws to
acquire resources to carry on with their everyday living. It is in these circumstances that T&T’s
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laws unwittingly channels migrants into spaces of exploitation, exposing themselves to certain
danger in some instances. As illustrated, the everyday law enforcers appear to be ignorant of the
protections attached to immigration division dictates. Further, the public and targeted interactions
between the police and Venezuelans result in public shaming of the Venezuelan migrants. This is
a significant disciplining and controlling strategy of the sovereign and its agents—creating a
spectacle inside and out of policed spaces in full view of onlookers. By creating a spectacle, this
operates as conduit through which the state inserts the negative framing of the Venezuelan migrant
into the public consciousness. Consequently, creating and encouraging opportunities through
which citizens can enact their prejudices through their assumed superiority that is, their citizenship.
Within the framework of this coercive space created by the state’s restrictive laws,
Venezuelan migrants covertly enter into the labour market, while at the same time crippled by the
fear of being reported and potentially deported (De Genova, 2002). The persistence and
perseverance of Venezuelan men and women to endure such conscious exploitation,
embarrassment and objectification is telling of the urgency and severity of their individual and
collective situations. Embedded in the disdain about Venezuelan migrants “stealing” locals’ jobs,
sits a degree of contradiction. It is a self reinforcing situation when locals complain that
Venezuelans are taking away their jobs, while it is in fact, locals hiring those migrants to work.
Further, the types of tasks that Venezuelan migrants are hired to perform appears to be undersubscribed by the local population, as one participant’s comment suggested: “Trinis do not want
to work these jobs, Trinis want to be [the] boss.” This not only gives an indication of the lowly
jobs that migrants do, but also the superior position that locals presume to occupy, in relation to
the Venezuelans.
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It is a false claim to blanketly state that Venezuelans look quite physically distinctive from
Trinidadians and Tobagonians. In fact, many Venezuelan migrants fit in seamlessly amongst the
T&T crowd, because they share certain physical resemblances to the local population – provided
they don’t speak. Manuel, 31, says to me “I look like you, that is why, I could get away, once I
don’t talk.” In this instance, his mother tongue is seen as the explicit marker of difference.
Therefore, to successfully navigate the day to day, Manuel consciously does not speak when not
necessary. On the other hand, Venezuelans who have the stereotypical “Spanish” look, are easily
identifiable through broad stereotypical readings of phenotype – “mixed” persons of lighter
complexion with a specific “look”. Gloria, 19, comments “I have to go from [point] A to B without
stopping, keep my head down, don’t talk and try to be invisible”, yet she admits, she still gets
heckled and cat-called “Spanish, Spanish” regularly, and she is also sometimes propositioned
whilst in public.
Gendered discrimination and violence are fundamental to the telling of the Venezuelan
migrant story, where especially for women, the paradoxical “exoticized other” becomes a major
trope. The discourse of the Latin body in Trinidad and Tobago is largely tied to discussions of
human and sex trafficking and the sexualized readings of the female body. Trinidad and Tobago
has long been a hub for sex trafficking, and since the Maduro migrations, there has been a noted
upsurge in the number of brothels and sex dens, that are populated with Latin women, more
specifically Venezuelans. This has partly contributed to the stigma attached to the Venezuelan
woman. Imaginings of the Latina body invoke an amalgam of sexual desire, shame, malice,
inferiority and objectification – a body of contradiction. Venezuelan men and persons in LGBTQI
community have been less prominent in these conversations. This is because little representations
were made in my research. However, at the time of this writing, Venezuelan migrant men
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specifically, were being aligned with gang culture and criminality, given a noted increase in gang
activity in the country. This represents a significant shift from the position that they occupied in
times before the crisis migration to the islands, as privileged expatriates working oil and gas jobs.
The narratives, however, illustrate their current positions in the T&T landscape as lowly labourers,
whose jobs in reality, do not commensurate with their qualifications and experience. In addition,
conversations about LGBTQI Venezuelans are still on the very margins of any issue in T&T.
Although an important part of refugee protection, I suspect this is because T&T’s own position on
domestic LGBTQI matters have been suppressed in the everyday. Like race relations and identity
politics, LGBTQI issues are limitedly addressed in T&T, alongside a noticeable absence in the
state’s legislative discourse.

4.5. Conclusion
This chapter aimed to inform understandings of the structural relations of power inherent
in post-colonial society—organized by race and gender relations and undergirded by sovereign
control – that inevitably marginalize migrant communities. It is presented through an analysis of
representations of the daily lived experiences of Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago.
The island nation, in its recent history, has not experienced such an intense and steady in-flow of
non-English speaking persons from a mainland territory – a circumstance that is steeped in a kind
of urgency attached to the “crisis” narrative. I argue that there is a fundamental dissonance between
immigration legislation and migrants’ lived experiences, wherein the very laws that are meant to
protect migrants, work against them through a reproduction of colonial hierarchies and processes
of racialization. Venezuelan migrants’ reception and treatment in T&T can be characterized as
deficient, exclusionary and inherently violent. The ill-treatment of Venezuelan migrants, and in
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particular, women, speaks to racist and gendered discourses that are manifested through a
reproduction of hegemonic heteropatriarchal structures in Caribbean sexualities. This
contemporary circumstance constructs mirror imagery of plantation hierarchies that were informed
by stark corporeal and cultural differentiations of the population during the colonial period.
This analysis also acknowledges the fraught political tensions attached to the Maduro
migrations. Building on the observations in Chapter 3, no substantive revisions or pronouncements
to immigration legislation. Instead, ad hoc “standard operating procedures” are used alongside
ramped-up policy agendas of surveillance, control and containment. This is a conscious launching
of the state’s program of control that is politically necessary in efforts to preserve its sovereignty.
This chapter also demonstrates the necessity of intersectional considerations of historicalgeographical specificities and social context that inform the way global south societies view the
world, when contemplating issues of race and immigration. Previous models have taken on statecentric analyses of race- migration convergences, however, it is important to acknowledge unique
variances across time and space. This will facilitate challenging and perhaps vexing questions
when engaged with wider publics and varying logics, bringing to relief the specific differences
that persevere in the postcolonial landscape.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Interrupting Island:
Trinidad & Tobago and the Shifting Trajectories of Venezuelan Migrants

5.1. Introduction
Having previously interrogated Trinidad and Tobago state’s response to the in-migration of
Venezuelans, in addition to migrants’ everyday lived experiences, in this chapter, I bring the island
itself as a migration site into analytic focus. More specifically, I examine the changing migration
trajectories of Venezuelans on the island, and the ways in which these shifts have impacted the
island’s spatial functioning for migration and mobility. I argue that Venezuelan migrants’
movements, to and across T&T have re-engineered the island’s mobility regimes, serving to
interrupt their intended trajectories, by (en)closing the island’s geography from within and out.
While there was an “opening up” of the island, spatially, through multiple migrations of
Venezuelans, the island was effectively “closing down” due to its amplification in enforcement
action in response to these arrivals. This (en)closing of the island’s geography invokes the
physicality of the island site, and underscores not only its limiting capacity, but its strategic usage
in migrant mobility containment. This empirical example also supports the privileging of islands’
physical geographies in conceptual understandings of the entanglement between mobilities and
immobilities, given the island’s spatial fixity or “mooring” (Hannam, Sheller & Urry, 2006) in
these readings.
Formative historical experiences in the Caribbean have crafted channels of outward
migrations, which have come to define island territories in the wider context. Although at the
regional scale, interterritorial migrations do exist, this analysis comes at the backdrop of acute and

130

“crisis-induced” mobilities that have triggered major shifts in the geographies of large-scale and
much more pronounced migratory movements. Mainland Venezuela, for example, has itself
experienced massive out-migration, countering its former identity as a migrant receiving nation,
and carving migration paths not only to other territories. The observed mainland-to-island
migration dynamic at such a scale, intensity and urgency is novel to the contemporary T&T and
Caribbean context. The Maduro migrations specifically, have considerably configured the
overarching immigration enforcement response of the T&T government. Amplified state
regulatory actions have in turn worked to alter migrant experiences and have caused a re-thinking
of settlement plans through the island’s interruption of their trajectories. Initial migrant
inclinations may have been aimed at the utilization of the island as a stepping-stone for resettlement to a third country, however state mechanisms have forced settlement (at least
temporarily) on the island, activated its barrier function (Bernardie-Tahir & Schmoll, 2014a) to
intended moves. By spatializing these circumstances, it allows for an understanding of how
mobilities and immobilities are intertwined (Ehrkamp, 2019).
Using interview data with Venezuelan migrants in T&T, I analyse their aspirational
narratives before and upon arrival to the island. After detailing their domestic experiences, I inquire
further into their actions in the present circumstances – noting if their settlement and migration
goals have changed or if they have remained the same. This is an attempt to acknowledge many of
the dynamics, frictions and failures often involved in the migration process. By tracing migrants’
actions to further these intentions, I illustrate their migration trajectories, shifting or otherwise.
Within an overarching mobilities framing, I launch conceptual tools from scholarship that maps
migration trajectories (Schapendonk et al., 2018) in a productive pairing with Bernadie-Tahir and
Schmoll’s (2014a) categorisations of the role of the islands within migratory patterns: the island
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as barrier, hub, and place of settlement. This analytical framework allows for a spatializing of
migrant mobilities and an analysis of the (un)intended outcomes. It provides useful ways to think
about both the island as a spatial unit and its dialectical relationship between mobility and
immobility. It also asks questions around the co-constitutive impacts of migration movements,
underscoring the idea that migration trajectories are constantly evolving in response to the spaces
that migrants traverse and inhabit.
I proceed by providing an overview of the theoretical discourses that thread through
readings of migration and mobilities on islands, migration trajectories and transit geographies. I
then provide narratives of Venezuelan migrants’ trajectories, to show the pronounced shifts in their
movements. Subsequently, I offer a discussion of these findings and conclusions, including a call
for the formulation of a robust island-mobilities framework in island and migration studies.

5.2. Geographies of Islands and Migration
Small islands and migration are inherently geographical concepts, that organically intersect across
space and time. Most islands have been, and continue to be, configured by migrations linked to
their historical roles (King, 1996, 2009; Warrington & Milne, 2007; Teerling & King, 2012). As a
consequence, small islands have largely been characterized by out-migrations. In the postcolonial
context, metropoles’ economic and labour schemes attracted persons from former colonies causing
a consistent outflow from islands, largely to the Global North. This trajectory of movement has
continued in contemporary times and shaped the imaginings of islands, primarily, as points of
departure (Liauzu, 1996; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The literatures discussed below explore the
multi-dimensionality of mobilities and movements, to and through island spaces. Island-Migration
scholarship has marked small islands as interstitial places and points of convergence (Bernardie-
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Schmoll, 2014b) for multiple categories of people and ideas (Lloyd & Mountz, 2014; Schnepel &
Alpers, 2018). In this section, I situate the empirical example of the Maduro migrations to T&T in
the literatures of mobilities, island studies and transit migration geographies. Here, I will examine
the overarching debates in island studies relative to migration discourses. I will also illustrate how
spatializing shifting migration movements generate productive possibilities in understanding how
migrant mobilities and immobilities are enmeshed – primary components of the analytical and
conceptual lenses operationalized in this project.

5.2.1. Island Movements: Thinking with/in the Island
Although scholars agree on the physical definition of an island, “this says nothing about what
makes islands matter to people—to those who live on them, to those who look upon them”
(Grydehøj, 2020, p. 2). As such, studies of islands have largely rested on conceptual engagements
with the notion of “islandness”. However, there is a kind of tension or messiness that persists in
the scholarship, hinged to inconsistencies in understandings of the concept. This continues to be
reflected in two ways: 1) the analytical and methodological approaches attempting to dissolve
binaries in studies of islands, for example, emic/etic dichotomies and 2) the enduring island
exceptionalism debate.
Godfrey Baldacchino (2006) asserts that the concept of islandness and its potential
influence on myriad disciplines, scholarship and human behaviour is fundamental to the study of
islands. In broad terms, islandness refers to both the physical element of islands’ geographies, in
addition to its impact on human occupants (Royle & Brinkow, 2018); however, its conceptual
specificity is not uniform among scholars. Across the varied interpretations though, there are
threads of notions of isolation, peripherality and disconnectedness. Natalie Bernardie-Tahir (2008)

133

categorizes these tropes into “three ‘i’s”: immobility (where time is slowed and change occurs only
gradually); isolation (places of remoteness); and identity (insular collective ‘island’ traditions,
culture). Stephen Royle (2001) views islandness as the constraints generated by island insularity.
Baldacchino (2007) however replaces the term insularity with islandness due to the former’s
pejorative connotations or “negative baggage” (p. 15). In a more vigorous interpretation,
Baldacchino conceives islandness as a dynamic variable “that does not determine, but contours
and conditions physical and social events in distinct, and distinctly relevant ways” (2004, 278).
Philip Conkling (2007), moves away from the materialism-essentialism framing, and sees
islandness as an encounter and feeling, “a metaphysical sensation that derives from the heightened
experience that accompanies physical isolation,” which can be equally experienced by visitors as
an “instantaneous recognition” (191). Stratford (2008) refines this approach into a kind of
emotional geography that is ascribed to a “complex expression of identity” attached to a “sense of
being in place”. More recent scholars have built on Baldacchino’s elucidations to interpret places’
islandness as “practiced” (see for example Vannini & Taggart, 2012; Grydehøj & Casagrande,
2020). The prevailing notion of the expression and emotional geographies of islandness in island
studies, however, propels a kind of “ontological power of islandness” (Falzon, 2012), that is
consequential.
Relative to migration discourse, the phenomenology of islandness and its emotional
attachment to sense of place has introduced incongruities toward the explicit consequences of
island’s conceptual delimiters or boundaries. Whether they work to insulate or connect however,
there is consensus that island boundaries do matter (Falzon, 2012) in the study of islands.
With over 20 years of methodological and analytical considerations, the island as a unit of
analysis remains problematic – bearing on the unevenness of islandness conceptualizations as
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elucidated above. There is however, a collective endeavour to dilute outsiders’ biases in the study
of islands. McCall’s (1994, 1996) proposed term nissology to refer to “the scientific study of
islands on their own terms”, although not without significant critique, has anchored this approach.
The past decade has seen scholarship’s “relational turn” impact the approaches to the study of
islands. More emphasis is now being placed on islands’ relationalities, privileging understanding
of islands as being “mutually constituted and co-constructed” (Stratford et. al 2011, cited in Pugh,
2016). Inherent in this approach is also the resolve to dissolve dichotomies of island/mainland as
well as land/sea (Stratford et al., 2011; Lee, Huang, & Grydehøj, 2017). See Table 3, summarizing
the progression of thought in Island Studies.
Table 3
The Evolution of Island Studies’ Scholarly Thought
Period
Since the
Early 19th
Century

Dominant
Approaches/Methods
Environmental
determinism

MIRAB Economic
Model
Since the
1990s

“Nissology”

Socio-demographic
Early 21st
Century
onward

Place Phenomenology

Archipelagoes and
“Archipelagic thinking”
“Aquapelagic
assemblages”

Main Concepts & Achievements
-Islands’ physical features determine human
culture & societal development.
-Introduced the island insularity concept.
-Focused on migration discourses: Asserts that
island economies are dependant on Migration,
Remittances, Aid & Bureaucracy.
-Studying islands on their own terms.
-Triggered a paradigmatic shift to an emic
view of island studies.
-A focus on new cycles of demographic,
social, economic and landscape change
because of island migrations
-Islands are affective spaces, i.e. places.
-Uses place theory to conceptually frame
studies through islanders’ lived experiences.
-A more relational approach to the study of
islands—island to island – and the cultural and
performative possibilities inherent in these
relations.
-A conceptual re-definition of “archipelagoes”
-Includes marine spaces & the interrelation
with terrestrial spaces in considerations of
island identities & belonging.

Examples
Semple
(1911),
Brunhes
(1920)
Bertram &
Watters
(1985)
McCall
(1994, 1996)
King &
Connell
(1999)
Hay (2006)

Stratford et al
(2011), Pugh
(2013)
Hayward
(2012)
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Archipelagic Socioecological frame

-Focus on the human social & natural systems
interaction in understandings of island
livelihoods & livelihood strategies.

Hidalgo et al
(2015)

Note: Author’s construction based on a review of theoretical and empirical literature
Debates on reading islands as exceptional spaces also continue to disrupt understandings
of islandness. Herein lies the risk of essentializing islands and islandness, while at the same time
creating spatial myopias (King, 2009). Should islands be read as “laboratories” (Baldacchino,
2006; King, 2009; Klepp, 2011), where islands are conceived as small-scale models of the wider
world – or, as semi-closed systems - pointing out islands’ sterile and isolated uniqueness?
Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll (2014) instead opt to characterize islands as “places of condensation”
– an analogy of the densification of water vapour molecules, making them visible. The authors
view islands as “synecdoche, a small part that may help us to understand the whole” (p. 94) to
account for its constituency in an increasingly globalized world. Mountz (2015) notes that
“[i]slands are unique locations, which may fuel the tendency toward geographical imaginaries that
orientalize an other” (p. 636). She has also suggested that islands, like elsewhere, have been subject
to histories of colonization, imperialism and empire – systems and processes that have significantly
configured island power structures and economies. Islands are therefore spatial paradoxes. While
there are commonalities in historic experiences and processes, islands’ physical geographies
cannot be understated. These very geographies have influenced the ways in which these processes
have unfolded in these contexts. Within island spaces, there is a degree of hypervisibility of issues
and concentrated happenings. These issues imprint on the island’s character, that then work to
wholly define the island. Clarke (2001) for example, suggests: “On continents, economic and
political changes evolve over decades; on islands, a ship appears on the horizon, a seaplane lands
in a harbour, a European explorer arrives, and a single day changes everything forever” (p. 46).
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5.2.2. Mobilities & Migrant Trajectories
Adding to the recent scholarship critiquing what is constituted as “transit migration” (Collyer &
De Haas, 2012; Collyer, Düvell & De Haas, 2012; Mainwaring & Brigden, 2016; Düvell, 2012),
there is a body of literature that launches the notion of “migration trajectories” to underscore the
entanglements of mobility and immobility in migrant journeys. “Migration trajectories” work to
disrupt the linear logics of migratory movements. More specifically, this work focusses on the
nature of how people move across space (see for example Khosravi, 2007, 2010; Mainwaring &
Brigden, 2016; BenEzer and Zetter, 2015). In this formative work (see specifically Schapendonk
et al, 2018 in GeoForum Special Collection), the authors bring to the fore the tentativeness of
migrant movements, offering that the im/mobilities along journeys are configured by a pairing of
“spatial dynamics” and specific “spatial frictions”, the latter of which is produced by migration
regimes. “Spatial dynamics” are characterized by the multiplicity of detours, transit spaces, actor
networks, in addition to the changeability of migrant aspirations and identities (Mainwaring &
Brigden, 2016; Schapendonk & Steel, 2014). “Spatial frictions” are constituted by mobility
controls and regulations that are often observed in spaces of waiting, detention and at border sites.
The notion of migration trajectories operationalizes this pairing of “spatialities”, recognizing a
kind of “ambiguity and clandestinity” (Mainwaring & Brigden, 2016) that pushes against
essentialist and absolutist interpretations of the fixity of migration motivations, intentionality and
outcomes. Migration trajectories therefore are undergirded by a transformative logic, emphasizing
evolution and process, even in times of immobility or settlement, where the fundamental dynamics
of migrant decision-making are impacted (Mallet & Hagen-Zanker, 2018).
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Discourses of mobility should not be considered without the necessary spatial,
infrastructural and institutional moorings” that regulate them (Hannam, Sheller & Urry, 2006).
These regulatory “moorings” are also referred to as “spatial fixes”, after Harvey (1989). They
moorings suggest inflexibility and immobility. As the “new mobilities paradigm” scholarship has
demonstrated, there is a need for degrees of immobility in order to facilitate mobility (Sheller &
Urry, 2006, 2016; Cresswell 2011; Sheller, 2017). Synchronist exercises of mobility and
immobility are therefore organically occurring. As illustrated in the conceptual framing of migrant
trajectories, mobilities are complex and interdependent. This entanglement stems from the
simultaneous fixes or moorings that often give rise to differential access to mobilities – “motilities”
(Kaufmann, 2002). These differences ultimately engender unequal power relations. Doreen
Massey (1994) also notes that mobilities are caught up in power geometries of everyday life. This
suggests that spatial frictions should be considered as occurring in the everyday within
“unregulated” spaces as well. As such, I conceptually foreground the island and its geography as
the prevalent spatial fix, upon and through which institutional moorings are harnessed and
operationalized. These are concurrent systems (spatial dynamics) of mobility and immobility that
interface and impact (spatial frictions) migrant trajectories in the everyday, that then either thwart
or enable desired outcomes.
Small islands have long been situated as simply “milestones” in a linear trajectory in
sedentarist readings of migration journeys. However, trans -nationalism, -localities and mobilities
scholarship has underscored the increasing complexity of migration routes and paths, situating the
migrant central to the production of complex spatial formations (Urry, 2000; Basch, Glick-Schiller
& Szanton-Blanc, 1996; Vertovec, 1999). Drawing from the transformative logics of migration,
mentioned above, migration projects are almost always “in process”, shifting with barriers or

138

access, before, during and after moments of encounter. Therefore, the island cannot simply be
conceptualized as a “momentary stop”. In fact, the island should be seen as a territory that
intervenes and interferes in the re-configuration of migration trajectories (Bernardie-Tahir &
Schmoll, 2014). This interface between migrant and the island territory, notwithstanding the
complexities of movement, impacts each constituent of the journey. The scholarship has offered
many personal narratives, and more recently, analysis of the impacts on migrants themselves,
however there is much to be said about the outcomes on the functions of the spaces which migrants
settle or traverse. It is in this area, that the empirical example of Venezuelan migration trajectories
can contribute.

5.2.3. The “Counter-islandness” Approach
The counter-islandness concept, set forth by Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll (2014), is a multipronged spatial analytic that carves out a position to reconsider and challenge conventional
delineations of islandness and common ascriptions to islands. The approach is operationalized by
emphasizing a conscious analytical articulation of scales (versus isolation), and the examination
of movements (versus immobility) – “countering” the deterministic discourses as characterized in
Bernardie-Tahir’s (2008) “three i’s” of immobility, isolation and identity, mentioned earlier.
Working in Malta, Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll (2014) engage in a multi-scalar analysis of
irregular migrations on the island, focusing on the shifting patterns and flows of migration
movements and processes from the scale of the body to the macro regional. Their argument frames
Malta as a space of circulation, where processes of migration and migrant spatialities are steeped
in a trans-scalar logic of control that are in some instances multiple, interlocked or contradictory.
The authors further articulate three island functions in their analysis of migrants’ movements: 1)
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the island as a barrier, 2) the island as a “hub” (where migrants come and go) and, 3) the island as
a place to settle down, or home. It is this latter segment of the framework, in the categorization of
island functions, that I find particularly relevant in my examination of the shifting functions of
Trinidad and Tobago as a migration site. Importantly as well, the authors’ characterization of
islands as “spaces of enclosure” is instructive, where while emphasizing openness through
movements and mobilities, there is still a recognition of the physicality of the island, and invariably
an acknowledgment of island “limits”.
As discussed in Chapters two and four, Trinidad and Tobago as a migration site, functions
primarily as a sending nation in the global migration imaginary, however it is also a site of intraregional migrations in addition to being pegged as a site of sex trafficking. The Venezuelan inmigration circumstance, however, provides a contemporary and highly visible empirical example
to delineate the functions of the island in a “crisis” situation. By spatializing Venezuelan migrants’
trajectories and evaluating the impacts on the meanings of T&T space as a site of migration, adds
to understandings of the process geographies of migration. This framework facilitates a move
beyond mere mentions of simplistic geographies and offers an invitation for much more complex
spatial thinking (Rechniewski & Graves, 2015) and analysis of the interplay between mobility and
immobility.

5.3. Spatializing Migrant Mobilities
In this section, I present narratives of Venezuelan migrants—reflections on their migration
intentions before making their way to T&T, their spatial maneuverings and subsequent decisions
in revising their movements. By highlighting the re-working of these trajectories and their eventual
outcomes, I engage in a spatializing of migrant mobilities. It is necessary to reiterate here that
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migration projects are constantly “in process” with outcomes sometimes being inadvertent
(Bernardie-Tahir & Schmoll, 2014). These narratives shed light on the multiplicity of movements
on the island and the methods engaged by islands’ authorities to inhibit movements. In this
circumstance, and at the time of these interviews, entering the island was less tenuous, while
exiting was largely restricted to legal or official processes, for example, through deportations or
re-settlement exercises, which were slow and intermittent.
5.3.1. Shifting Migration Trajectories
The deteriorating circumstances in Venezuela were the primary motivations for emigrating from
the mainland, and decisions to migrate to T&T were conceived in discourses of “escape”.
Choosing to journey specifically to T&T, and the degree of permanence of the move, varied
relative to peoples’ locational geographies, economic capacity, antecedent connections and
conceptions of their ultimate destinations. For people who resided in the interior of Venezuela,
decisions to migrate to T&T were driven by previous social connections on the island and took on
a more permanent and conclusive intention. Venezuelans from areas closer to the coast, for
example, Güiria or Tucupita, considered their proximate distance from the island, and their
migration plans took on a more temporary outlook in instances (See Figure 4). In T&T, on the
ground and at sea, policing and enforcement efforts were intensified, heightening the complexities
of mobility and narrowing options for migrants.
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Figure 4
Map showing Travel Routes of Venezuelan migrants to Trinidad

Olivia, and her family for example, were “cornered” into seeking asylum. The family, who
resided in Caracas, entered Trinidad through the Piarco International Airport on tourist
designations. The family’s movement took place in two stages: Olivia first traveled to the island
to make accommodations, then her sons and husband followed. The decision to move specifically
to T&T was based on her previous connections to the island. Several years ago, Olivia studied
English in Trinidad, and had built a social network of persons with whom she kept in contact. She
reveals that the decision to emigrate to T&T was not easy, but the situation in Venezuela was
growing increasingly untenable and desperate. Having sold the entirety of the family’s assets in
Venezuela, the intention was to permanently settle in T&T. While making efforts to apply for
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permanent residence on the island, Olivia and her family were forced to change their plans in an
instant. Olivia explains:
If I knew that the situation here would be so horrible here now, I would never move
my whole family to this country. When I came to Trinidad before, the people was
kind to me and respect me. I had plenty friends here, and they help me when I now
come back. Now, I cannot see any of them. I think they are tired of me and my
family…I cannot even step outside. The people hate us, the police hate us, Rowley
hates us. I don’t know what else to do. I am worrying about my sons…they are the
ones that I worry. I cannot move, I cannot work, I cannot send the boys to school.
What is this a prison? I tell you. Look, look once people see me, they start saying
things to me. I have to hide…
Olivia’s commentary illustrates the impacts of the changing geopolitical circumstances and
shifting relations toward Venezuelans on the island – moving from a warm and inclusive reception,
to now more isolation and persecution. Olivia continues:
I thought I know this country. When we reach the tourist date [expiration], I went
to the Immigration to talk the officer for how to fill in the form. He tell me I come
too late, I was suppose to come earlier to ask for extension and not permanent
residence form. They tell me I broke the law and they tell me they could take me
away from my children and take me to jail. They end up putting me on a
“supervision”…My husband told me we had to sign up for asylum then! It is the
only way I cannot go to jail.
Let me tell you, this is a very very bad situation (crying)…the situation is very very
bad in Venezuela. I cannot stay here, I want to go to America now...it is the only
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way I can see my family can survive…I praying that the United Nation send my
family to America…that is what we have to do now.
This unintended encounter brought about a direct modification in Olivia’s family migration
trajectory. In what can be read as a coerced circumstance, followed by a strategic response, Olivia’s
family added a segment of their migration journey that they did not anticipate, through their
application for asylum—that is, with expectations to be re-settled in another country by the
UNHCR. Through its legal infrastructure, the island effectively intervenes and interferes in the
blueprint of migrants’ movements. For this family, a migration journey that was intended to end
on the island, as a place to settle down and call home, now, in the larger scheme of the mobility
flow, takes on the character of a transit space. Their migration journey has now become protracted,
with the addition of a new segment of movement.
For Martha and her husband, the island’s intervention yielded tangible and dramatic
outcomes. From the outset, the couple’s objective was to apply for asylum status in Trinidad, with
the aim of being resettled. However, this did not turn out to be the case:
Martha: My husband has been sent back to Venezuela. On a Saturday the police
raided the place he was working in…and I have not seen him since. We did talk on
the phone in secret from the prison (Immigration Detention Centre) and he told me
to stay away, don’t even come to look for him…Then they send him back to
Venezuela on a plane. I am so scared for his life…but I think he will come back, I
don’t know how, but he will.
Me: Are you considering returning to Venezuela?
Martha: No! He will come back!
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The deportation of Martha’s husband has now forced her to “settle” on the island. This is
a deviation from the couple’s initial trajectory, given the intervening spatial friction. At the time
of the interview, Martha had not yet applied for asylum status. She has overstayed her allotted time
as a “tourist” and continues to live precariously outside of the dictates of the island’s immigration
laws. With enthusiasm, Martha states that she is awaiting her husband’s return to Trinidad, where
they will then both apply for asylum.
From the perspective of the migrants themselves, these two narratives illustrate the island’s
shifting functions in one instance, from a transit point to site of settlement and vice versa,
involuntarily or otherwise. The narratives also underscore a kind of instantaneity in making lifealtering decisions through changing migration objectives. The spatial frictions as experienced
through the amplified enforcement of the island’s legal architecture, has intervened and interrupted
the migrants’ intended trajectories of movement. Olivia was forced to change her migration
outlook by desiring to leave to a third country, while Martha has had her plans revised, settling on
the island (at least in the interim). Interestingly, both parties indicated their desire to be relocated
to the United States of America. Specific to a more longitudinal reading of migration trajectories
however, the island can be viewed as an intervening site of migration stoppage or barrier to
intended and further mobility.
Pivoting from the island’s functioning of hub to that of barrier, I reference Andres’
situation. Andres, who originates from a small town in Tucupita, journeyed from the mainland to
the island every two months to purchase goods and supplies for his family, including a new-born
baby. Andres would enter through the Cedros port, after making the boat journey across the
Columbus Channel. He would sometimes stay in the South of the island for a bit of time and do
short term jobs to finance the purchase of supplies. He engaged in this back and forth movement
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for quite some time. Andres states that it was never his intention to stay in Trinidad. It was not
practical – he is the breadwinner of his family and takes care of his ailing parent and his immediate
family. At the end of 2017 however, there was growing anxiety on the ground, following
heightened policing and surveillance exercises and an increase in the detention of immigrants
across the island. Andres claims he grew anxious and scared, thinking that he would be jailed for
working illegally in the country, and ultimately refused entry again if he ever left and tried to reenter. Andres stated that this would certainly result in the curtailment of the resource- flow to his
family back home. Andres explains:
I cannot return home as is. I will not take risk. If I leave and they don’t let me come
back, we will starve back home. My mother is very old, and she is very sick, and I
have a baby. I work here, not for much, but I send money for them when I can. My
cousin buys what he can when he gets the money and give it to them in the house…I
have not seen my family in 5 months… of course, I miss them. But I have to stay
here so that my family could live there.
I wanted to go and apply for extension to stay, but I didn’t know if they would find
out I was working…listen, it is better I stay here and send back money home for
them. I will keep my work.
In attempting to discern if Andres had heard about resources available through institutions such as
the Living Water Community and the UNHCR, he replies:
Yes, I know about Living Water…Now, people tell me I should apply for refugee,
but I do not know. I do not want to stay here forever or go somewhere else. I cannot
do that. I want to go back home to my family.
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Although Andres frequented the island back and forth, because of increasing constraints in
mobilities into and on the island, and compounded by his fear of arrest, he chose to stay on the
island. His migration trajectory changed to having to “settle” in Trinidad. His migration outlook
however remains steeped in a sense of temporariness and perhaps optimism. He, however, sees
the necessity of staying in Trinidad, to ensure that his family has food and supplies back in
Venezuela. The policing and immigration authorities in discharging the island’s immigration laws
and policies have intervened and interrupted Andres’ movements, and in a moment, modified his
migration intentions.
From the excerpts presented, the island and its “spatial frictions” through enforcement
actions, have caused a pivoting of migration intentions and trajectories. The interface between
migrant and island site impacts both constituents immeasurably. For Venezuelans, there is an
almost immediate shift in lifecourse, because of modified migration paths resulting from the
domestic limitations and regulations on the island. Stepping back, these movements, trajectories
and transitions or shifts of the migrants have also impacted the functionings of the island as a
migration space. The island is now seen to serve as a barrier to future movement, and a site of
(in)voluntary settlement. This pushes against the dominant migration narratives of islands as
merely sending nations and transit sites of movement. In these circumstances, the twin-island of
Trinidad and Tobago constrained and halted movement of Venezuelan migrants, and in effect
“absorbed” these migrants into itself.

5.3.2. “Barriers” to Exit
Departures from T&T were quite limited, largely confined to state and humanitarian processes.
The voluntary and independent migrations of Venezuelans to third countries were miniscule
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because of the few resources they possessed to fund such movements. During the course of my
data collection, a solitary narrative of a Venezuelan migrating to reunite with their family in a third
country was communicated to me. Unsurprisingly however, this trip was secured and facilitated
by the person’s family in Spain. It was generally accepted however that refugee re-settlement
would be one out of two ways to leave T&T – in fact, this was the preferred means, although it
was nearly non-existent. Being repatriated by the state was the other option. Both modes of
departure off the island were slow and severely infrequent.
Illustrating the modes of departure and circumstances around these movements Camila’s
narrative describes a success story, while Ricardo reveals the problematics of changing migration
movements.
Camila explains:
My cousin and I came together. We travelled here for carnival last two years and
we knew people here already. I know I wanted to stay because I have a boyfriend
here who takes very good care of me, but she [the cousin] always wanted to leave.
She never wanted to live here. She apply for asylum and they interview her quick,
and now she’s in Australia…She didn’t even want to go when she heard where she
been sent, but she said there’s nothing here for her. This was what she wanted to
do, but I don’t know if she expected Australia. She always said she wanted to go to
the States (resettled by the UNHCR with assistance from the IOM)
In this excerpt, we observe a successful re-settlement situation. It was one out of only two
“advanced” stories recorded, based on the cohort of participants – a number of who were asylum
seekers.
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Ricardo migrated to Trinidad with the intention to settle in the country. However, his initial
narrative suggested a degree of temporariness, and even a sense of optimism for Venezuela’s
situation. As his story unfolded however, the complexity of his situation came to the fore:
Ricardo: My brother was already here. My wife and children are still in Venezuela.
I had to convince my wife that this was the right thing to do, for a while. Things are
very bad in Venezuela, and they need to eat. Over here, my brother got a job for
me, and it was the plan to stay at his apartment for a while until I save some
money…I never come to Trinidad…everything was new for me. I came on the boat.
I used to work for a machine shop for about a month, while I start to look for a
place to live on my own. Then police and Immigration start coming in the area
where I work. My boss let me go from work. He said he was scared to get reported.
Now, everyday I am just at my brother’s place. Asking people and trying to make
connections to find work.
I talk to my wife everyday and she is crying, begging me to come back home. I am
so confused right now, if to stay here or go back. The two-places are bad, but here
seem worse without my family here. Right, sir?
Me: If you do decide to go back to Venezuela, how would get back there?
Ricardo: Sir, I cannot take the plane and I cannot afford to pay to go back on the
boat right now. I am trying to borrow some money to get the fare, but it is hard. I
think people know things are trouble all over…but sir, I miss my wife and children.
I am very worried.
As noted in Ricardo’s situation, the limited economic capacity of migrants to facilitate a
change in their migration trajectory fortifies the island’s functioning as a barrier to movement.
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With limited departure options from the island, outside of official conduits, and little finance to
facilitate independent movements, the island invariably reinforces itself as a site of (in)voluntary
settlement. For Ricardo, it becomes a kind of self-perpetuating cycle of regulated mobility,
bolstered by restrictive legal infrastructures within a fraught social environment.
The above narratives represent a comprehensive cross-section of migrants’ spatial
movements re-considered. In all of these excerpts, re-thinkings of additional movements were
coerced. As time progressed, there were amplified surveillance and policing regimes within the
island and along its maritime borders. Following the limited modes of exit, means of entry into the
island became increasingly restrictive as well. This was evidenced by boatloads of persons being
refused entry at official ports of entry, and the increasing interception of other vessels destined to
other unofficial sites of entry along the west coast of the island. These practices were situated along
a strategic enforcement continuum operationalized by coordinated efforts of T&T’s coast guards,
police and immigration officials.

5.4. An Interrupting Island?
T&T can be read as an island site that, through the intensification of its immigration enforcement
regime, works to intervene, interfere and interrupt the migrations and intended trajectories of
Venezuelans. Spatializing migrant mobilities through the presented narratives, serves to
productively map the multiple and complex trajectories of Venezuelan migrants into and across
T&T, in addition to detailing the ways in which the island’s enforcement programme interfaces
with migrants. In the first instance, it is observed that migration trajectories are characterized by
varying aspirations for permanence, in addition to the myriad ways in which migrants strategically
utilize the island site. The island however, functionally operationalized through its mobility
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regimes and other regulating mechanisms – through offshore patrolling by coast guards, and police
and immigration officials at ports of entry and inland – can coercively and instantaneously thwart
movements into, through, and out of the country. Thus, at the backdrop of Bernadie-Tahir and
Schmoll’s (2014) categorization of the functions of islands, T&T within the Venezuelan migration
scenario, functions as a site of settlement and as a barrier, where the latter reinforces the former.
Here, “T&T as barrier” is understood not only as an absolute discontinuance of movement, but as
island elements, functions or measures that interrupt, frustrate or complicate future and further
movements and intentions.
The Maduro migrations and T&T’s responding enforcement actions reflect the island’s
self-preservation processes. As such, the state’s mechanization at and within the island’s borders
constitute certain parallels with Joseph Nevin’s Operation Gatekeeper (2002) analysis. Ricardo’s
situation elucidated above, for example, in similar reading of Mexican immigration to the US,
where migrants were “forced” to remain in the US because mobility was curtailed – Mexican
migrants paralyzed by fears of not being able to return – holds true in both circumstances. In
limited ways, the T&T state, in pursuit of its barrier function, appear to reproduce strategies from
non-island

jurisdictions’

(US)

containment

models.

However,

while

the

practical

operationalization of both US and T&T enforcement worked to interrupt migrants’ movements
and intentions, several divergences exist across the contexts. Nevins’ argument is visible through
an assertion of the state-sponsored creation of an immigration “crisis”, while in T&T, the state
sought to precisely downplay that crisis narrative. How enforcement operations unfold, also varies
significantly. T&T has watery borders and it is tremendously challenging to undertake
enforcement operations at sea, as compared to physical borders on land—the spatial frictions that
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manifest from the island’s legal, policy and enforcement actions however work to discursively
construct a kind of “border”, that interrupt migrant movement and trajectories.
Diverging from migration discourses on islands, the spatialities of migrant movement have
shifted readings of the island as an open and interconnected space to now, an (en)closed geography.
Spatially, the arrested mobilities on the island demonstrate parallels to other readings of closed
geographies in the form of carceral spaces. In similar form, the regulations and “frictions”
encountered on the island site threads discourses of detention and confinement to the ways in
which immobilities are compelled, forcing the migrant to “settle” in a specific site. This closed
geography also invokes the physicality of the island site, underscoring its limitations, in relation
to other sites, such as mainland territories. This is evidenced by the limited ways in which
movements are facilitated into and out of the island—a migrant cannot simply cross land to another
sovereign nation or entity. Of course, persons can attempt to swim across the watery spaces, but
perhaps to their own peril. Therefore, restricting the already limited means of movement, in part,
reinforces the assertion that the novel and multiple movements of Venezuelan migrants, to and
across T&T caused a “closing” of the island’s geography from within and out.
5.5. Conclusions
This chapter examined how Venezuelans’ shifting migration trajectories have impacted the
functions of Trinidad and Tobago as a migration site. The analysis revealed that while there was
an “opening up” of the island spatially, through multiple migrations, the island was effectively
“closing down”, carving out its fundamental function as “barrier” in the mobilities landscape. This
role became clearer with time, evidenced by the island’s amplified restrictionist agendas
(beginning within the island, quickly complemented by operations along the coasts). As migrant
numbers increased on the island, so too did measures to shut down the island. By identifying the
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multiplicity of movements into and through the island, it bolsters challenges to deterministic
narratives of small islands as merely “sending nations” or “transit points”. The “island as barrier”
function also manifested in the swift shifts in people’s migration trajectories. People shifted, for
example, from intending to settle on the island to wanting to relocate to another country, or from
back and forth journeys to “settling” on the island. Beyond this, and notwithstanding the
difficulties of migrants to facilitate independent travels, the few options to leave the island, also
reinforces the functionality of the barrier concept. These limitations and constraints on mobilities
worked to re-map migrants’ movements, effectively confining them to the island itself or read
alternatively, provided an impetus to involuntarily “settle’ on the island. Additionally, this spatial
analysis, and the empirical mapping of migrants’ movements and trajectories, has added to
nuanced considerations of the conceptual entanglements of mobilities and immobilities in an island
context. Beyond its material configuration, the island remains a paradoxical site.
Conceptually, the mobilities approach to spatializing migrant trajectories incorporates the
“spatial fixity” of the island geography and its regulatory institutional moorings observed through
the island’s “spatial dynamics” and manifested through “spatial frictions”. All of these elements
work in tandem to intervene and interrupt migrant mobilities and intentionality, in everyday
situations. The ways in which this conceptual framework is operationalized in T&T context is also
significantly grounded in the specificities of the historical and geo-political background of
Venezuela-T&T relations. As I have mentioned earlier, the contemporary out-migrations from
Venezuela are primarily steeped in discourses of escape—and Venezuelans have been emigrating
to other small islands in the region, including T&T. However, the ways in which these spatial
frictions unfold in T&T and their eventual outcomes are distinctive. The spatial frictions delineated
in this analysis are pointed illustrations of arguments espoused in Chapters three and four, of the
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state-society attempts to contain and control the discourse of the Maduro migrations, maintaining
the island’s status quo. This chapter, however, shows how these actions impact the functioning of
the island as a migration site.
Although this analysis is read through a highly configured mobilities lens, Island Studies
epistemology can benefit from an “island-mobilities approach” especially in light of the complex
human migrations and non-human mobilities occurring on island sites. While the “new mobilities
paradigm” (Sheller & Urry, 2006) has obliquely influenced Island Studies approaches, there is an
absence of a robust, measured, and holistic mobilities intervention, as observed in the mapping of
scholarly thought at Figure 5.1. Related works have traditionally borrowed fragments of
approaches to constitute a whole (for example, Christensen & Gough, 2012; Sheller 2007, 2009)
– as was undertaken in this inquiry. This instinctively calls for an intentional marriage of
geography, mobilities and migration studies approaches unfolding onto the study of islands. The
“ontological power of islandness” is a promising launching point from which to build such an
epistemological trajectory.
Fundamentally, the study of islands cannot be done without the engagement of the notion
of “islandness” and its markers of isolation, immobility and insular identity. Islandness as an
emotional geography (Stratford, 2008) invokes the social and spatial in its conceptual delineations.
Massey (2005) reads space as the outcome of social interrelations that is always under
construction. Cresswell (2004), and Malpas (1999) before him, argue against this kind of social
constructionism, rather they see the spatial as existing prior to and facilitating the social. With the
mapping of the social (and emotional) onto the island’s physical geography, a crucial perspective
of the notion of islandness then, is its boundedness. Of equal importance is the ways in which these
conceptual boundaries enable or constrain mobilities as they are traversed– do they connect or
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further isolate? For Pete Hay (2006) island boundaries “invite transgression; inspire restlessness;
demand to be breached” (23). There is immense productivity in operationalizing the percepts of
the “mobilities turn” in a comprehensive and instructive way, in readings of mobilities and
migrations on islands.
By making this argument, I continue to privilege the physical geographies of islands that
inform the notion of islandness. Perhaps the constant retheorizing of islands and islandness,
particularly through the use of over-extended metaphors, has lost sight of the very geography that
it seeks to re -produce and re-present. Scholars are “islands” themselves and inevitably bring their
own biases. I fear that this hyperconsciousness may dilute critical approaches to the study of
islands. I make this assertion as an “insider” in service of the emic privileging as an islander
myself, and at the backdrop of the renewed call (just at the time of this writing) from scholars
advocating for an inductive approach to the study of islands (Nimführ & Otto, 2020). In discourses
of migration and mobilities on islands, there are limitations, but also productive possibilities that
can be derived from their “enclosed” geographies. As exemplified in the spatial analysis of T&T,
the limited means and modes of movement out of, and eventually into the island, constitutes
material evidence of the thresholds of islands. In migration studies, our work is always in progress,
and while some may argue that the island is (now) quite a malleable unit of analysis, there needs
to remain some fixity to the analytical element – consider a shift from a “fixed” unit, to “fixated”
which invokes ideas of connectedness, but still maintains notions of enclosure. Perhaps, Pete Hay’s
(2013) argument of connectivity not being the antithesis of isolation should be re-visited, in rethinkings of islandness and considerations of a key mobilities intervention.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion

In this final chapter, I weave the claims articulated across the preceding three empirical chapters
to complete the overarching argument of this dissertation. Brathwaite’s “tidalectics” (DeLoughrey,
2007) has proven useful in framing the re-emergences of traditional geopolitical architectures and
the reinvocations of colonial and imperialist ontologies and ideologies in the present day that occur
in this island-migration study. How these resurgences unfold and impact the twin-island nation of
Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) constitutes a primary focus of this dissertation. Specifically, this
project engaged in a critical examination of the responses of Trinidad and Tobago to the inflow of
Venezuelans or the “Maduro migrations”. The inquiry methodically dissects the island’s responses
in terms of its government’s domestic and country-position, society’s reception and treatment of
migrants, and the impacts of the in-migration on the island’s functions as a migration site.
The overarching argument I have made is that Trinidad and Tobago’s responses, launched
through the use of its island-geographies, are exercises in defence of its sovereignty, with a view
to self-preservation, maintaining its status quo and autonomy, thereby rejecting external dictates
in its domestic affairs. This central argument is tethered by a robust thread of island selfpreservation practices, and metaphors of control, containment and closure, that occur at all scales
of this analysis. Through its geo/political response, T&T’s government sought to craft and control
a precise discourse of Venezuelan migration into the country, on its own terms. Shifting the
narrative from “refugee” to “economic migrant” served to be politically expedient in the domestic
context, by ascribing non-committal service to the Venezuelan migrants. On the international
circuit, T&T’s actions were in defiance of external agitations and expectations.
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There exists salient interconnectivity among the various scales of response, where
immigration law and policy, enforcement activity and anti-immigrant attitudes and action are coconstituting, and work to restrict, regulate and contain migrants and their mobilities. For the T&T
government, these responses are steeped in a cumulative apprehensiveness toward external
dictates, hence its posturing of rejection of outside influence. This follows, in particular, from a
long history of US interventionism in the region. In terms of society’s response; migrants are
already made vulnerable by the state’s ad hoc and restrictive laws and are further exposed to
racialized and gendered readings by the local population. These anti-immigrant responses are
indicative of a re-scripting and re-casting of colonial codes of difference, embodied and projected
onto the Venezuelan migrants. These behaviours emanate from warped discourses of race, beauty,
desirability and colourism, conditioned by the colonial experience.
The “crisis” has also impacted people’s migration trajectories and has shifted the
functioning of the island as a migration site. While there was an “opening up” of the island spatially
through multiple migrations of Venezuelans, the island was effectively “closing down” due to its
responding amplification in mobility and migration regulatory regimes. This (en)closing of the
island’s geography also invokes the physicality of the island site, and underscores not only its
limitations, but its strategic usage in these containment exercises.
T&T’s rejection of the external, and re-assertion of its sovereignty, is part and parcel of a
larger decolonization project that disrupts pre-defined structures and expectations. Presupposed
arrangements situate small island states at the lower rungs of geo/political hierarchies. Given their
usually “dependent sovereignties”, islands are expected to acquiesce to the dictates of larger, more
powerful nation-states. In these circumstances, Trinidad and Tobago did not follow that model,
giving rise to inter-territorial tensions. From 2015 onward, the mapping of T&T’s response shows
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the calculated ways in which the island nation-state ramped up efforts to fortify its position of
disallowing external dictates to influence its domestic affairs. This, however, had the opposite
effect, working to obliquely impact the island’s domestic decisions.
T&T’s modes of operation are telling of the perception of the health of its sovereignty –
that it is waning. This, of course, is a continuity of a default position of recently independent postcolonial nations. Since economic progress is intimately tied to meanings of sovereignty (Lewis,
2013) especially for “new” nation-states, T&T experienced double blows through the drop-in oil
prices and the onset of political intrusiveness given the unfolding Venezuelan circumstance. The
island-nation was perceived to be in vulnerable form. The migration “crisis” then, elicited grand
posturing to articulate the image of the island as strong, resilient and autonomous. For T&T, it is
physically (and financially) impractical to “wall-off” an island nation, given its very geography.
Therefore, the use of legislation, policy and geopolitical pronouncements work to discursively
construct the “wall”: a) to offset the idea that there is an erosion of nation-state sovereignty
(Brown, 2010) and, b) as a mechanism of closure, containment and control, in defence of the
island’s sovereignty.
Old geopolitical lines are being re-drawn: traditional geopolitical tensions have been rekindled, and the old power playbook has re-emerged. Power geometries have resurfaced closer to
T&T, and hemispheric geopolitics can be viewed as intimately linked to developments and impacts
in the locality. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, T&T’s delicate positionality is amplified,
influenced by the unfurling geopolitical situation between the US and Venezuela, next door, that
has caused massive migration inflows to the small island nation. This, in concert with hemispheric
entities using the very migration situation as leverage to influence T&T’s geopolitical stance, has
caused T&T to vigorously control and contain the mobilities of Venezuelans to and through its
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domestic space. There are connectivities and influences here: hemispheric geopolitics and
domestic matters; state to state politics and relations; geopolitics and microscale bodies, and
mobilities; state politics and migrants and mobilities. The spatialities and mobilities of the
geopolitics of the Venezuelan (migration) crisis continue to shape, reproduce, and in instances,
resist certain power differentials at varied scales and across contexts. Further, the wider Caribbean,
but especially Trinidad and Tobago, given its proximate geography and geostrategic significance,
can potentially be an immediate casualty if there is military conflict between Venezuela and the
United States. While Trinidad and Tobago’s political potential, in this circumstance, can be
perceived as elevated, T&T remains a tiny island in the Caribbean Sea, permeable to forces around
it.
The ways in which issues unfold and are handled, wholly define the small island –
imprinting on the island’s identity. Islands in postcolonial settings operate through hauntings of
colonial structures and strictures, where the past manifests in the present. As I have elucidated in
Chapters One and Three, for T&T, visible racial disparity in the country’s composition energizes
the unfolding of the Venezuelan in-migration circumstance on the island – as if the formerly
colonized have taken on the profile of the oppressor, toward an “outsider” body, in a visceral kind
of way. There is a resurgence of the hierarchical social readings of difference, and continuities of
racism in the country. The island also emerges as a re-presentation of a kind of carceral state that
works to regulate and contain migrant bodies, as I have shown in Chapter Five. The regulatory
mechanisms that permeate the island site, in these circumstances, threads discourses of detention
and confinement through the ways in which migrant immobilities are compelled by the state.
These readings of the island illustrate the recurrence of a traditional container model of statesociety control, in situ.
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6.1. Contributions
The intellectual mapping and dimensions of analysis undertaken in this project are pivotal and
timely. The enormity of the Venezuelan crisis and its outcomes continue to overshadow the
fullness of the situation. Media coverage and other analyses focus on the statistics and main
migratory movements of Venezuelans into mainland territories. However, significant migration is
happening elsewhere—on islands. This study re-inserts the human element of the Maduro
migrations into the conversation. This is an important acknowledgement of migrants’ agency, and
an appreciation of their everyday experiences toward ensuring the preservation of their human
rights, as they move. Further, this work situates the postcolonial island as central to contemplations
of migration, mobilities, sovereignty and other themes in wider geopolitical discourse. Following
from Brathwaite’s tidalectics, the study illuminates the ways in which islands’ centrality has reemerged with empathic energies and heightened political consciousness. Notwithstanding their
limited capacities, islands are slowly shedding their passive profiles, through the re-assertion of
their autonomy.
The dissertation extends its empirical and conceptual tentacles across myriad subdisciplines. In migration and island studies for example, this case study highlights the novelty of
mainland to island migrations in the contemporary Caribbean, making an important empirical
contribution to south-south migration discourse. It also gauges islands as migration sites beyond
their physical response capacities, and underscores islands’ import in the global migration regime
architecture. It situates the island as a relevant component in migration flows, particularly in
relation to (un)intended migration trajectories, especially in “crisis” eventualities. The study also
advocates for a re-acknowledgement of the physical geographies of island sites, in conceptions of
“islandness” and in studies of migration and mobilities. After all, in human migration analyses,
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there is a usual need for (a) reference point(s), rather than the dominance of over-stretched
metaphorizations. Island studies migration literature has often sought to reproduce the “idea” of
the island in differing contexts, and when islands’ physicality is invoked, it is usually limited to
understandings as transitory spaces or spaces of detention. Harnessing and navigating some of
these arguments, this project contributes a nuanced layer to the discourse, by critically mapping
the embeddedness of geopolitical interventions and launchings of sovereignty in island
geographies and their impacts on migratory movements.
Through a post-colonial studies lens, the case of T&T and Maduro migrations highlights
the decolonization advances of former colonial territories. For Trinidad and Tobago as a
postcolonial island within the larger geopolitical hierarchical framework, this study elucidates how
subaltern identities and geopolitical space are being mobilized to resist the dominant matrix of
power created in the aftermath of colonization, neo-imperialism and “modernity”. T&T’s steadfast
positions on geo/political matters or what is perceived as “resistances” to mainstream order
establishes a counter-discourse. The capacities and responses of postcolonial territories to
established structures, work in service of a kind of “writing back” in attempts to dismantle the
Eurocentric, hierarchical configurations that still provision global epistemic and ontological
ordering.
In terms of feminist geography approaches, this dissertation has situated the migrant at the
center of its analysis, illustrating how migrants’ bodies are affected by larger geopolitical
developments—tying the scale of the body to macro-scale happenings. Here, intersectional
analysis has been proven to be not only productive, but critical. Linkages of the histories,
geographies and cultural crosscurrents are integral in wholly framing the issue and contextualizing
nuances that may emerge in the contemporary moment—an approach that is essential in readings
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of post-colonial spaces. Lastly, the de-constructivist orientation of this work through critical
geopolitics readings has been squarely focussed on context-specific understandings of
“sovereignty”. For T&T, there are many dimensions to its understandings of sovereignty, including
a well-protected, but interwoven economic aspect. Throughout this analysis, there is an
undercurrent of separation between political autonomy and the economic capacity, that the T&T
government attempts to keep separate. However, the tension is that they are intimately linked.
Strategic crafting of geo/political responses by the T&T state, particularly to the US, the island’s
largest trading partner, keeps the politics separate from economic conversations—while sanctions
and other restrictions loom over the island.

6.2. New Lines of Inquiry
The ontological launchings and epistemological approaches in this project, prompt several new
intersectional and interdisciplinary avenues for study. Migration as a conduit between islands and
the study of political geographies illustrates how colonialism and empire are resurgent in
contemporary political landscapes. There is ripe potential to focus on the interconnections of postcoloniality, sovereignty and islands.
For the broader Caribbean, this study creates space for an evaluation of the ways in which
the Maduro migrations are impacting other island territories within the region. Engaging the
heterogeneity of the Caribbean region allows for evaluation of how territories interface with
hemispheric geopolitics on other small island territories with differing domestic legal and political
structures. This will enable the mapping of how “sovereignties” are oriented across different
contexts, in acute moments, such as this “crisis”. How, for example, will Sub-national island
jurisdictions’ (SNIJs) appreciations of sovereignty impact crisis response? In order to access
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external capacity supports, will islands be willing to engage in sovereignty bargains? Do islands’
political economy and legal structures allow for such action? Knowledge in these areas of inquiry
will be deepened and broadened through comparison of findings from the range of territories
impacted by this crisis, as well as other archipelagic regions with parallel moments like this.
Further, this work creates an entry into reading the island Caribbean on its own terms– countering
its usual subsummation by the umbrella categorization of Latin America and the Caribbean. The
aspiration here is not to create an exclusive and disconnected space for island Caribbean issues,
but to enhance geography-specific knowledges. My suggestion is grounded in an extension of the
island exceptionalism debate, coupled with a long-time “mimicry” contention about the
unoriginality of Caribbean identity24. Here, Island Studies’ nissological approach (McCall, 1994,
1996) will be productive. Studying the island Caribbean on its own terms, will aid in privileging
island specific issues, fostering a distinctive space and identity, to, for example, contextualize
islands’ resources capacities, and gauge their response potential to internal and external issues.
This study inspires questions around regionalism and how island archipelagoes navigate
dominant geopolitical forces, with relevance to the most urgent global problem, climate change in
the Anthropocene. Informed readings of islands’ sovereignties have shifted the once dominant
framing of the peripheral situatedness of islands, now with their potential to reconfigure and better
understand larger geopolitical architectures. It is important to discern how governance structures
are operationalized in geopolitical arrangements, toward preserving social and mobility justices
(Sheller, 2018). Studies with this focus will be critical in determining how the outcomes of climate
change and other forms of displacement are interpreted and dealt with. These investigations should
be crafted to re-shift island studies and geographies to acknowledge their physical limitations and

24

For a full discussion see Walcott’s (1974) essay: The Caribbean: Culture or Mimicry?
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constrained capacities to deal with large scale issues like the climate emergency and large-scale
migrations.
Crafting inquiries into the mobilities of Venezuelan males will also prove useful in an
appreciation of how immigration legislation and policy impact their everyday lives. In addition, a
study focussed on the Venezuelan LGBTQI community will also shed light on the varied ways in
which mobilities are operationalized or immobilized in relation to state prescription and societal
responses. These are key dimensions of migration studies on islands, particularly in the global
south, that would benefit from scholarly inquiry.
The research also presents fertile ground for policy engagement. It can be used in informing
policy and legislative responses at islands’ domestic and regional levels: 1) as an instructive
reflective piece in prioritizing regional foreign policies by identifying islands’ positionality and
influence in the global geopolitical order and identifying counterstrategies to potential divergences
on matters and 2) to work, specifically, toward migration governance reformations that seek to
diminish the disconnections between immigration laws and migrants’ lived experiences. Crafting
and actioning foreign policies and initiatives in the knowledge of the potential and capacity of
larger geopolitical expectations and forces will enable the strengthening of the effectiveness of
such programmes of action. In addition, given the continual and amplified intensity of mobilities
and migrations across geographies, there is an ethical mandate to safeguard the rights of every
migrant. Working from the centrality of the migrant body in this work, institutions can re-consider
questions around containment and resource allocation while privileging the migrant in its policy
and procedural decisions.
Finally, it is important to interrogate the political reach of organizing movements in island
nations around social and mobility injustices. Brathwaite’s tidalectics frame how these issues
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reoccur with evolved complexities and capacities of violence. However, in synchronous ways,
there has also been an emergence of organized resistances and representations. An intersectional
inquiry into these matters can work to unhide inequalities and uneven governance frameworks.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – Participant Demographic Profiles

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Pseudonym Gender
Marco
M
Monica
F
Camila
F
Michael
M
Mariana
F
Maria
F
Luis
M
Sofia
F
Martinez
M
Alma
F
Olivia
F
Agustina
F
Manuel
M
Gloria
F
Martha
F
Andres
M
Joanna
F
Dina
F
Javier
M
Tommy
M
Manuel
M
Rodrigo
M
Santiago
M
Daniela
F
Elsa
F
Dana
F
Marisol
F
Juanita
F
Mala
F
Ricardo
M
Pato
M

Age
28
22
31
32
27
24
27
33
36
32
38
20
31
19
29
31
29
34
43
22
27
28
32
22
25
29
36
31
26
28
35

Length of time
in Trinidad
2 years
2.5 years
3 years
1.5 years
2.5 years
3.5 years
3.5 years
1.5 years
1 year
2 years
3.5 years
2 years
2.5 years
11 months
1 year
1.5 years
1 year
10 months
1.5 years
1 year
2 years
1.5 years
10 months
8 months
8 months
2 years
10 months
1 year 7 months
2 years
1 year
4 years

Mode of
Entry
Plane
Plane
Plane
Plane
Plane
Plane
Plane
Boat
Boat
Boat
Plane
Boat
Plane
Boat
Boat
Plane
Plane
Boat
Plane
Boat
Plane
Plane
Boat
Boat
Boat
Plane
Boat
Plane
Plane
Boat
Plane
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Appendix B – Consent Form
UNIVERSIDAD WILFRID LAURIER
DECLARACIÓN DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO
TÍTULO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN: Negociando las Geografías Políticas de las Islas: El caso de
las ‘Migraciones de Maduro’ de Venezuela a Trinidad y Tobago
INVESTIGADOR PRINCIPAL: Shiva Mohan, PhD Candidate, Departamento de Geografía y
Estudios Ambientales, Universidad Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario, Canadá. Teléfono:
1(519) 884-0710 x2160; Correo electrónico:moha8320@mylaurier.ca
ADVISOR: Alison Mountz, Profesora, Departamento de Geografía y Estudios Ambientales,
Universidad Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario, Canadá. Teléfono: 1 (226) 772-3143; Correo
electrónico: amountz@wlu.ca

Usted está invitado a participar en un estudio de investigación. El propósito de este estudio de
investigación es conocer las experiencias personales y cotidianas de los inmigrantes
venezolanos en Trinidad y Tobago. Para este proyecto no se registrarán nombres y direcciones.
Esta investigación tiene como objetivo estudiar los desafíos que enfrentan los inmigrantes
venezolanos en su vida cotidiana además de identificar sus intenciones en el país y sus futuras
trayectorias migratorias. El objetivo general es identificar las áreas que necesitan mejoras y
fortalecimiento con respecto a las políticas y leyes existentes que hacen frente al asentamiento y
movimiento de inmigrantes.
INFORMACIÓN
Se le pedirá que reflexione sobre sus motivaciones para venir a Trinidad desde Venezuela, cómo
fue recibido en la isla, identificando cualquier desafío o presión que enfrentó y cómo es que ha
llegado a lidiar con estas circunstancias. También se le pedirá que describa cuáles son sus
intenciones migratorias dada la situación actual en Venezuela y sus circunstancias en
Trinidad. Su información individual es confidencial, lo que significa que no puede vincularse
con su persona.
Habrá un total de 30 personas participando en este estudio. Solo se usará la comunicación
verbal a través de la entrevista. Esta información se grabará digitalmente con una grabadora de
voz y además estará en las anotaciones del investigador. Esta entrevista tomará
aproximadamente 1 hora.
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RIESGOS
No se pedirán nombres ni direcciones en ningún momento durante esta entrevista, es decir, su
información individual no podrá vincularse con su persona. Sin embargo, en el caso improbable
de que haya una revelación sobre una situación migratoria ilegal o indocumentada, se podrán
tomar medidas legales contra usted. Usted podría ser detenido por el Ministerio de Seguridad
Nacional, luego juzgado por el sistema legal de Trinidad y Tobago, enfrentando la posibilidad
de deportación si se encuentra en violación de las leyes del país.
Puede negarse a continuar con esta entrevista en cualquier momento. Todos sus datos serán
borrados en el sitio.
BENEFICIOS
Sus experiencias y pensamientos serán incluidos en una estrategia que ayudará al desarrollo de
un sistema de inmigración bien planeado para Trinidad y Tobago, el cuál ayudará a mejorar el
asentamiento y las intenciones transitorias de los posibles inmigrantes a las islas.
La Universidad Wilfrid Laurier continúa desarrollando experiencia en investigación en el área
de migraciones interestatales en América Latina y el Caribe. El investigador no recibe fondos de
investigación o recompensas materiales en el estudio.
CONFIDENCIALIDAD
Todos los materiales recopilados de este proceso de entrevista se almacenarán en archivos
protegidos con contraseña y en gabinetes bloqueados. Las grabaciones de voz se transcribirán y
se guardarán con transcripciones electrónicas como archivos protegidos con contraseña. Como
medida adicional de privacidad, las grabaciones de voz se eliminarán cuando se creen las
transcripciones.
CONTACTO
Si tiene preguntas en cualquier momento sobre el estudio o los procedimientos, puede contactar
al investigador, Shiva Mohan en el Departamento de Geografía y Estudios Ambientales,
Universidad Wilfrid Laurier, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada y al teléfono 1 (519) 884-0710 x2160.
Este proyecto ha sido revisado y aprobado por la Junta de Ética de Investigación de la
Universidad (que recibe fondos del Fondo de Apoyo a la Investigación). Si siente que no ha
sido tratado de acuerdo con las descripciones de este formulario, o si sus derechos como
participante en la investigación han sido violados durante el curso de este proyecto, puede
contactar al Dr. Robert Basso, Presidente de la Junta de Ética en Investigación de la Universidad,
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Waterloo, 1 (519) 884-0710 x4994 o rbasso@wlu.ca
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PARTICIPACIÓN
Debe tener 18 años o más para participar en este estudio de investigación. Tu participación en
este estudio es voluntaria; Puede negarse a participar sin penalidad. Si decide participar,
puede retirarse del estudio en cualquier momento sin penalización y sin la pérdida de los
beneficios a los que tiene derecho de otro modo. Si se retira del estudio, se hará todo lo posible
para eliminar sus datos del estudio y hacer que se destruyan. Usted tiene el derecho de omitir
cualquier (s) pregunta (s) / procedimiento (s) que elija.
RETROALIMENTACIÓN Y PUBLICACIÓN
Todos los datos recopilados se agruparán y, a través del análisis, se identificarán las tendencias
generales y las trayectorias. A veces, puede ser útil tener ejemplos concretos de las cosas que se
extraen o se miden. Es posible que extractos breves de las respuestas de los participantes
expliquen o ilustren ciertos conceptos en conferencias o publicaciones. Por supuesto, no habrá
información de identificación, se atribuirán pseudo identificadores al extracto. Sin embargo,
tiene la opción de aceptar realizar esta entrevista, pero se niega a utilizar cualquiera de sus citas.
La publicación principal de los datos recopilados se incluirá en una disertación de doctorado
según los requisitos de la Universidad. Los datos también se pueden usar en publicaciones
como artículos de revistas y presentaciones de conferencias en una fecha futura.
Los hallazgos de la investigación serán comunicados a la persona de contacto que lo hizo
conocer esta entrevista en primera instancia.

CONSENTIMIENTO
He leído y comprendido la información anterior. He recibido una copia de este formulario.
Acepto participar en este estudio.

Firma del participante____________________________________

Fecha _________________

Firma del investigador__________________________________ Fecha _____________________
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Appendix C – Interview Guide
Interview Questions-Guide

•
•

What was your family circumstance in Venezuela, socio-economically and otherwise?
¿Cuál fue su situación familiar en Venezuela, socio-económicamente y de otra
manera?

•
•

What motivated you to leave Venezuela? While thinking about the idea of leaving your
home, what were your intentions in the new country?
¿Qué te motivó a salir de Venezuela? Al pensar en la idea de abandonar su hogar,
¿cuáles eran sus intenciones en el nuevo país?

•
•

Why Trinidad, and not another country or state?
¿Por qué Trinidad, y no otro país o estado?

•
•

By what means did you come to Trinidad? Boat, plane? What was that journey like?
¿De qué manera viniste a Trinidad? Barco, avión? ¿Cómo fue ese viaje?

•
•

What happened when you landed in Trinidad territory? How were you received?
¿Qué pasó cuando aterrizaste en el territorio de Trinidad? ¿Cómo te recibieron?

•
•

What would you say is your status here, now?
¿Cuál dirías que es tu estado aquí, ahora?

•

Have you sought assistance from any official government agencies or agents? What did
you seek assistance for specifically, and how did those interactions end?
¿Ha buscado ayuda de alguna agencia o agente gubernamental oficial? ¿Para qué
buscó ayuda específicamente, y cómo terminaron esas interacciones?

•

•
•

What is your daily life like here in Trinidad? How do you live—support yourself/work?
¿Cómo es tu vida diaria aquí en Trinidad? ¿Cómo vives, te apoyas / trabajas?

•
•

What has the reception and reaction been from locals? Tell me about your experiences.
¿Qué ha sido la recepción y la reacción de los lugareños? Cuéntame sobre tus
experiencias.

•
•

Now that you’re in the country, have your intentions changed? Why?
Ahora que estás en el país, ¿han cambiado tus intenciones? ¿Por qué?
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•
•

Have you been in contact with family? What has their reaction been to your experiences
here?
¿Has estado en contacto con la familia? ¿Cuál ha sido su reacción a tus experiencias
aquí?

•
•

Would you encourage/advise other Venezuelans to come to Trinidad? Why? Why not?
¿Animarías / recomendarías a otros venezolanos que vengan a Trinidad? ¿Por qué?
Por qué no?

•

Do you see yourself residing permanently in Trinidad? If yes, what steps are you taking
towards that end? If no, what are your options/intentions?
¿Te ves residiendo permanentemente en Trinidad? En caso afirmativo, ¿qué pasos
está dando hacia ese fin? Si no, ¿cuáles son tus opciones / intenciones?

•

•
•

Based on your personal experiences, what can the Trinidad government do to assist
Venezuelan persons, given what is happening in Venezuela now?
Con base en sus experiencias personales, ¿qué puede hacer el gobierno de Trinidad
para ayudar a las personas venezolanas, dado lo que está sucediendo en Venezuela
ahora?
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